placement warning in California

2025(Cesar V., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1033 .) [¶] Ideally, the statutory scheme contemplates the Agency has identified and approved the child’s relatives for placement before the dispositional hearing.

2017Like section 361.31, section 361.3—the general statute governing the court's relative placement decision—"gives 'preferential consideration' to a relative request for placement, which means 'that the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated.' (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).)" (Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1033 .) "The Agency is required to assess those relatives seeking placement according to the factors described in section 361.3, subdivision (a) (placement factors) and must document those efforts in the social study prepared

2022(In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1032 .) A. Requests for Assessment Early in the Dependency Grandfather argues the department failed to follow through on their own obligations to have his home evaluated for placement.

2021(In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 .) Father contends his immediate family was never considered for placement even though they requested it.

2024(In re Sarah S. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 274, 285 .) Rather, as both parties recognize, when reunification efforts have ended, the question is whether a change of placement would be in the child’s best interest.

2017(In re Sarah S. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 274, 286 ; see In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 ["when a court has made a custody determination in a dependency proceeding, ' "a reviewing court will not disturb that decision unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations]." ' "].) " 'The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.

2021(Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913 .) The court considered and applied the placement factors and exercised its independent judgment concerning the request for placement.

2020(Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913 .) The court considered and applied the placement factors and exercised its independent judgment concerning the request for placement.

2015(Id. at p. 1028 [placement of clause near signature block does not relate to it being prominently displayed].) “An enrollment form that does not have the required arbitration disclosure prominently displayed on it—in direct contravention of subdivision (b) of section 1363.1—does not substantially comply with that statute.” (Id. at p. 1029; see also Zembsch, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 166–167 [“the failure of Health Net to display its disclosure with the prominence required by the statute casts doubt on whether Zembsch knowingly waived his rights”]; Robertson, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 14

2008(Robertson v. Health Net of California, Inc., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1430 .) To achieve that purpose, the Legislature has mandated that any arbitration requirement be disclosed to the enrollee by displaying the disclosure of that requirement immediately above the signature line on the enrollment form and by doing so “prominently.” This prominence requirement (like the placement requirement) is essential to achieving the legislative purpose, and therefore anything less than actual compliance with the prominence requirement is unacceptable.

1986(Hansen v. Superior Court, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d 823, 829 ; Hernandez v. Temple, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d 286, 290 ; Billings v. Edwards (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 238, 246 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 722 ].) However, cases espousing either view emphasize that the important fact may be whether the party was misled by the placement of the warning.

1986The Hernandez court held that although the statute permits the language of “warning to vary slightly from the language it suggests, the statute’s requirement that the warning be placed at the end of the request portion of the document is unqualified.” ( 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 290 .) Hernandez held that the warning in the middle of the introductory paragraph of a request did not meet the legislative requirement that the warning be placed at the end of the “original request.” The similarity between the instant case and Hernandez in terms of the placement of the warning is persuasive.

2024(In re Daniel C.H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814 , 839.)5 Father first contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by considering the placement factors as to H.I., which he argues is the incorrect legal standard.

2024In the Order, this court found that Price established a prima facie case that the superior court’s continuance of the placement hearing for six months to January 2024 was an excessive period of time following the determination in October of 2022 that conditional release was appropriate, impacting his “significant liberty interest.” (See People v. Superior Court (Karsai) (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 774 ; see also § 6608, subd. (i).) We also stated that, in the interim, the superior court retained the authority to render the matter moot by advancing the hearing date.

2023(In re Joseph T., Jr. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 798 .) The preferential consideration rule applies “[a]t the outset of the case and during the reunification period.” (In re Maria Q. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 577, 591 .) “ ‘Appellate court decisions have consistently held that the relative placement preference applies at least through the family reunification period. [Citations.] During the reunification period, the preference applies regardless of whether a new placement is required or is otherwise being considered by the dependency court.’ ” (Id. at p. 592.) “When considering whether to place t

2023(In re Joseph T., Jr. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 798 .) The preferential consideration rule applies “[a]t the outset of the case and during the reunification period.” (In re Maria Q. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 577, 591 .) “ ‘Appellate court decisions have consistently held that the relative placement preference applies at least through the family reunification period. [Citations.] During the reunification period, the preference applies regardless of whether a new placement is required or is otherwise being considered by the dependency court.’ ” (Id. at p. 592.) “When considering whether to place t

2023Analysis Father relies on In re R.T. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1284 , to argue the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to change Kylie’s placement.

