general community property presumption in California

2015The lender’s intent doctrine “applies [only to] the characterization of loan proceeds obtained during marriage.” (In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 277, 288 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 ].) Charles rebutted the general community property presumption as to the down payment (§ 760), by tracing it to his separate property. ( Gudelj, supra, 41 Cal.2d at pp. 209-211 [husband rebutted presumption of community property as to 3/23 of business interest by tracing down payment to his separate property]; In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 455 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 668 ], disapproved on a

2015The lender’s intent doctrine “applies [only to] the characterization of loan proceeds obtained during marriage.” (In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 277, 288 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 ].) Charles rebutted the general community property presumption as to the down payment (§ 760), by tracing it to his separate property. ( Gudelj, supra, 41 Cal.2d at pp. 209-211 [husband rebutted presumption of community property as to 3/23 of business interest by tracing down payment to his separate property]; In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 455 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 668 ], disapproved on a

2014If he proves that at that time all community income was exhausted by family expenses, he establishes that the property was purchased with separate funds. [Citations.] Only when, through no fault of the husband, it is not possible to ascertain the balance of income and expenditures at the time property was acquired, can recapitulation of the total community expenses and income throughout the marriage be used to establish the character of the property.” (See v. See (1966) 64 Cal.2d 778, 783 ; accord, In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 610-611 ; see In re Marriage of Ficke (2013) 217 Cal

1995(In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 611-612 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 79 , 536 P.2d 479 ].) Since this general community property presumption is not a title presumption, virtually any credible evidence may be used to overcome it, including tracing the asset to a separate property source, showing an agreement or clear understanding between parties regarding ownership status and presenting evidence the item was acquired as a gift.

2021(Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 91 .) Because it “ ‘is not a title presumption, virtually any credible evidence may be used to overcome it, including tracing the asset to a separate property source, showing an agreement or clear understanding between the parties regarding ownership status and presenting evidence the item was acquired as a gift.’ ” (Ibid., fn. omitted; see In re Marriage of Bonvino (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1423 ; In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277 , 289–290 (Haines), questioned on another point in In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1404 .)

2019And the "rents, issues, and profits" of separate property also are separate property, whether earned before, during, or after marriage. (§ 770, subd. (a)(3).) "Except as otherwise provided by statute, neither spouse has any interest in the separate property of the other." (§ 752.) "Thus, there is a general presumption that property acquired during marriage by either spouse other than by gift or inheritance is community property unless traceable to a separate property source. [Citation.] This is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof; hence it can be overcome by the party contes

2019And the "rents, issues, and profits" of separate property also are separate property, whether earned before, during, or after marriage. (§ 770, subd. (a)(3).) "Except as otherwise provided by statute, neither spouse has any interest in the separate property of the other." (§ 752.) "Thus, there is a general presumption that property acquired during marriage by either spouse other than by gift or inheritance is community property unless traceable to a separate property source. [Citation.] This is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof; hence it can be overcome by the party contes

2019And the "rents, issues, and profits" of separate property also are separate property, whether earned before, during, or after marriage. (§ 770, subd. (a)(3).) "Except as otherwise provided by statute, neither spouse has any interest in the separate property of the other." (§ 752.) "Thus, there is a general presumption that property acquired during marriage by either spouse other than by gift or inheritance is community property unless traceable to a separate property source. [Citation.] This is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof; hence it can be overcome by the party contes

2019But if the separate property and community property interests have been commingled in such a manner that the respective contributions cannot *92 be traced and identified, the entire commingled funds will be deemed community property pursuant to the general community property presumption of section 760." ( In re Marriage of Braud (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 797 , 822-823, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 179 ( Braud ); see also In re Marriage of Cochran (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1050 , 1057, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 920 ( Cochran ); Bonvino , supra , 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 754 .) A. Joe's Tracing At trial, Jo

2019But if the separate property and community property interests have been commingled in such a manner that the respective contributions cannot *92 be traced and identified, the entire commingled funds will be deemed community property pursuant to the general community property presumption of section 760." ( In re Marriage of Braud (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 797 , 822-823, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 179 ( Braud ); see also In re Marriage of Cochran (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1050 , 1057, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 920 ( Cochran ); Bonvino , supra , 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423 , 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 754 .) A. Joe's Tracing At trial, Jo

2021(Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 91 .) Because it “ ‘is not a title presumption, virtually any credible evidence may be used to overcome it, including tracing the asset to a separate property source, showing an agreement or clear understanding between the parties regarding ownership status and presenting evidence the item was acquired as a gift.’ ” (Ibid., fn. omitted; see In re Marriage of Bonvino (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1423 ; In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277 , 289–290 (Haines), questioned on another point in In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1404 .)

