Your MCP token and copy-and-paste setup for Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor and the rest are on the install page — filled in with your real credentials while you are signed in.
Delete my account: email [email protected] and it is done by hand, usually the same day. (Self-serve deletion is not built yet.)
Free, and it takes a minute. A syfert.com account skips the bot checks on search and case pages, keeps your details and plan under the account icon, and comes with an MCP token for Claude, ChatGPT or any MCP-capable assistant — emailed to you with setup instructions, and always available under that icon.
Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
34 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1944–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Foskey v. Foskeygreen2 sentences1997Assuming that the trial court mistakenly used the word “impeached” in place of “unimpeached,” we are persuaded that this is a case in which the presumption of harm which arises from a charging error (see Foskey v. Foskey, 257 Ga. 736 (2) ( 363 SE2d 547 ) (1988)) is overcome by a review of the record as a whole. 1997Assuming that the trial court mistakenly used the word “impeached” in place of “unimpeached,” we are persuaded that this is a case in which the presumption of harm which arises from a charging error (see Foskey v. Foskey, 257 Ga. 736 (2) ( 363 SE2d 547 ) (1988)) is overcome by a review of the record as a whole. | 3 | 7 |
Shaw v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Foskey v. Foskey, 257 Ga. 736, 737 (2) ( 363 SE2d 547 ) (1988); Shaw, supra at 759 (1). 2017See Edwards, supra; Shaw, supra at 758 (1). 8 A charging error is presumed to be prejudicial and harmful unless the record shows that it was harmless. | 2 | 2 |
Rivers v. Stategreen2 sentences2013When such a charging error occurs, “a rebuttable presumption arises that the charge is prejudicial and harmful, and this Court must so hold unless it appears from the entire record that the error is harmless.” Id. at 712-713 (1) (b). 2013When such a charging error occurs, “a rebuttable presumption arises that the charge is prejudicial and harmful, and this Court must so hold unless it appears from the entire record that the error is harmless.” Id. at 712-713 (1) (b). | 2 | 2 |
Ross v. Stategreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Gavin v. Vasquez, 261 Ga. 568, 570 ( 407 SE2d 756 ); Timmers Chevrolet v. Dept. of Transp., 261 Ga. 270, 271 (2) ( 404 SE2d 121 ); Pouncey v. Adams, 206 Ga. App. 126, 127 ( 424 SE2d 376 ); Ross v. State, 192 Ga. App. 850, 851 (4) ( 386 SE2d 721 ). 1995See, e.g., Gavin v. Vasquez, 261 Ga. 568, 570 ( 407 SE2d 756 ); Timmers Chevrolet v. Dept. of Transp., 261 Ga. 270, 271 (2) ( 404 SE2d 121 ); Pouncey v. Adams, 206 Ga. App. 126, 127 ( 424 SE2d 376 ); Ross v. State, 192 Ga. App. 850, 851 (4) ( 386 SE2d 721 ). | 2 | 2 |
Whatley v. Stategreen2 sentences1992“Having elected to take immediate exception to a portion of the charges at trial, rather than reserving a right to except or object to all charges until motion for new trial or on appeal, appellant waived his right to assert a charging error on appeal to the remaining portion of the charges to which he did not so object or except.” Grissett v. State, 199 Ga. App. 547 (1) ( 405 SE2d 542 ), citing Whatley v. State, 196 Ga. App. 73, 76 (2) ( 395 SE2d 582 ). 1992“Having elected to take immediate exception to a portion of the charges at trial, rather than reserving a right to except or object to all charges until motion for new trial or on appeal, appellant waived his right to assert a charging error on appeal to the remaining portion of the charges to which he did not so object or except.” Grissett v. State, 199 Ga. App. 547 (1) ( 405 SE2d 542 ), citing Whatley v. State, 196 Ga. App. 73, 76 (2) ( 395 SE2d 582 ). | 2 | 2 |
Talton v. Stategreen2 sentences2024He had to defend himself.” 11 he argues that the reversal of the appellant’s aggravated assault conviction in Talton v. State, 254 Ga. App. 111, 112-13 (1) (561 SE2d 139) (2002), based on a similar charging error should control here. 2024He had to defend himself.” 11 he argues that the reversal of the appellant’s aggravated assault conviction in Talton v. State, 254 Ga. App. 111, 112-13 (1) (561 SE2d 139) (2002), based on a similar charging error should control here. | 1 | 2 |