2021To the contrary, “ ‘[a] public entity is not liable for injuries except as provided by statute (§ 815) and . . . section 835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property.’ ” (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129 , italics added, quoting Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829 .) Section 830.8 provides public entities with “a limited immunity” for “exercising their discretion in the placement of warning signs described in the Vehicle Code.” (Kessler v. State

2021Nothing in this section exonerates a public entity or public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by such failure if a signal, sign, marking or device (other than one described in Section 830.4) was necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care.” 41 those described in section 830.428 that “constitute[ ] a concealed trap for those exercising due care, assuming the conditions of its liability under section 835 are otherwis

2021In denying a mistrial, the juvenile court was well within its discretion to conclude that the remedy of appointing new counsel and, in effect, affording her an opportunity to change the children’s legal position or to put on new evidence both adequately protected the children’s interests in the placement hearing, and also virtually eliminated any conceivable impact of Julian’s participation in the contested hearing on the other parties, all of whom were themselves represented by conscientious, competent counsel. “[T]he trial judge, present on the scene, is obviously the best judge of whether a

2021Defendant made a motion pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) after he was found incompetent but before a placement hearing was held and the order of commitment issued.

2021To the contrary, “ ‘[a] public entity is not liable for injuries except as provided by statute (§ 815) and . . . section 835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property.’ ” (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129 , italics added, quoting Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829 .) Section 830.8 provides public entities with “a limited immunity” for “exercising their discretion in the placement of warning signs described in the Vehicle Code.” (Kessler v. State

2021To the contrary, “ ‘[a] public entity is not liable for injuries except as provided by statute (§ 815) and . . . section 835 sets out the exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property.’ ” (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129 , italics added, quoting Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829 .) Section 830.8 provides public entities with “a limited immunity” for “exercising their discretion in the placement of warning signs described in the Vehicle Code.” (Kessler v. State

2017(Saller, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236, fn. 11 .) " ' "[O]rdinary knowledge . . . as to . . . [the product's] characteristics" . . . may permit an inference that the product did not perform as safely as it should.' " (Ibid., quoting from Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 566 .) 21 not overly technical or so complex as to preclude jurors from using their own judgment to determine (1) whether the ordinary consumers of the Subject Lift would have minimum safety assumptions or expectations where the product was being used in a warehouse with pedestrians, and if so (2) whether the Subject Lift's de

2017(Saller, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236, fn. 11 .) " ' "[O]rdinary knowledge . . . as to . . . [the product's] characteristics" . . . may permit an inference that the product did not perform as safely as it should.' " (Ibid., quoting from Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 566 .) 21 not overly technical or so complex as to preclude jurors from using their own judgment to determine (1) whether the ordinary consumers of the Subject Lift would have minimum safety assumptions or expectations where the product was being used in a warehouse with pedestrians, and if so (2) whether the Subject Lift's de

2016While the children’s preference is not the deciding factor under section 361.2, (In re John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1570 ), in light of their adolescent age their preference should be given great weight.

2015(People v. Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 796 ; People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 589 ; People v. Byoune, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 345-346; People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 205 .) Because a new placement hearing will have to be held, defendant’s arguments regarding his removal from the first placement hearing and the order for involuntary medication made at that hearing are moot. 10 DISPOSITION The finding that defendant was incompetent to stand trial is affirmed, but the trial court’s denial of defendant’s request for a continuance to have retained counsel present at the place

2015(People v. Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 796 ; People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 589 ; People v. Byoune, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pp. 345-346; People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 205 .) Because a new placement hearing will have to be held, defendant’s arguments regarding his removal from the first placement hearing and the order for involuntary medication made at that hearing are moot. 10 DISPOSITION The finding that defendant was incompetent to stand trial is affirmed, but the trial court’s denial of defendant’s request for a continuance to have retained counsel present at the place

2015(Id. at p. 1028 [placement of clause near signature block does not relate to it being prominently displayed].) “An enrollment form that does not have the required arbitration disclosure prominently displayed on it—in direct contravention of subdivision (b) of section 1363.1—does not substantially comply with that statute.” (Id. at p. 1029; see also Zembsch, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 166–167 [“the failure of Health Net to display its disclosure with the prominence required by the statute casts doubt on whether Zembsch knowingly waived his rights”]; Robertson, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 14

2015Under these circumstances, the statutory objectives of section 1363.1 have not been met.” (Malek, at p. 73.) The “prominence requirement (like the placement requirement) is essential to achieving the legislative purpose, and therefore anything less than actual compliance with the prominence requirement is unacceptable.” (Burks, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029 .) Moreover, the prominence requirement is viewed separately and in addition to the placement requirement.

2015(People v. Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 465 .) II Denial Of Continuance Defendant contends the denial of a continuance for retained counsel to appear at the placement hearing deprived him of his due process rights.