dangerous condition exception in Missouri

1997To state a claim under the dangerous condition exception to sovereign immunity, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a dangerous condition of a public entity’s property at the time of the injury; (2) that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition; (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind that the plaintiff incurred; and (4) either that a public employee’s negligence or wrongful act or omission within the course of his employment created the dangerous condition or that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous

1996In Kanagawa v. State By and Through Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. banc 1985), the Missouri Supreme Court held that a plaintiff seeking to state a claim under the dangerous condition exception must allege facts that demonstrate: (1) a dangerous condition of the property; (2) that the plaintiffs injuries directly resulted from the dangerous condition; (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind the plaintiff incurred; and (4) that a public employee negligently created the condition or that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of t

2025In Alexander, our Supreme Court recognized that the dangerous condition exception allowed for waiver of sovereign immunity when “[t]he danger was created not by any intrinsic defect in the property involved, but by the dangerous condition created by the positioning of the various items. . . .” 756 S.W.2d at 542 .

2005Martin, 981 S.W.2d at 579-80 ; (citing Alexander v. State, 756 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Mo. banc 1988)).

1999Under the statute, to fall within the dangerous condition exception to sovereign immunity, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a dangerous condition of a public entity’s property at the time of injury; (2) that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition; (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind that the plaintiff incurred; and (4) that either (a) a public employee’s negligence or wrongful act or omission within the course of his employment created the dangerous condition, or (b) the public entity had actual or constructive knowledge of

1997To state a claim under the dangerous condition exception to sovereign immunity, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a dangerous condition of a public entity’s property at the time of the injury; (2) that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition; (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind that the plaintiff incurred; and (4) either that a public employee’s negligence or wrongful act or omission within the course of his employment created the dangerous condition or that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous

2023Allen v. 32nd Judicial Circuit, 638 S.W.3d 880 , 890 (Mo. banc 2022); Hensley, 227 S.W.3d at 497 .

2023But the dangerous condition exception “encompasses more than a physical defect in the pavement itself” and may now be satisfied by the “negligent, defective, or dangerous design’ of roadways.” Huifang v. City of Kansas City, 229 S.W.3d 68, 71-75 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (see also Hensley v. Jackson County, 227 S.W.3d 491, 495 (Mo. banc 2007)).

2013See State v. Williams, 729 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Mo. bane 1987) (stating that “the well-established rule is that the legislature has plenary power to prescribe or alter rules of evidence ... in the absence of an express constitutional guarantee to the contrary”).

1999See State v. Williams, 729 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Mo. banc 1987) (stating that “the well-established rule is that the legislature has plenary power to prescribe or alter rules of evidence ... in the absence of an express constitutional guarantee to the contrary”).

2024Id. at 612 .

2007Comm’n, 16 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Mo.App.

2018Id. at 955 .

1999Under the statute, to fall within the dangerous condition exception to sovereign immunity, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a dangerous condition of a public entity’s property at the time of injury; (2) that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition; (3) that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind that the plaintiff incurred; and (4) that either (a) a public employee’s negligence or wrongful act or omission within the course of his employment created the dangerous condition, or (b) the public entity had actual or constructive knowledge of

2015Div. of Motor Carrier, 91 S.W.3d at 616 (holding that if property “is not ‘property1 of the [public entity], then [the public entity] cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver”).

2004Specifically, the Court held that “[f]or a dangerous condition waiver of sov *808 ereign immunity to apply, the dangerous condition must ‘describe, define, explain, denote or reference only and exclusively the physical defects in, upon and/or attending to property of the public entity.’ ” Id. (emphasis added).

2000As stated in Oldaker , the "negligence of the defendant need not be the sole cause of the injury, as long as it is one of the efficient causes thereof, without which injury would not have resulted." Oldaker, 869 S.W.2d at 100 . [6] Thus, even accepting that a causal connection could be established between the negligence of Uber and the accident, rendering her liable to the appellants, this fact would be insufficient, in and of itself, to negate the second element of the dangerous condition exception pled by the appellants in order to waive the sovereign immunity defense of the MHTC.

