charging error in Texas

2025“But when the charging error is not preserved, a greater degree of harm is required, and this standard of harm is described as egregious harm.” Id. (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ).

2025“But when the charging error is not preserved, a greater degree of harm is required, and this standard of harm is described as egregious harm.” Id. (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ).

2020“The standard to determine whether sufficient harm resulted from the charging error to require reversal depends upon whether appellant objected.” Id. at 732 .

2015Therefore, the trial court erred, and we must “determine whether sufficient harm resulted from the charging error to require reversal.” Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 731–32.

2008Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 .

2008Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.

2009See Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. Crim.App.2006) (interpreting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (op. on reh’g)).

2009See Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. Crim.

2017However, when the charging error is not preserved “and the accused must claim that the error was ‘fundamental,’ he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he ‘has not had a fair and impartial trial’—in short ‘egregious harm.’” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; see Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim.

2015However, when the charging error is not preserved “and the accused must claim that the error was ‘fundamental,’ he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he ‘has not had a fair and impartial trial’ — in short ‘egregious harm.’” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; see Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (egregious harm “is a difficult standard to meet and requires a showing that the defendants, were deprived of a fair and impartial trial.”).

2008This standard of harm is described as "egregious harm." Hutch v. State , 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim.

2008This standard of harm is described as “egregious harm.” Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

2020When, as here, the defendant did not object to the charge, we will not reverse unless the record shows that the error resulted in egregious harm, Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738 , 743–44 (Tex. Crim.

2008Id. at 743-44 .

2021App. 2019) (citing Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. Crim.

2021App. 2019) (citing Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Henry v. State, 263 S.W.3d 151, 156 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet)(“‘Some’ harm in an Almanza analysis means ‘any’ harm; thus, if the charging error causes any actual harm to the appellant, as opposed to ‘theoretical harm,’ then the error requires a reversal of the judgment of the trial court.”).

2012Under Almanza , when error in the jury charge is properly preserved, reversal is required if the charge error resulted in some harm to the defendant, “some” meaning “any.” O’Brien , 89 S.W.3d at 756 ; see also Henry v. State , 263 S.W.3d 151, 156 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“‘Some’ harm in an Almanza analysis means ‘any’ harm; thus, if the charging error causes any actual harm to the appellant, as opposed to ‘theoretical harm,’ then the error requires a reversal of the judgment of the trial court.”).

1994Id.

1994Belyeu, 791 S.W.2d at 75 .

1988The appropriate standard of harm depends upon whether or not Appellant objected to the charging error at trial If he did object, then a finding of “some harm” is sufficient to require reversal Black, 723 S.W.2d at 675 n. 2; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 .

1987The court of criminal appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review, vacated the judgment of this court, and remanded the case for us to "consider whether the charging error was harmless." Black v. State, 723 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex. Crim.App.1986).

1986Brown, supra; Govan, supra. Cf. Art. 36.19, V.A.C.C.P. (1981); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (standard for reviewing charging error for harm). [2] *676 In the instant case, the Court of Appeals did not determine whether the charging error was harmless, despite the State's argument in its brief before that court.

1986Brown, supra; Govan, supra. Cf. Art. 36.19, V.A.C.C.P. (1981); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (standard for reviewing charging error for harm). 2 In the instant case, the Court of Appeals did not determine whether the charging error was harmless, despite the State’s argument in its brief before that court.

2024However, in Duron v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “a written instrument is an indictment or information” under the Texas Constitution “if it accuses someone of a crime with enough clarity and specificity to identify the penal statute under which the State intends to prosecute, even if the instrument is otherwise defective.” 956 S.W.2d 547, 551 (Tex. Crim.

2024Haywood v. State, No. 05-99-01806-CR, 2000 WL 1808430 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 11, 2000, no pet.) (citing Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 492 (Tex. Crim.

2015Sakil v. State, 287 S.W.3d 23, 25-26 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009).

2014App. 1984) (op. on reh’g); see also Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim.

2008Errors that result in egregious harm are those affecting the "'very basis of the case,'" those depriving "the defendant of a 'valuable right,'" or those that "'vitally affect a defensive theory.'" 225 S.W.3d 491, 504 (Tex. Crim.

2002See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172 ; Escobar, 28 S.W.3d at 777.