2021Section 760 provides, “Except as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” 8 status. [Citation.] Since this general community property presumption is not a title presumption, virtually any credible evidence may be used to overcome it, including tracing the asset to a separate property source, showing an agreement or clear understanding between the parties regarding ownership status and presenting evidence the item was acquired as a gift.’” (In re Marria

2021(Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 91 .) Because it “ ‘is not a title presumption, virtually any credible evidence may be used to overcome it, including tracing the asset to a separate property source, showing an agreement or clear understanding between the parties regarding ownership status and presenting evidence the item was acquired as a gift.’ ” (Ibid., fn. omitted; see In re Marriage of Bonvino (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1423 ; In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277 , 289–290 (Haines), questioned on another point in In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1404 .)

2019And the "rents, issues, and profits" of separate property also are separate property, whether earned before, during, or after marriage. (§ 770, subd. (a)(3).) "Except as otherwise provided by statute, neither spouse has any interest in the separate property of the other." (§ 752.) "Thus, there is a general presumption that property acquired during marriage by either spouse other than by gift or inheritance is community property unless traceable to a separate property source. [Citation.] This is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof; hence it can be overcome by the party contes

2016I, § 21.) The characterization of property as community or separate usually depends on when the property was acquired. ( *994 In re Marriage of Rossin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 725 , 732, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 .) Thus, property acquired during marriage is subject to the rebuttable presumption that it is community property. ( Id. at p. 733, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 .) "This is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof; hence it can be overcome by the party contesting community property status. [Citation.] Since this general community property presumption is not a title presumption, virtually a

2016I, § 21.) The characterization of property as community or separate usually depends on when the property was acquired. ( *994 In re Marriage of Rossin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 725 , 732, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 .) Thus, property acquired during marriage is subject to the rebuttable presumption that it is community property. ( Id. at p. 733, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 427 .) "This is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof; hence it can be overcome by the party contesting community property status. [Citation.] Since this general community property presumption is not a title presumption, virtually a

2025Code § 760.) “[T]he mere commingling of separate property and community property funds does not alter the status of the respective property interests, provided that the components of the commingled mass can be adequately traced to their separate property and community property sources. [Citation.] But if the separate property and community property interests have been commingled in such a manner that the respective contributions cannot be traced and identified, the entire commingled fund will be deemed community property pursuant to the general community property presumption of section 760. [C

2023(In re Marriage of Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 822-823.) However, “if the separate property and community property interests have been commingled in such a manner that the respective contributions cannot be traced and identified, the entire commingled fund will be deemed community property pursuant to the general community property presumption of section 760.” (Id. at p. 823.) California case law has long held that the community property presumption applies to property acquired during the marriage from an account or fund in which the spouse has commingled their separate funds with comm

2015The lender’s intent doctrine “applies [only to] the characterization of loan proceeds obtained during marriage.” (In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 277, 288 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 ].) Charles rebutted the general community property presumption as to the down payment (§ 760), by tracing it to his separate property. ( Gudelj, supra, 41 Cal.2d at pp. 209-211 [husband rebutted presumption of community property as to 3/23 of business interest by tracing down payment to his separate property]; In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 455 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 668 ], disapproved on a

2015The lender’s intent doctrine “applies [only to] the characterization of loan proceeds obtained during marriage.” (In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 277, 288 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 ].) Charles rebutted the general community property presumption as to the down payment (§ 760), by tracing it to his separate property. ( Gudelj, supra, 41 Cal.2d at pp. 209-211 [husband rebutted presumption of community property as to 3/23 of business interest by tracing down payment to his separate property]; In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 455 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 668 ], disapproved on a

