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5 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 2002–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daniels v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2022While the District Court was correct that Tai Tam lacked a protected property interest in a subdivision application, as Tai Tam specifically conceded in its Complaint, the court failed to address could prevent Tai Tam from being allowed to assert § 1983 claims depending on how the record in this case is developed would certainly be “unfair” in this case. 4 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981) (overruled, in part, by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 , 106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986)) and its progeny “hold that a deprivation of liberty or property is not cognizable under 2022While the District Court was correct that Tai Tam lacked a protected property interest in a subdivision application, as Tai Tam specifically conceded in its Complaint, the court failed to address could prevent Tai Tam from being allowed to assert § 1983 claims depending on how the record in this case is developed would certainly be “unfair” in this case. 4 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981) (overruled, in part, by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 , 106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986)) and its progeny “hold that a deprivation of liberty or property is not cognizable under | 1 | 1 |
McRorie v. Shimodagreen1 sentence2022See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989) (deprivation of liberty or property is not cognizable under §1983 when a state’s post-deprivation remedies are “adequate to protect a victim’s procedural [as opposed to substantive] due process rights.” (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541-44 , 101 S. Ct. 1916 -17); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 1986 (“[A] procedural due process violation . . . does not occur until the state deprives the individual of a procedure for redress.”). | 1 | 1 |
Parratt v. Taylorred2 sentences2022While the District Court was correct that Tai Tam lacked a protected property interest in a subdivision application, as Tai Tam specifically conceded in its Complaint, the court failed to address could prevent Tai Tam from being allowed to assert § 1983 claims depending on how the record in this case is developed would certainly be “unfair” in this case. 4 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981) (overruled, in part, by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 , 106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986)) and its progeny “hold that a deprivation of liberty or property is not cognizable under 2022While the District Court was correct that Tai Tam lacked a protected property interest in a subdivision application, as Tai Tam specifically conceded in its Complaint, the court failed to address could prevent Tai Tam from being allowed to assert § 1983 claims depending on how the record in this case is developed would certainly be “unfair” in this case. 4 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981) (overruled, in part, by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 , 106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986)) and its progeny “hold that a deprivation of liberty or property is not cognizable under | 1 | 1 |
Linda K. Wood v. Steven C. Ostrander Neil Maloneygreen2 sentences2022See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989) (deprivation of liberty or property is not cognizable under §1983 when a state’s post-deprivation remedies are “adequate to protect a victim’s procedural [as opposed to substantive] due process rights.” (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541-44 , 101 S. Ct. 1916 -17); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 1986 (“[A] procedural due process violation . . . does not occur until the state deprives the individual of a procedure for redress.”). 2022While the District Court was correct that Tai Tam lacked a protected property interest in a subdivision application, as Tai Tam specifically conceded in its Complaint, the court failed to address could prevent Tai Tam from being allowed to assert § 1983 claims depending on how the record in this case is developed would certainly be “unfair” in this case. 4 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981) (overruled, in part, by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 , 106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986)) and its progeny “hold that a deprivation of liberty or property is not cognizable under | 1 | 1 |
Merrel J. Cline v. Morris L. Brusettgreen1 sentence2015In the Ninth Circuit, malicious prosecution “is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy.” Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) 4 (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1981)). | 1 | 1 |
L.R. Bretz v. Zollie Kelman, Jack R. Lande, Eugene R. Welborngreen2 sentences2015As an exception, malicious prosecution is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if it is “intended to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights.” Usher, 828 F.2d at 561 (quoting Bretz, 773 F.2d at 1031 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶9 Vainio’s complaint alleged that the State violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by searching and seizing MSP inmate eye exam records without probable cause, conspiring to maliciously accuse him of criminal conduct, filing exaggerated felony charges without probable cause, submitting incomplete patient records to expert witnes 2015In the Ninth Circuit, malicious prosecution “is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy.” Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) 4 (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1981)). | 1 | 1 |
Sterling Usher v. City of Los Angeles, Richard A. Gonzales, Michael E. Melton, Jose E. Ramirez, Joe Rios, and Robert L. Vanngreen2 sentences2015As an exception, malicious prosecution is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if it is “intended to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights.” Usher, 828 F.2d at 561 (quoting Bretz, 773 F.2d at 1031 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶9 Vainio’s complaint alleged that the State violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by searching and seizing MSP inmate eye exam records without probable cause, conspiring to maliciously accuse him of criminal conduct, filing exaggerated felony charges without probable cause, submitting incomplete patient records to expert witnes 2015In the Ninth Circuit, malicious prosecution “is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy.” Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) 4 (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1981)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Heck v. Humphrey
green
2 sentences2002Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 , 114 S.Ct. at 2372 , 129 L.Ed.2d at 394 . 2002Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 , 114 S.Ct. at 2372 , 129 L.Ed.2d at 394 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Smith v. City of Fontana
red
1 sentence2022“However, ‘the Parratt line of cases does not focus on the relevance of procedural protections to alleged violations of substantive constitutional rights.’” Wood, 879 F.2d at 588 (quoting Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 , 1414 (9th Cir. 1987 (overruled, in part, by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 , 1040 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc))). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina
green
1 sentence2022“However, ‘the Parratt line of cases does not focus on the relevance of procedural protections to alleged violations of substantive constitutional rights.’” Wood, 879 F.2d at 588 (quoting Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 , 1414 (9th Cir. 1987 (overruled, in part, by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 , 1040 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc))). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Rudolph v. Dussault
neutral
2 sentences2003In Rudolph v. Dussault (1988), 234 Mont. 449 , 763 P.2d 1139 , we similarly concluded that Rudolph would be barred by collateral estoppel from bringing a cause of action against the city for violation of his civil rights, in light of his criminal conviction. 2003In Rudolph v. Dussault (1988), 234 Mont. 449 , 763 P.2d 1139 , we similarly concluded that Rudolph would be barred by collateral estoppel from bringing a cause of action against the city for violation of his civil rights, in light of his criminal conviction. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Brown v. State
green
2 sentences2003Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907 . ¶25 The dissent, in advocating the “one-track” approach, points out that in Brown v. State, 2002 MT 58 , 309 Mont. 106 , 46 P.3d 42 , we affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the reason that “Brown’s claims, if proven, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence and are therefore not cognizable under § 1983 unless he can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Brown , ¶ 26. 2003Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907 . ¶25 The dissent, in advocating the “one-track” approach, points out that in Brown v. State, 2002 MT 58 , 309 Mont. 106 , 46 P.3d 42 , we affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the reason that “Brown’s claims, if proven, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence and are therefore not cognizable under § 1983 unless he can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Brown , ¶ 26. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Gebhardt v. O'ROURKE
green
2 sentences2003Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907 . ¶ 25 The dissent, in advocating the "one-track" approach, points out that in Brown v. *469 State, 2002 MT 58 , 309 Mont. 106 , 46 P.3d 42 , we affirmed the district court's dismissal of Brown's cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the reason that "Brown's claims, if proven, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence and are therefore not cognizable under § 1983 unless he can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Brown , ¶ 26. 2003Gebhardt, 510 N.W.2d at 907 . ¶25 The dissent, in advocating the “one-track” approach, points out that in Brown v. State, 2002 MT 58 , 309 Mont. 106 , 46 P.3d 42 , we affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the reason that “Brown’s claims, if proven, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence and are therefore not cognizable under § 1983 unless he can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Brown , ¶ 26. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.