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5 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Teague v. Lanegreen2 sentences2014We therefore hold that, implicit in the retroactivity approach we adopt today, is the principle that habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review . . . . [Teague, 489 US at 316 (opinion by O’Connor, J.) (all but last emphasis added).] 22 Tellingly, with regard to the prosecutor’s intentions in Jackson, we further note that on remand the prosecutor conceded the defense of retroactivity, but did so only on the basis “that Jackson is entitled to the benefi 2014We therefore hold that, implicit in the retroactivity approach we adopt today, is the principle that habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review . . . . [Teague, 489 US at 316 (opinion by O’Connor, J.) (all but last emphasis added).] 22 Tellingly, with regard to the prosecutor’s intentions in Jackson, we further note that on remand the prosecutor conceded the defense of retroactivity, but did so only on the basis “that Jackson is entitled to the benefi | 3 | 3 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2016Defendant also raised several issues in a Standard 4 brief, including that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not having brought a motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that the arresting officer conducted a stop and frisk without a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting [defendant] of criminal activity.” People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 54 ; 378 NW2d 451 (1985); see also Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21-22 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). 2016Defendant also raised several issues in a Standard 4 brief, including that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not having brought a motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that the arresting officer conducted a stop and frisk without a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting [defendant] of criminal activity.” People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 54 ; 378 NW2d 451 (1985); see also Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21-22 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Norris
green
2 sentences2014Tellingly, with regard to the prosecutor’s intentions in Jackson, we further note that on remand the prosecutor conceded the defense of retroactivity, but did so only on the basis “that Jackson is entitled to the benefit of the United [States] Supreme Court’s opinion in his own case.” See Jackson v Norris, 2013 Ark 175, p 6 ; 426 SW3d 906 (2013) (emphasis added). 2014Tellingly, with regard to the prosecutor’s intentions in Jackson, we further note that on remand the prosecutor conceded the defense of retroactivity, but did so only on the basis “that Jackson is entitled to the benefit of the United [States] Supreme Court’s opinion in his own case.” See Jackson v Norris, 2013 Ark 175, p 6 ; 426 SW3d 906 (2013) (emphasis added). | 3 | 2014–2014 |
People of Michigan v. Alonzo Carter
green
1 sentence2026Id. -12- Following a motion to remand to challenge the scoring of the sentencing guidelines, the prosecutor conceded error in part. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Shabaz
green
2 sentences2016Defendant also raised several issues in a Standard 4 brief, including that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not having brought a motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that the arresting officer conducted a stop and frisk without a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting [defendant] of criminal activity.” People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 54 ; 378 NW2d 451 (1985); see also Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21-22 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). 2016Defendant also raised several issues in a Standard 4 brief, including that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for not having brought a motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that the arresting officer conducted a stop and frisk without a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting [defendant] of criminal activity.” People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 54 ; 378 NW2d 451 (1985); see also Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21-22 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.