Hampton v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Hampton v. State, 302 Ga. 166, 168-69 (2) (805 SE2d 902) (2017) (observing that the harm element of plain error and the prejudice element of Strickland are equivalent). 2024See Hampton v. State, 302 Ga. 166, 168-69 (2) (805 SE2d 902) (2017) (observing that the harm element of plain error and the prejudice element of Strickland are equivalent). | 1 | 1 |
Wooten v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Wooten v. State , 240 Ga. App. 725 , 726, 524 S.E.2d 776 (1999) ; United States v. Italiano , 894 F.2d 1280 , 1282 (11th Cir. 1990). 2018See Wooten v. State , 240 Ga. App. 725 , 726, 524 S.E.2d 776 (1999) ; United States v. Italiano , 894 F.2d 1280 , 1282 (11th Cir. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Thrash v. Rahngreen2 sentences2010Following the conclusion of the jury charge, Thompson objected to the foregoing charge without specifying the grounds. *261 To preserve appellate review of a charging error, “an objection must clearly direct the attention of the trial court to the claimed error and must be stated with sufficient particularity to leave no doubt as to the specific ground upon which the charge is challenged[.]” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Thrash v. Rahn, 249 Ga. App. 351, 353 (4) ( 547 SE2d 694 ) (2001). 2010Following the conclusion of the jury charge, Thompson objected to the foregoing charge without specifying the grounds. *261 To preserve appellate review of a charging error, “an objection must clearly direct the attention of the trial court to the claimed error and must be stated with sufficient particularity to leave no doubt as to the specific ground upon which the charge is challenged[.]” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Thrash v. Rahn, 249 Ga. App. 351, 353 (4) ( 547 SE2d 694 ) (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Nixon v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Clemmons v. State, 282 Ga. App. 261, 264 (2) ( 638 SE2d 409 ) (2006) (child’s testimony and hospital examination revealing physical conditions consistent with sexual abuse provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in child molestation case); Crosby v. State, 240 Ga. App. 84, 85 (1) ( 522 SE2d 571 ) (1999) (victim’s testimony and physician’s examination provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in incest case); Nixon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 797, 799-800 (1) ( 507 SE2d 833 ) (1998) (testimony of multiple grandchildren and physician’s findings after a physical examination of one child provided ove 2009See Clemmons v. State, 282 Ga. App. 261, 264 (2) ( 638 SE2d 409 ) (2006) (child’s testimony and hospital examination revealing physical conditions consistent with sexual abuse provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in child molestation case); Crosby v. State, 240 Ga. App. 84, 85 (1) ( 522 SE2d 571 ) (1999) (victim’s testimony and physician’s examination provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in incest case); Nixon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 797, 799-800 (1) ( 507 SE2d 833 ) (1998) (testimony of multiple grandchildren and physician’s findings after a physical examination of one child provided ove | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Clemmons v. State, 282 Ga. App. 261, 264 (2) ( 638 SE2d 409 ) (2006) (child’s testimony and hospital examination revealing physical conditions consistent with sexual abuse provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in child molestation case); Crosby v. State, 240 Ga. App. 84, 85 (1) ( 522 SE2d 571 ) (1999) (victim’s testimony and physician’s examination provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in incest case); Nixon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 797, 799-800 (1) ( 507 SE2d 833 ) (1998) (testimony of multiple grandchildren and physician’s findings after a physical examination of one child provided ove 2009See Clemmons v. State, 282 Ga. App. 261, 264 (2) ( 638 SE2d 409 ) (2006) (child’s testimony and hospital examination revealing physical conditions consistent with sexual abuse provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in child molestation case); Crosby v. State, 240 Ga. App. 84, 85 (1) ( 522 SE2d 571 ) (1999) (victim’s testimony and physician’s examination provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in incest case); Nixon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 797, 799-800 (1) ( 507 SE2d 833 ) (1998) (testimony of multiple grandchildren and physician’s findings after a physical examination of one child provided ove | 1 | 1 |
