speculative inquiry in California

2022In juvenile dependency proceedings, due process requires parents 19 be given notice that is reasonably calculated to advise them an action is pending and afford them an opportunity to defend.” (In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1114 .) “‘A parent’s fundamental right to adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard in dependency matters involving potential deprivation of the parental interest [citation] has little if any, value unless that parent is advised of the nature of the hearing giving rise to that opportunity, including what will be decided therein.

2021(See ibid.; In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109 , 1115- 1116 [failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard can be reversible per se].) Accordingly, we conclude the due process violations in this case are reversible per se.

2019Unlike erroneous admission of evidence or improper instructions, which can be reviewed in light of the evidence or instructions as a whole, the impact of having less than the statutorily mandated minimum time within which to (1) confer with one's lawyer, (2) contact witnesses, (3) obtain documents, (4) prepare for examination and cross-examination, and (5) hone one's arguments, is impossible for either a trial court or an appellate court to assess." ( Judith P. , supra , 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 557 , 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 .) Determining prejudice in this context would require "a speculative inquiry

2019Unlike erroneous admission of evidence or improper instructions, which can be reviewed in light of the evidence or instructions as a whole, the impact of having less than the statutorily mandated minimum time within which to (1) confer with one's lawyer, (2) contact witnesses, (3) obtain documents, (4) prepare for examination and cross-examination, and (5) hone one's arguments, is impossible for either a trial court or an appellate court to assess." ( Judith P. , supra , 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 557 , 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 .) Determining prejudice in this context would require "a speculative inquiry

2025If Davis had admitted a felony violation of former section 245, subdivision (a)(1), which was later reduced to a misdemeanor violation at his disposition hearing or at some point thereafter, the assault charge would have become a misdemeanor “for all purposes” from the moment of the reduction onwards. (§ 17, subd. (b); see In re C.H. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1146 [“ ‘[W]hen a wobbler is reduced to a misdemeanor [under section 17], the offense thereafter is deemed a “misdemeanor for all purposes ….” ’ [Citations.] Put differently, redesignation under section 17 makes the wobbler ‘a misdemeano

2025Appellants have cited no authority supporting their notion that an objector’s claim for a potential, future recovery amounts to a “liabilit[y]” that must be reported pursuant to section 1063, subdivision (g).6 On this record, the trial court appropriately overruled Appellants’ objections and approved the Second Account Current.7 6 On the contrary, “an order settling an accounting in a conservatorship proceeding has res judicata effect.” (Knox v. Dean (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 417, 424 ; see also § 2103, subd. (a).) That supports the Public Guardian’s position it would be inappropriate to prematur

2025He alleges that the juvenile court’s primary motivation throughout the proceedings was to increase the county’s financial gain through the “Youth Offender Block Grant.”9 However, he cites to nothing in the record showing he objected on this basis below (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 880-881 [issue not raised below may be forfeited on appeal]; In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293 [same]), nor to any evidence supporting this speculative claim (see People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 113 [rejecting the appellant’s speculative claim as unpersuasive]).

2025(See Estate of McCabe (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 503, 504, 508 ; Purdy v. Johnson (1917) 174 Cal. 521 , 523–525; cf. Clark v. 9 C.

2024Instead of hypothesizing what decision the juvenile court would have made if it had understood the extent of its lawful 11. authority, reviewing courts have consistently held that remand is appropriate in these circumstances.” (Ibid.) The high court also recently expounded upon this standard in People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416 (Salazar).

2024As we note above, in Ford, the defendant and his counsel admittedly had no standing to assert a privilege on behalf of the third parties, and the trial court had no idea if the third parties would elect to waive the privilege. ( Ford, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 440, 442.) Here, in contrast, R.J. received counsel to represent her for the express purpose of protecting her Fifth Amendment interests, which he did after consulting with R.J. personally and conveying her refusal to testify as to certain topics absent a grant of immunity. 14 The way in which this case is factually similar to Ford does no

2023(See Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 934 .) By contrast, where the concern is that no discretionary decision was made, attempting to discern the likelihood of a “more favorable” decision is a more speculative inquiry.

2022(BreakZone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1236 .) Nashed only makes 5. the speculative claim that Harwell “may have harbored some ill will” against him.

2022In Iverson, the case cited by Blackburn, the court noted that a landlord may recover the “loss of rental” during any repair period. ( Iverson, supra, at p. 308 , italics added.) It follows that to the extent there was no loss of rental because no new tenant intended to occupy the building, Blackburn could not recover any damages premised on a speculative claim to rent.

2022The relevant inquiry, according to the Court of Appeal, was whether there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson)) if Father had been present at the March 2018 hearing or had been represented by counsel.

2021“Determining prejudice in this context would require ‘a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.’ ” (Severson & Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry- Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 951 .) We simply cannot know what impact this failure had on the proceedings.

2021But plausible conjectures are far from sufficient to “necessarily dispel any inference of bias,” such that “ ‘there is no longer any suspicion . . . of discrimination in th[e] strike[].’ ” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 384 , italics added.) II.

2020Right to notice and right to appear “Due process requires that a parent is entitled to notice that is reasonably calculated to apprise him or her of the dependency proceedings and afford him or her an opportunity to object. [Citation.] The child welfare agency must act with diligence to locate a missing parent. [Citation.] Reasonable diligence denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and an inquiry conducted in good faith.” (In re Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 188 .) When a parent is not present at the detention hearing, the notice of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing mus

2019(See Conservatorship of Kevin M. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 79, 91 .) 13 time within which to (1) confer with one’s lawyer, (2) contact witnesses, (3) obtain documents, (4) prepare for examination and cross-examination, and (5) hone one’s arguments, is impossible for either a trial court or an appellate court to assess.” (Judith P., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 557 .) Determining prejudice in this context would require “a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” (United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 150 ; see In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901,

2012The trial judge in Sullivan had read to the jury an instruction similar to the one given in Cage v. Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S. 39 [ 112 L.Ed.2d 339 , 111 S.Ct. 328 ], which defined the reasonable doubt standard by referring to “ ‘grave uncertainty’ ” and “ ‘substantial doubt,’ ” terms that effectively and improperly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof.

2012The trial judge in Sullivan had read to the jury an instruction similar to the one given in Cage v. Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S. 39 [ 112 L.Ed.2d 339 , 111 S.Ct. 328 ], which defined the reasonable doubt standard by referring to “ ‘grave uncertainty’ ” and “ ‘substantial doubt,’ ” terms that effectively and improperly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof.

2012In holding that the constitutional violation was “structural,” the court emphasized that the consequences of that error were “ ‘necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.’ ” (Id. at p. 150.) Noting the myriad ways that representation might have proceeded had the trial court not erroneously disqualified the defendant’s chosen attorney, the court observed that conducting a harmless error analysis of that error “would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” (Ibid.) The high court had relied on similar reasoning in Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S.

2012In holding that the constitutional violation was “structural,” the court emphasized that the consequences of that error were “ ‘necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.’ ” (Id. at p. 150.) Noting the myriad ways that representation might have proceeded had the trial court not erroneously disqualified the defendant’s chosen attorney, the court observed that conducting a harmless error analysis of that error “would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” (Ibid.) The high court had relied on similar reasoning in Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S.