capacity to understand warning in Connecticut

2010Thus, in the present case, we consider the foregoing factors, along with “the [child’s] age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he [or she] has the capacity to understand the warnings given him [or her], the nature of [the child’s] [f]ifth [a]mendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 , 99 S. Ct. 2560 , 61 L.

2010Thus, in the present case, we consider the foregoing factors, along with “the [child’s] age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he [or she] has the capacity to understand the warnings given him [or her], the nature of [the child’s] [f]ifth [a]mendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 , 99 S. Ct. 2560 , 61 L.

2006Furthermore, [a] defendant’s express written and oral waiver is strong proof that the waiver is valid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 72-73 , 782 A.2d 149 (2001), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001).

2002Furthermore, [a] defendant’s express written and oral waiver is strong proof that the waiver is valid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 72-73 , 782 A.2d 149 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001).

2006Furthermore, [a] defendant’s express written and oral waiver is strong proof that the waiver is valid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 72-73 , 782 A.2d 149 (2001), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001).

2002Furthermore, [a] defendant’s express written and oral waiver is strong proof that the waiver is valid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 72-73 , 782 A.2d 149 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001).

2006Furthermore, [a] defendant’s express written and oral waiver is strong proof that the waiver is valid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 72-73 , 782 A.2d 149 (2001), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001).

2006Furthermore, [a] defendant’s express written and oral waiver is strong proof that the waiver is valid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 65 Conn. App. 59, 72-73 , 782 A.2d 149 (2001), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 923 , 782 A.2d 1251 (2001).

2006“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2006“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2006“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2006“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2006“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2006“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2006“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2006“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2001In ascertaining the voluntariness of the waiver by a juvenile of his Miranda rights, a court should inquire into the" `juvenile's age, experience, education, background and intelligence and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings give him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.' " State v. Whitaker , 215 Conn. 739 , 754 , 578 A.2d 1031 (1990), quoting Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 725 , 99 S.Ct. 21560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); see also State v. Perez , supra, 218 Conn. 714 , 728 .

2001In ascertaining the voluntariness of the waiver by a juvenile of his Miranda rights, a court should inquire into the" `juvenile's age, experience, education, background and intelligence and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings give him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.' " State v. Whitaker , 215 Conn. 739 , 754 , 578 A.2d 1031 (1990), quoting Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 725 , 99 S.Ct. 21560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); see also State v. Perez , supra, 218 Conn. 714 , 728 .

2003Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings ... his level of intelligence, including his IQ ... his age ... his level of education . . . his vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given . . . intoxication . . . his emotional state . . . and the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jacques, 53 Conn. App. 507, 514-1

2003Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings ... his level of intelligence, including his IQ ... his age ... his level of education . . . his vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given . . . intoxication . . . his emotional state . . . and the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jacques, 53 Conn. App. 507, 514-1

2000Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings . . . his level of intelligence, including his IQ . . . his age . . . his level of education . . . his vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given . . . intoxication ... his emotional state . . . and the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fernandez,

2000Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings . . . his level of intelligence, including his IQ . . . his age . . . his level of education . . . his vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given . . . intoxication ... his emotional state . . . and the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fernandez,

2001Furthermore, [a] defendant’s express written and oral waiver is strong proof that the waiver is valid.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lewis, 60 Conn. App. 219, 244-45 , 759 A.2d 518 , cert, denied, 255 Conn. 906 , 762 A.2d 911 (2000); State v. Fernandez, 52 Conn. App. 599, 610-11, 728 A.2d 1 , cert, denied, 249 Conn. 913 , 733 A.2d 229 , cert, denied, 528 U.S. 939 , 120 S. Ct. 348 , 145 L.