Clemmons v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Clemmons v. State, 282 Ga. App. 261, 264 (2) ( 638 SE2d 409 ) (2006) (child’s testimony and hospital examination revealing physical conditions consistent with sexual abuse provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in child molestation case); Crosby v. State, 240 Ga. App. 84, 85 (1) ( 522 SE2d 571 ) (1999) (victim’s testimony and physician’s examination provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in incest case); Nixon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 797, 799-800 (1) ( 507 SE2d 833 ) (1998) (testimony of multiple grandchildren and physician’s findings after a physical examination of one child provided ove 2009See Clemmons v. State, 282 Ga. App. 261, 264 (2) ( 638 SE2d 409 ) (2006) (child’s testimony and hospital examination revealing physical conditions consistent with sexual abuse provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in child molestation case); Crosby v. State, 240 Ga. App. 84, 85 (1) ( 522 SE2d 571 ) (1999) (victim’s testimony and physician’s examination provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in incest case); Nixon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 797, 799-800 (1) ( 507 SE2d 833 ) (1998) (testimony of multiple grandchildren and physician’s findings after a physical examination of one child provided ove | 1 | 1 |
Crosby v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Clemmons v. State, 282 Ga. App. 261, 264 (2) ( 638 SE2d 409 ) (2006) (child’s testimony and hospital examination revealing physical conditions consistent with sexual abuse provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in child molestation case); Crosby v. State, 240 Ga. App. 84, 85 (1) ( 522 SE2d 571 ) (1999) (victim’s testimony and physician’s examination provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in incest case); Nixon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 797, 799-800 (1) ( 507 SE2d 833 ) (1998) (testimony of multiple grandchildren and physician’s findings after a physical examination of one child provided ove 2009See Clemmons v. State, 282 Ga. App. 261, 264 (2) ( 638 SE2d 409 ) (2006) (child’s testimony and hospital examination revealing physical conditions consistent with sexual abuse provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in child molestation case); Crosby v. State, 240 Ga. App. 84, 85 (1) ( 522 SE2d 571 ) (1999) (victim’s testimony and physician’s examination provided overwhelming evidence of guilt in incest case); Nixon v. State, 234 Ga. App. 797, 799-800 (1) ( 507 SE2d 833 ) (1998) (testimony of multiple grandchildren and physician’s findings after a physical examination of one child provided ove | 1 | 1 |
Bernoudy v. Stategreen2 sentences2001See Bernoudy v. State, 245 Ga.App. 489 (2), 538 S.E.2d 150 (2000); Cowan v. State, 243 Ga.App. 388 (7), 531 S.E.2d 785 (2000). 2001See Bernoudy v. State, 245 Ga.App. 489 (2), 538 S.E.2d 150 (2000); Cowan v. State, 243 Ga.App. 388 (7), 531 S.E.2d 785 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Brewton v. Stategreen2 sentences1998However, where, as here, the charging error was a substantial misstatement of the essential elements of the offense, it is reviewable as a “substantial error . . . harmful as a matter of law.” OCGA § 5-5-24 (c); Brewton v. State, 216 Ga. App. 346, 351 (6) ( 454 SE2d 558 ) (1995), rev’d on other grounds, 266 Ga. 160 ( 465 SE2d 688 ) (1996). 1998However, where, as here, the charging error was a substantial misstatement of the essential elements of the offense, it is reviewable as a “substantial error . . . harmful as a matter of law.” OCGA § 5-5-24 (c); Brewton v. State, 216 Ga. App. 346, 351 (6) ( 454 SE2d 558 ) (1995), rev’d on other grounds, 266 Ga. 160 ( 465 SE2d 688 ) (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Roura v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Such error occurs when the charge “ Tails to provide the jury with proper guidelines for determining guilt or innocence.’ [Cit.]” Roura v. State, 214 Ga. App. 43, 45-46 (2) (b) ( 447 SE2d 52 ) (1994). 1998Such error occurs when the charge “ Tails to provide the jury with proper guidelines for determining guilt or innocence.’ [Cit.]” Roura v. State, 214 Ga. App. 43, 45-46 (2) (b) ( 447 SE2d 52 ) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Timmers Chevrolet, Inc. v. Department of Transportationgreen | 1 | 1 |