2000As stated in Oldaker , the “negligence of the defendant need not be the sole cause of the injury, as long as it is one of the efficient causes thereof, without which injury would not have resulted.” Oldaker, 869 S.W.2d at 100 . 6 Thus, even accepting that a causal connection could be established between the negligence of Uber and the accident, rendering her liable to the appellants, this fact would be insufficient, in and of itself, to negate the second element of the dangerous condition exception pled by the appellants in order to waive the sovereign immunity defense of the MHTC.

2025As such, Relator’s request for a permanent writ of mandamus is granted, 4 and the trial court is directed to dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s petition with prejudice. 5 3 See, e.g., Proffer v. Federal Mogul Corp., 341 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo.App. 2011); Matter of Care and Treatment of Lester Bradley v. State, 554 S.W.3d 440, 455 (Mo.App. 2018); Esparza v. State, 518 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Mo.App. 2017); Turner v. State, 341 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Mo.App. 2011); Woodworth v. State, 408 S.W.3d 143, 150 (Mo.App. 2010); State v. Mitchell, 41 S.W.3d 574, 579 (Mo.App. 2001). 4 Respondent’s motion to strike Relator’s

2025As such, Relator’s request for a permanent writ of mandamus is granted, 4 and the trial court is directed to dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s petition with prejudice. 5 3 See, e.g., Proffer v. Federal Mogul Corp., 341 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo.App. 2011); Matter of Care and Treatment of Lester Bradley v. State, 554 S.W.3d 440, 455 (Mo.App. 2018); Esparza v. State, 518 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Mo.App. 2017); Turner v. State, 341 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Mo.App. 2011); Woodworth v. State, 408 S.W.3d 143, 150 (Mo.App. 2010); State v. Mitchell, 41 S.W.3d 574, 579 (Mo.App. 2001). 4 Respondent’s motion to strike Relator’s

2025As such, Relator’s request for a permanent writ of mandamus is granted, 4 and the trial court is directed to dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s petition with prejudice. 5 3 See, e.g., Proffer v. Federal Mogul Corp., 341 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo.App. 2011); Matter of Care and Treatment of Lester Bradley v. State, 554 S.W.3d 440, 455 (Mo.App. 2018); Esparza v. State, 518 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Mo.App. 2017); Turner v. State, 341 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Mo.App. 2011); Woodworth v. State, 408 S.W.3d 143, 150 (Mo.App. 2010); State v. Mitchell, 41 S.W.3d 574, 579 (Mo.App. 2001). 4 Respondent’s motion to strike Relator’s

2025As such, Relator’s request for a permanent writ of mandamus is granted, 4 and the trial court is directed to dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s petition with prejudice. 5 3 See, e.g., Proffer v. Federal Mogul Corp., 341 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo.App. 2011); Matter of Care and Treatment of Lester Bradley v. State, 554 S.W.3d 440, 455 (Mo.App. 2018); Esparza v. State, 518 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Mo.App. 2017); Turner v. State, 341 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Mo.App. 2011); Woodworth v. State, 408 S.W.3d 143, 150 (Mo.App. 2010); State v. Mitchell, 41 S.W.3d 574, 579 (Mo.App. 2001). 4 Respondent’s motion to strike Relator’s

2025As such, Relator’s request for a permanent writ of mandamus is granted, 4 and the trial court is directed to dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s petition with prejudice. 5 3 See, e.g., Proffer v. Federal Mogul Corp., 341 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo.App. 2011); Matter of Care and Treatment of Lester Bradley v. State, 554 S.W.3d 440, 455 (Mo.App. 2018); Esparza v. State, 518 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Mo.App. 2017); Turner v. State, 341 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Mo.App. 2011); Woodworth v. State, 408 S.W.3d 143, 150 (Mo.App. 2010); State v. Mitchell, 41 S.W.3d 574, 579 (Mo.App. 2001). 4 Respondent’s motion to strike Relator’s