2000Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings . . . his level of intelligence, including his IQ . . . his age . . . his level of education . . . his vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given . . . intoxication ... his emotional state . . . and the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fernandez,

2001Furthermore, [a] defendant’s express written and oral waiver is strong proof that the waiver is valid.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lewis, 60 Conn. App. 219, 244-45 , 759 A.2d 518 , cert, denied, 255 Conn. 906 , 762 A.2d 911 (2000); State v. Fernandez, 52 Conn. App. 599, 610-11, 728 A.2d 1 , cert, denied, 249 Conn. 913 , 733 A.2d 229 , cert, denied, 528 U.S. 939 , 120 S. Ct. 348 , 145 L.

2000Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings . . . his level of intelligence, including his IQ . . . his age . . . his level of education . . . his vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given . . . intoxication ... his emotional state . . . and the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fernandez,

1987Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings; Fare v. Michael C., supra, 726; State v. Alfonso, supra, 630-31 ; People v. Medina, 71 Ill. 2d 254, 259 , 375 N.E.2d 78 (1978); his level of intelligence, including his IQ; Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972); State v. Benoit, 440 So. 2d 129, 131 (La. 1983); Matter of Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 512-13 (Minn. 1979); his age; Fare v. Michael C., supra; Ma

1987Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings; Fare v. Michael C., supra, 726; State v. Alfonso, supra, 630-31 ; People v. Medina, 71 Ill. 2d 254, 259 , 375 N.E.2d 78 (1978); his level of intelligence, including his IQ; Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972); State v. Benoit, 440 So. 2d 129, 131 (La. 1983); Matter of Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 512-13 (Minn. 1979); his age; Fare v. Michael C., supra; Ma

1987App. 1978); his level of education; Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742 , 86 S. Ct. 1761 , 16 L.

1987App. 1978); his level of education; Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742 , 86 S. Ct. 1761 , 16 L.

1987Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings; Fare v. Michael C., supra, 726; State v. Alfonso, supra, 630-31 ; People v. Medina, 71 Ill. 2d 254, 259 , 375 N.E.2d 78 (1978); his level of intelligence, including his IQ; Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972); State v. Benoit, 440 So. 2d 129, 131 (La. 1983); Matter of Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 512-13 (Minn. 1979); his age; Fare v. Michael C., supra; Ma

1986Factors ■ which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings; Fare v. Michael C., supra, 726; State v. Alfonso, supra, 630-31 ; People v. Medina, 71 Ill. 2d 254, 259 , 375 N.E.2d 78 (1978); his level of intelligence, including his IQ; Cooper v. Griffin, 455 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972); State v. Benoit, 440 So. 2d 129, 131 (La. 1983); Matter of Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 512-13 (Minn. 1979); his age; Fare v. Michael C., supra;

2025Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 , 50–51, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 , 124 S. Ct. 1614 , 1

2025Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 , 50–51, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 , 124 S. Ct. 1614 , 1

2025Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 , 50–51, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 , 124 S. Ct. 1614 , 1

2025Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 , 50–51, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 , 124 S. Ct. 1614 , 1

2025Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 , 50–51, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 , 124 S. Ct. 1614 , 1

2008Fare v. Michael C., [ 442 U.S. 707, 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perez, 218 Conn. 714, 725 , 591 A.2d 119 (1991). [1] The respondent was charged with reckless burning in violation of General Statutes § 53a-114, breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181, making a false statement in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-157b, reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64 and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes §

2008Fare v. Michael C., [ 442 U.S. 707, 725 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perez, 218 Conn. 714, 725 , 591 A.2d 119 (1991). [1] The respondent was charged with reckless burning in violation of General Statutes § 53a-114, breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181, making a false statement in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-157b, reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64 and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes §

2004“Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings ... his level of intelligence, including his IQ . . . his age ... his level of education ... his vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given . . . intoxication . . . his emotional state . . . and the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 76 Conn. App. 91, 100 ,

2004“Factors which may be considered by the trial court in determining whether an individual had the capacity to understand the warnings include the defendant’s experience with the police and familiarity with the warnings ... his level of intelligence, including his IQ . . . his age ... his level of education ... his vocabulary and ability to read and write in the language in which the warnings were given . . . intoxication . . . his emotional state . . . and the existence of any mental disease, disorder or retardation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 76 Conn. App. 91, 100 ,