Toth v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Toth v. State, 213 Ga. App. 247, 251 (7) ( 444 SE2d 159 ) (1994); Tibbs v. State, 211 Ga. App. 250, 252 (3) ( 438 SE2d 706 ) (1993). 1995Toth v. State, 213 Ga. App. 247, 251 (7) ( 444 SE2d 159 ) (1994); Tibbs v. State, 211 Ga. App. 250, 252 (3) ( 438 SE2d 706 ) (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Gavin v. Vasquezgreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Gavin v. Vasquez, 261 Ga. 568, 570 ( 407 SE2d 756 ); Timmers Chevrolet v. Dept. of Transp., 261 Ga. 270, 271 (2) ( 404 SE2d 121 ); Pouncey v. Adams, 206 Ga. App. 126, 127 ( 424 SE2d 376 ); Ross v. State, 192 Ga. App. 850, 851 (4) ( 386 SE2d 721 ). 1995See, e.g., Gavin v. Vasquez, 261 Ga. 568, 570 ( 407 SE2d 756 ); Timmers Chevrolet v. Dept. of Transp., 261 Ga. 270, 271 (2) ( 404 SE2d 121 ); Pouncey v. Adams, 206 Ga. App. 126, 127 ( 424 SE2d 376 ); Ross v. State, 192 Ga. App. 850, 851 (4) ( 386 SE2d 721 ). | 1 | 1 |
Pouncey v. Adamsgreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Gavin v. Vasquez, 261 Ga. 568, 570 ( 407 SE2d 756 ); Timmers Chevrolet v. Dept. of Transp., 261 Ga. 270, 271 (2) ( 404 SE2d 121 ); Pouncey v. Adams, 206 Ga. App. 126, 127 ( 424 SE2d 376 ); Ross v. State, 192 Ga. App. 850, 851 (4) ( 386 SE2d 721 ). 1995See, e.g., Gavin v. Vasquez, 261 Ga. 568, 570 ( 407 SE2d 756 ); Timmers Chevrolet v. Dept. of Transp., 261 Ga. 270, 271 (2) ( 404 SE2d 121 ); Pouncey v. Adams, 206 Ga. App. 126, 127 ( 424 SE2d 376 ); Ross v. State, 192 Ga. App. 850, 851 (4) ( 386 SE2d 721 ). | 1 | 1 |
Tibbs v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Toth v. State, 213 Ga. App. 247, 251 (7) ( 444 SE2d 159 ) (1994); Tibbs v. State, 211 Ga. App. 250, 252 (3) ( 438 SE2d 706 ) (1993). 1995Toth v. State, 213 Ga. App. 247, 251 (7) ( 444 SE2d 159 ) (1994); Tibbs v. State, 211 Ga. App. 250, 252 (3) ( 438 SE2d 706 ) (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Benton v. Chatham Countygreen2 sentences1995This practice defeats a primary purpose of requiring counsel to object to the court’s charge after it has been given, which is “ ‘to insure that the trial judge is afforded an *174 opportunity to (determine if a charging error in fact has occurred and to) correct any error in the instructions prior to verdict so that the necessity of an appeal will be obviated.’ [Cit.]” Benton v. Chatham County, 206 Ga. App. 285, 287 (2) ( 425 SE2d 317 ) (1992). 1995This practice defeats a primary purpose of requiring counsel to object to the court’s charge after it has been given, which is “ ‘to insure that the trial judge is afforded an *174 opportunity to (determine if a charging error in fact has occurred and to) correct any error in the instructions prior to verdict so that the necessity of an appeal will be obviated.’ [Cit.]” Benton v. Chatham County, 206 Ga. App. 285, 287 (2) ( 425 SE2d 317 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clark v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Watts v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sanders v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Singleton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grissett v. State
green
2 sentences1992“Having elected to take immediate exception to a portion of the charges at trial, rather than reserving a right to except or object to all charges until motion for new trial or on appeal, appellant waived his right to assert a charging error on appeal to the remaining portion of the charges to which he did not so object or except.” Grissett v. State, 199 Ga. App. 547 (1) ( 405 SE2d 542 ), citing Whatley v. State, 196 Ga. App. 73, 76 (2) ( 395 SE2d 582 ). 1992“Having elected to take immediate exception to a portion of the charges at trial, rather than reserving a right to except or object to all charges until motion for new trial or on appeal, appellant waived his right to assert a charging error on appeal to the remaining portion of the charges to which he did not so object or except.” Grissett v. State, 199 Ga. App. 547 (1) ( 405 SE2d 542 ), citing Whatley v. State, 196 Ga. App. 73, 76 (2) ( 395 SE2d 582 ). | 3 | 1992–1994 |