2015The lender’s intent doctrine “applies [only to] the characterization of loan proceeds obtained during marriage.” (In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 277, 288 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 ].) Charles rebutted the general community property presumption as to the down payment (§ 760), by tracing it to his separate property. ( Gudelj, supra, 41 Cal.2d at pp. 209-211 [husband rebutted presumption of community property as to 3/23 of business interest by tracing down payment to his separate property]; In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 455 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 668 ], disapproved on a

2015The lender’s intent doctrine “applies [only to] the characterization of loan proceeds obtained during marriage.” (In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 277, 288 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 ].) Charles rebutted the general community property presumption as to the down payment (§ 760), by tracing it to his separate property. ( Gudelj, supra, 41 Cal.2d at pp. 209-211 [husband rebutted presumption of community property as to 3/23 of business interest by tracing down payment to his separate property]; In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 455 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 668 ], disapproved on a

2021Hal’s argument that the interest Chi Zen acquired from her sisters was community property relies on section 760, which states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” Section 760 establishes a “ ‘general presumption that property acquired during marriage by either spouse other than by gift or inheritance is community property unless traceable to a separate property source.’ ” (In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 91 (Ci

2021(Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 91 .) Because it “ ‘is not a title presumption, virtually any credible evidence may be used to overcome it, including tracing the asset to a separate property source, showing an agreement or clear understanding between the parties regarding ownership status and presenting evidence the item was acquired as a gift.’ ” (Ibid., fn. omitted; see In re Marriage of Bonvino (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1423 ; In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277 , 289–290 (Haines), questioned on another point in In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1404 .)

2013(Stoll, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 841 , citing and quoting See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 783-784.) The need for specific records and documents to trace funds is thus predicated on the existence of a commingled account.

2013(Stoll, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 841, citing and quoting See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 783-784.) The need for specific records and documents to trace funds is thus predicated on the existence of a commingled account.

2021Standard of Review “The existence and scope of a fiduciary duty is a question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.] However, ‘the factual background against which we [answer that question] is a function of a particular case’s procedural posture.’ [Citation.] Thus, to the extent the court’s decision below ‘turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and review the trial court’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard.’” (I

2021Standard of Review “The existence and scope of a fiduciary duty is a question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.] However, ‘the factual background against which we [answer that question] is a function of a particular case’s procedural posture.’ [Citation.] Thus, to the extent the court’s decision below ‘turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and review the trial court’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard.’” (I

2021Standard of Review “The existence and scope of a fiduciary duty is a question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.] However, ‘the factual background against which we [answer that question] is a function of a particular case’s procedural posture.’ [Citation.] Thus, to the extent the court’s decision below ‘turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and review the trial court’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard.’” (I

2021Standard of Review “The existence and scope of a fiduciary duty is a question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.] However, ‘the factual background against which we [answer that question] is a function of a particular case’s procedural posture.’ [Citation.] Thus, to the extent the court’s decision below ‘turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and review the trial court’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard.’” (I

2021Standard of Review “The existence and scope of a fiduciary duty is a question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.] However, ‘the factual background against which we [answer that question] is a function of a particular case’s procedural posture.’ [Citation.] Thus, to the extent the court’s decision below ‘turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and review the trial court’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard.’” (I

2021Standard of Review “The existence and scope of a fiduciary duty is a question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.] However, ‘the factual background against which we [answer that question] is a function of a particular case’s procedural posture.’ [Citation.] Thus, to the extent the court’s decision below ‘turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and review the trial court’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard.’” (I

2021Standard of Review “The existence and scope of a fiduciary duty is a question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.] However, ‘the factual background against which we [answer that question] is a function of a particular case’s procedural posture.’ [Citation.] Thus, to the extent the court’s decision below ‘turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and review the trial court’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard.’” (I

2021Standard of Review “The existence and scope of a fiduciary duty is a question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.] However, ‘the factual background against which we [answer that question] is a function of a particular case’s procedural posture.’ [Citation.] Thus, to the extent the court’s decision below ‘turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and review the trial court’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard.’” (I

2021Standard of Review “The existence and scope of a fiduciary duty is a question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.] However, ‘the factual background against which we [answer that question] is a function of a particular case’s procedural posture.’ [Citation.] Thus, to the extent the court’s decision below ‘turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and review the trial court’s factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard.’” (I