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5 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2019–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
HERON LAKE II APARTMENTS, LP v. LOWNDES COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORSgreen2 sentences2025This is so, we explained, “because [the statutory provision] does not altogether preclude tax assessors from considering [Section 42 tax credits] as part of the fair market value of Section 42 properties.” Id. at 825. 2025As we explained, OCGA § 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(II) “define[s] the contours” of “the income approach” by “tell[ing] tax assessors how they can use the . . . income approach[ ] in determining the fair market value of Section 42 properties.” Heron Lake Two, 306 Ga. at 821, 824 (emphasis added). | 4 | 4 |
HERON LAKE II APARTMENTS, L.P. v. LOWNDES COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORSgreen2 sentences2025In Heron Lake One, we addressed the constitutionality of OCGA § 48-5-2(3)(B.1), which expressly prohibited tax assessors from considering Section 42 tax credits in determining the fair market value of Section 42 properties.4 See Heron Lake One, 299 Ga. at 598 . 2019As such, we decline to read OCGA § 48-5- 2 (3) (B) (vii) (II)’s phrase “actual income” to include LIHTCs, because they merely reduce investors’ individual tax liabilities.5 Our conclusion that LIHTCs do not constitute “actual income” for the purpose of OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B) (vii) (II) is consistent with the persuasive reasoning of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U. S. 647 ( 106 SCt 3143 , 92 LE2d 525) (1986), and the function of the particular tax credits at 5 Although we have previously stated that these tax credits “are an item of value” with respec | 2 | 3 |
Gateway Pines Hahira, Lp v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessorsgreen2 sentences2025Gateway Pines Hahira, 372 Ga. App. at 711 (citations and punctuation omitted). 2025R. & Regs., r. 560-11-10-.09(4)(c). precedent established in Freedom Heights, LP v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors, 369 Ga. App. 725 (2023), the Court of Appeals in this case concluded that our precedent regarding OCGA § 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(II) (a statute that addresses how Section 42 tax credits may be considered under the income approach)3 compelled it to conclude that, “as [Section 42 tax credits] are currently structured, tax assessors may not use the income approach in determining the fair market value of Section 42 properties.” Gateway Pines Hahira, LP v. Lowndes County Bd. of Tax A | 1 | 1 |
Freedom Heights, Lp v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessorsgreen2 sentences2025The Court of Appeals in Freedom Heights therefore erred in concluding that, “as [Section 42 tax credits] are currently structured, 21 tax assessors may not use the income approach in determining the fair market value of Section 42 properties.” Freedom Heights, 369 Ga. App. at 730. 2025R. & Regs., r. 560-11-10-.09(4)(c). precedent established in Freedom Heights, LP v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors, 369 Ga. App. 725 (2023), the Court of Appeals in this case concluded that our precedent regarding OCGA § 48-5-2(3)(B)(vii)(II) (a statute that addresses how Section 42 tax credits may be considered under the income approach)3 compelled it to conclude that, “as [Section 42 tax credits] are currently structured, tax assessors may not use the income approach in determining the fair market value of Section 42 properties.” Gateway Pines Hahira, LP v. Lowndes County Bd. of Tax A | 1 | 1 |
STILLWATER HOUSING ASSOCIATES v. Rosegreen1 sentence2019See, e.g., Cottonwood Affordable Housing v. Yavapai County, 72 P3d 357, 359 (Ariz. Tax Ct. 2003) (stating that LIHTCs “are not income flowing from the rental of the property”); Stillwater Housing Assoc. v. Rose, 254 P3d 726, 728 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. 2011) (holding that LIHTCs are not income and do not replace income). 17 considering LIHTCs when calculating the fair market value of Section 42 properties. | 1 | 1 |
Cottonwood Affordable Housing v. Yavapai Countygreen1 sentence2019See, e.g., Cottonwood Affordable Housing v. Yavapai County, 72 P3d 357, 359 (Ariz. Tax Ct. 2003) (stating that LIHTCs “are not income flowing from the rental of the property”); Stillwater Housing Assoc. v. Rose, 254 P3d 726, 728 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App. 2011) (holding that LIHTCs are not income and do not replace income). 17 considering LIHTCs when calculating the fair market value of Section 42 properties. | 1 | 1 |
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilkgreen2 sentences2019Corp. v. Loudermilk, 305 Ga. 558, 562 (1) ( 826 SE2d 116 ) (2019) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2019Corp. v. Loudermilk, 305 Ga. 558, 562 (1) ( 826 SE2d 116 ) (2019) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bainbridge Limited Lp v. Dekalb County Tax Assessors
neutral
1 sentence2024Bainbridge Ltd. v. DeKalb County Tax Assessors, 362 Ga. App. 654 , 657-658 (1) ( 869 SE2d 606 ) (2022). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Randall v. Loftsgaarden
green
2 sentences2019As such, we decline to read OCGA § 48-5- 2 (3) (B) (vii) (II)’s phrase “actual income” to include LIHTCs, because they merely reduce investors’ individual tax liabilities.5 Our conclusion that LIHTCs do not constitute “actual income” for the purpose of OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B) (vii) (II) is consistent with the persuasive reasoning of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U. S. 647 ( 106 SCt 3143 , 92 LE2d 525) (1986), and the function of the particular tax credits at 5 Although we have previously stated that these tax credits “are an item of value” with respec 2019As such, we decline to read OCGA § 48-5- 2 (3) (B) (vii) (II)’s phrase “actual income” to include LIHTCs, because they merely reduce investors’ individual tax liabilities.5 Our conclusion that LIHTCs do not constitute “actual income” for the purpose of OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B) (vii) (II) is consistent with the persuasive reasoning of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U. S. 647 ( 106 SCt 3143 , 92 LE2d 525) (1986), and the function of the particular tax credits at 5 Although we have previously stated that these tax credits “are an item of value” with respec | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.