eleventh clause in New York

1981In the concurring memorandum of Mr. Justice Hopkins, allusion is made to the peremptory challenges directed by the prosecutor to the three black prospective jurors on the panel, citing People v Thompson ( 79 AD2d 87 ).

1981If there was an abuse of discretion by the Trial Justice, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 ), and it is difficult to conceive how an eleventh challenge could possibly have changed the ultimate result.

1925With reference to this contention, Chief Judge Parker said: “The testator gives about twenty-five thousand dollars, or less than one-seventh of his estate, to organizations that are within the description of the statute, and in addition to that the residuary devises and bequests are charitable, and, therefore, within the general description of the statute; but as such devises and bequests are not to a ‘ society, association or corporation in trust or otherwise,’ but instead to trustees, they are not within its prohibition.” Judge Crane, writing for the court in Decker v. Vreeland ( 220 N. Y. 3

1925With reference to this contention, Chief Judge Parker said: “The testator gives about twenty-five thousand dollars, or less than one-seventh of his estate, to organizations that are within the description of the statute, and in addition to that the residuary devises and bequests are charitable, and, therefore, within the general description of the statute; but as such devises and bequests are not to a ‘ society, association or corporation in trust or otherwise,’ but instead to trustees, they are not within its prohibition.” Judge Crane, writing for the court in Decker v. Vreeland ( 220 N. Y. 3

1925The court said (at p. 148): “ In this case trustees were named, and, as the eleventh clause of the will expressly prohibits the trustees from holding any portion of the testator’s property longer than the fives of the two persons in being therein named, it must be held that the trustees are charged with the management and conduct of the trust until the expiration of a period measured by the two fives in being, at which time the title to the trust property will vest in the Supreme Court under the statute.” It was further claimed that the tenth provision of the will in Allen v. Stevens (supra) w

1891(Schettler v. Smith, 41 N. Y. 328 ; Knox v. Jones, 47 id. 389 .) The appellants claim, however, that the contingency provided for in the tenth clause refers to a death during the life of the testatrix, and having thus eliminated the tenth clause of the will, contends that there is, under the ninth clause, a separate trust created for each cousin, and that the words “ upon the death of said cousins ” in the eleventh clause should be construed to mean “upon the death of each cousin,” and that under this construction one-third of the property would upon the death of any of the cousins vest either

1891(Schettler v. Smith, 41 N. Y. 328 ; Knox v. Jones, 47 id. 389 .) The appellants claim, however, that the contingency provided for in the tenth clause refers to a death during the life of the testatrix, and having thus eliminated the tenth clause of the will, contends that there is, under the ninth clause, a separate trust created for each cousin, and that the words “ upon the death of said cousins ” in the eleventh clause should be construed to mean “upon the death of each cousin,” and that under this construction one-third of the property would upon the death of any of the cousins vest either

1887Those most directly in point are specified (Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584 ; Leonard v. Bell, 1 Supm.

1881My attention has been called to the case of Heard v. Case ( 23 How.