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5 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala.green1 sentence2022In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957), the Supreme Court said: “We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. [Citation.] The [LMRA] expressly furnishes some substantive law. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts
red
2 sentences1987In conclusion, Byrd’s cause of action is not preempted under either the breach of contract provisions found in section 301 of the LMRA or the preemption principles set forth in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts (1985), 471 U.S. 724 , 85 L. 1987In conclusion, Byrd’s cause of action is not preempted under either the breach of contract provisions found in section 301 of the LMRA or the preemption principles set forth in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts (1985), 471 U.S. 724 , 85 L. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
green
2 sentences1987The court, however, did state that “not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by section 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law.” ( 471 U.S. 202, 211 , 85 L. 1987Ed. 2d 206, 216 , 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 ), the claim must either be dismissed as preempted by Federal labor law or treated as a breach of contract action under section 301. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc.
green
1 sentence1987(Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc. (7th Cir. 1985), 772 F. 2d 342 , 347.) Thus, in our opinion the trial court properly found that Federal law obligated the plaintiff to exhaust his contract remedies before bringing suit under section 301. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Humphrey v. Moore
green
2 sentences1984Thus, in Humphrey v. Moore (1964), 375 U.S. 335 , 11 L. 1984Thus, in Humphrey v. Moore (1964), 375 U.S. 335 , 11 L. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.