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5 New York opinions name it 1 courts 2016–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Castillo v. Lukegreen1 sentence2016Initially, inasmuch as the mother did not object after the *1012 September 2013 custodial order was modified twice during the pendency of the fact-finding hearing, we find that the mother’s argument that Family Court deprived her of due process by suspending her parenting time is not preserved for our review (see Matter of Tisdale v Anderson, 100 AD3d 1517, 1517 [2012]; Matter of Castillo v Luke, 63 AD3d 1222, 1223 [2009]; Matter of Young v Collins, 37 AD3d 1014, 1016 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
Tisdale v. Andersongreen1 sentence2016Initially, inasmuch as the mother did not object after the *1012 September 2013 custodial order was modified twice during the pendency of the fact-finding hearing, we find that the mother’s argument that Family Court deprived her of due process by suspending her parenting time is not preserved for our review (see Matter of Tisdale v Anderson, 100 AD3d 1517, 1517 [2012]; Matter of Castillo v Luke, 63 AD3d 1222, 1223 [2009]; Matter of Young v Collins, 37 AD3d 1014, 1016 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Collinsgreen1 sentence2016Initially, inasmuch as the mother did not object after the *1012 September 2013 custodial order was modified twice during the pendency of the fact-finding hearing, we find that the mother’s argument that Family Court deprived her of due process by suspending her parenting time is not preserved for our review (see Matter of Tisdale v Anderson, 100 AD3d 1517, 1517 [2012]; Matter of Castillo v Luke, 63 AD3d 1222, 1223 [2009]; Matter of Young v Collins, 37 AD3d 1014, 1016 [2007]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Robert C. v. Katlyn D.
neutral
2 sentences2026The father does not challenge the dismissal of his family offense petitions, rendering any contention thereto abandoned ( see Matter of Robert C. v Katlyn D. , 230 AD3d 1392, 1393 n 3 [3d Dept 2024]). 2026The father does not challenge the dismissal of his family offense petitions, rendering any contention thereto abandoned ( see Matter of Robert C. v Katlyn D. , 230 AD3d 1392 , 1393 n 3 [3d Dept 2024]). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In re Ameillia RR.
neutral
1 sentence2026Although the interlocutory appeals are rendered moot by issuance of the final order, issues regarding these interlocutory orders can be raised on this appeal ( see Matter of Ameillia RR. [Megan SS. -Jered RR.] , 112 AD3d 1083 , 1083 n 1 [3d Dept 2013]). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Matter of Joseph XX. v. Jah-Rai YY.
green
1 sentence2026FN6 Finally, given the positive impact the coparenting counseling was having on the parties during the pendency of the fact-finding hearing, we believe it would be prudent to order the parties to refrain from disparaging one another and to order coparenting counseling on an ongoing basis, to ensure that they are consistently improving their communication with one another and have a forum to discuss major decisions with continued support ( see Matter of Joseph XX. v Jah-Rai YY. , 226 AD3d 49 , 55 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 901 [2025]). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Klee v. Schill
green
1 sentence2020In so denying the attorney for the child's adjournment request, Family Court ruled that the proffered testimony constituted inadmissible post-petition proof. [FN2] However, such ruling was in error, as the post-petition proof sought to be introduced by the attorney for the child was highly relevant to determining the best interests of the child and could and should have been permitted for that purpose ( see Matter of Klee v Schill , 95 AD3d 1599 , 1601 n 4 [2012]). | 1 | 2020–2020 |