2025As such, Relator’s request for a permanent writ of mandamus is granted, 4 and the trial court is directed to dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s petition with prejudice. 5 3 See, e.g., Proffer v. Federal Mogul Corp., 341 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo.App. 2011); Matter of Care and Treatment of Lester Bradley v. State, 554 S.W.3d 440, 455 (Mo.App. 2018); Esparza v. State, 518 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Mo.App. 2017); Turner v. State, 341 S.W.3d 750, 754 (Mo.App. 2011); Woodworth v. State, 408 S.W.3d 143, 150 (Mo.App. 2010); State v. Mitchell, 41 S.W.3d 574, 579 (Mo.App. 2001). 4 Respondent’s motion to strike Relator’s

2023“As a municipal corporation, the City qualifies as a ‘public entity’ generally accorded sovereign immunity under section 537.600 from tort lawsuits.” Pinnell v. City of Union, 579 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).

2023Kraus, 147 S.W.3d at 915 .

2023Now, “a dangerous condition of public property may arise from a general failure to post adequate signing or traffic controls,” Kraus, 147 S.W.3d at 915 , because “[t]raffic control devices including markings, signs, and traffic signals are part of the ‘design’ of a roadway.” Huifang, 229 S.W.3d at 75 .

2023Now, “a dangerous condition of public property may arise from a general failure to post adequate signing or traffic controls,” Kraus, 147 S.W.3d at 915 , because “[t]raffic control devices including markings, signs, and traffic signals are part of the ‘design’ of a roadway.” Huifang, 229 S.W.3d at 75 .

2023But the dangerous condition exception “encompasses more than a physical defect in the pavement itself” and may now be satisfied by the “negligent, defective, or dangerous design’ of roadways.” Huifang v. City of Kansas City, 229 S.W.3d 68, 71-75 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (see also Hensley v. Jackson County, 227 S.W.3d 491, 495 (Mo. banc 2007)).

2023Missouri long ago adopted a comprehensive system of comparative fault in Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. banc 1983), which applies in this context regarding the dangerous condition exception to sovereign immunity.

2022Summitt by Boyd v. Roberts, 903 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Mo. App. 1995) (property containing an allegedly dangerous condition was not owned or under exclusive control or possession of any public entity; therefore, the dangerous condition waiver of sovereign immunity was not applicable); Tillison v. Boyer, 939 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Mo. App. 1996) (“‘[T]he term of the property’ includes having exclusive control and possession of the property.”); Sisk v. Union Pac.

2022Summitt by Boyd v. Roberts, 903 S.W.2d 631 , 635 (Mo. App. 1995) (property containing an allegedly dangerous condition was not owned or under exclusive control or possession of any public entity; therefore, the dangerous condition waiver of sovereign immunity was not applicable); Tillison v. Boyer, 939 S.W.2d 471 , 473 (Mo. App. 1996) (“‘[T]he term of the property’ includes having exclusive control and possession of the property.”); Sisk v. Union Pac.

2022Summitt by Boyd v. Roberts, 903 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Mo. App. 1995) (property containing an allegedly dangerous condition was not owned or under exclusive control or possession of any public entity; therefore, the dangerous condition waiver of sovereign immunity was not applicable); Tillison v. Boyer, 939 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Mo. App. 1996) (“‘[T]he term of the property’ includes having exclusive control and possession of the property.”); Sisk v. Union Pac.

2022Summitt by Boyd v. Roberts, 903 S.W.2d 631 , 635 (Mo. App. 1995) (property containing an allegedly dangerous condition was not owned or under exclusive control or possession of any public entity; therefore, the dangerous condition waiver of sovereign immunity was not applicable); Tillison v. Boyer, 939 S.W.2d 471 , 473 (Mo. App. 1996) (“‘[T]he term of the property’ includes having exclusive control and possession of the property.”); Sisk v. Union Pac.

2010To state a claim under the dangerous condition exception, the plaintiff must allege facts that show: (1) a dangerous condition of public property; (2) the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition; (3) the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of harm incurred; and (4) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the condition. § 537.600.1(2); Dierker, 961 S.W.2d at 60 ; Thomas v. Clay County Election Bd., 261 S.W.3d 574, 577-78 (Mo.App.

2006Section 537.600.1(2); Necker by Necker v. City of Bridgeton, 938 S.W.2d 651, 654 (Mo.App.