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5 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Paul v. Stategreen1 sentence2024“To the extent that section 775.021(1) expresses the rule of lenity, it is ‘a canon of last resort and only applies if the statute remains ambiguous after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction.’” Schmidt v. State, 310 So. 3d 135 , 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (Winokur, J., concurring) (quoting Paul v. State, 129 So. 3d 1058, 1064 (Fla. 2013)). | 1 | 1 |
G.S. v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See § 985.26(2) (“A child may not be held in ... detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days ....” (emphasis added)); § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (holding that penal statutes “shall be strictly construed” and that any ambiguities “shall be construed most favorably to the accused”); see also A.M.P. v. State, 927 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (applying rule of lenity in section 775.021(1) in juvenile case); G.S. v. State, 761 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (applying strict construction provision of section 775.021(1) in juvenile case). | 1 | 1 |
A.M.P. v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See § 985.26(2) (“A child may not be held in ... detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days ....” (emphasis added)); § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (holding that penal statutes “shall be strictly construed” and that any ambiguities “shall be construed most favorably to the accused”); see also A.M.P. v. State, 927 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (applying rule of lenity in section 775.021(1) in juvenile case); G.S. v. State, 761 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (applying strict construction provision of section 775.021(1) in juvenile case). | 1 | 1 |
Gordon v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Section 775.021(4) eschews the rule of lenity, which compels strict construction of criminal statutes in favor of the accused, [1] by requiring that separate crimes committed in the course of one criminal episode be punished separately. § 775.021(4), Fla. Stat (2005); see also Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17, 24 (Fla.2001) ("Subsequently, the Legislature amended section 775.021, explicitly enunciating its intent that crimes be separately punished without regard to the rule of lenity."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Corbett
green
2 sentences2017The rule “that criminal statutes must be strictly construed does not require that the words of an enactment be given their narrowest meaning or that the lawmaker’s evident intent be disregarded.” United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 , 57 S.Ct. 340 , 81 L.Ed. 493 (1937) (citing United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 242 , 30 S.Ct. 81 , 54 L.Ed. 173 (1909)). 2017The rule “that criminal statutes must be strictly construed does not require that the words of an enactment be given their narrowest meaning or that the lawmaker’s evident intent be disregarded.” United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 , 57 S.Ct. 340 , 81 L.Ed. 493 (1937) (citing United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 242 , 30 S.Ct. 81 , 54 L.Ed. 173 (1909)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Giles
green
2 sentences2017The rule “that criminal statutes must be strictly construed does not require that the words of an enactment be given their narrowest meaning or that the lawmaker’s evident intent be disregarded.” United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 , 57 S.Ct. 340 , 81 L.Ed. 493 (1937) (citing United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 242 , 30 S.Ct. 81 , 54 L.Ed. 173 (1909)). 2017The rule “that criminal statutes must be strictly construed does not require that the words of an enactment be given their narrowest meaning or that the lawmaker’s evident intent be disregarded.” United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 , 57 S.Ct. 340 , 81 L.Ed. 493 (1937) (citing United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 242 , 30 S.Ct. 81 , 54 L.Ed. 173 (1909)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Carawan v. State
red
1 sentence1988It simply explains the meaning of 775.021(4)(a) and lists the only three instances where an offense may be treated as a lesser included offense, i.e., an offense which is not separate from the charged greater offense and not subject to separate conviction and separate punishment. [2] In Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987), we relied on a perceived distinction between "act" and "acts" and the rule of lenity in § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1985), to hold that the legislature did not intend separate convictions and separate sentences for two separate offenses as stated in § 775.021(4), Fla. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.