State v. Outen
green
2 sentences2018The question then becomes whether the relation back doctrine allows the State to correct this charging error by superseding indictment. *354 As our Supreme Court set out in State v. Outen , 296 Ga. 40 , 764 S.E.2d 848 (2014), A count contained in a subsequent indictment relates back to the date of the prior indictment for purposes of the statute of limitation if: (1) the prior indictment was timely; (2) the prior indictment is still pending; and (3) the later indictment does not broaden or otherwise substantially amend the original charges. 2018The question then becomes whether the relation back doctrine allows the State to correct this charging error by superseding indictment. *354 As our Supreme Court set out in State v. Outen , 296 Ga. 40 , 764 S.E.2d 848 (2014), A count contained in a subsequent indictment relates back to the date of the prior indictment for purposes of the statute of limitation if: (1) the prior indictment was timely; (2) the prior indictment is still pending; and (3) the later indictment does not broaden or otherwise substantially amend the original charges. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Nelson Italiano
green
1 sentence2018See Wooten v. State , 240 Ga. App. 725 , 726, 524 S.E.2d 776 (1999) ; United States v. Italiano , 894 F.2d 1280 , 1282 (11th Cir. 1990). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Brodes v. State
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Cowan v. State
green
2 sentences2001See Bernoudy v. State, 245 Ga.App. 489 (2), 538 S.E.2d 150 (2000); Cowan v. State, 243 Ga.App. 388 (7), 531 S.E.2d 785 (2000). 2001See Bernoudy v. State, 245 Ga.App. 489 (2), 538 S.E.2d 150 (2000); Cowan v. State, 243 Ga.App. 388 (7), 531 S.E.2d 785 (2000). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Lattarulo v. State
green
2 sentences2001In Lattarulo v. State, 261 Ga. 124 ( 401 SE2d 516 ) (1991), our Supreme Court recognized that breath test results are admissible when the statutory foundation requirements are met. 2001In Lattarulo v. State, 261 Ga. 124 ( 401 SE2d 516 ) (1991), our Supreme Court recognized that breath test results are admissible when the statutory foundation requirements are met. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Brewton v. State
green
1 sentence1998However, where, as here, the charging error was a substantial misstatement of the essential elements of the offense, it is reviewable as a “substantial error . . . harmful as a matter of law.” OCGA § 5-5-24 (c); Brewton v. State, 216 Ga. App. 346, 351 (6) ( 454 SE2d 558 ) (1995), rev’d on other grounds, 266 Ga. 160 ( 465 SE2d 688 ) (1996). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Chamberlain v. State
green
2 sentences1996Moreover, Chamberlain explicitly rejects the reasoning in Whitt that the error can be cured by some other portion of the charge: "[O]ther parts of the charge are merely inconsistent with this erroneous charge and do not explain or reconcile this erroneous charge with the full charge." 216 Ga.App. at 208 , 453 S.E.2d 793 . 1996Moreover, Chamberlain explicitly rejects the reasoning in Whitt that the error can be cured by some other portion of the charge: "[O]ther parts of the charge are merely inconsistent with this erroneous charge and do not explain or reconcile this erroneous charge with the full charge." 216 Ga.App. at 208 , 453 S.E.2d 793 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bruno v. Evans
green
1 sentence1995Bruno, supra; Sims, supra. Without access to the trial transcript we cannot conclude that appellant properly preserved a charging error for appellate review, and for this additional and independent reason, we must affirm the trial court’s rulings. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Croker v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Hilliard v. Canton Wholesale Co. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Crandall v. Sammons green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Hodges v. State neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.