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5 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Frasca v. Frascagreen2 sentences2010A stipulation entered into by the parties in April 2004 is not a separation agreement within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) for the purpose of awarding the defendant a conversion divorce, as it contains affirmative language that its purpose was to settle certain issues pendente lite (see Sint v Sint, 225 AD2d 606, 607 [1996]; Frasca v Frasca, 213 AD2d 589, 590 [1995]; Stone v Stone, 45 AD2d 967, 968 [1974]). 1996However, in this case, the agreement is not only silent on the parties’ intent to live separate and apart pursuant to the agreement; it contains affirmative language that its purpose was to settle issues pendente lite (see, Frasca v Frasca, 213 AD2d 589 ) pending final resolution of the matrimonial action. | 1 | 2 |
Stone v. Stonegreen2 sentences2010A stipulation entered into by the parties in April 2004 is not a separation agreement within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) for the purpose of awarding the defendant a conversion divorce, as it contains affirmative language that its purpose was to settle certain issues pendente lite (see Sint v Sint, 225 AD2d 606, 607 [1996]; Frasca v Frasca, 213 AD2d 589, 590 [1995]; Stone v Stone, 45 AD2d 967, 968 [1974]). 1995We agree with the Supreme Court that the parties’ stipulation, which was intended to set forth their respective pendente lite obligations, is not a separation agreement within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) for the purpose of granting the defendant a so-called conversion divorce (see, e.g., Stone v Stone, 45 AD2d 967 ). | 1 | 2 |
Sint v. Sintgreen1 sentence2010A stipulation entered into by the parties in April 2004 is not a separation agreement within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) for the purpose of awarding the defendant a conversion divorce, as it contains affirmative language that its purpose was to settle certain issues pendente lite (see Sint v Sint, 225 AD2d 606, 607 [1996]; Frasca v Frasca, 213 AD2d 589, 590 [1995]; Stone v Stone, 45 AD2d 967, 968 [1974]). | 1 | 1 |
O'Halloran v. O'Hallorangreen1 sentence2010The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit (cf. O’Halloran v O’Halloran, 58 AD3d 704, 706 [2009]). | 1 | 1 |
Siczewicz v. Siczewiczgreen1 sentence1986At best they constitute potential defenses to an action for divorce based on a separation agreement under Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6), but in no sense are they acts of "calculated cruelty” (Siczewicz v Siczewicz, supra, at p 916). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Littlejohns v. Littlejohns
green
2 sentences1996A clause explicitly stating that the parties shall live separate and apart pursuant to the agreement is not a prerequisite to a valid agreement of separation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) (see, Littlejohns v Littlejohns, 76 Misc 2d 82 , affd 42 AD2d 957 ; see also, Morhaim v Morhaim, 44 NY2d 785 ). 1995In Littlejohns v Littlejohns ( 76 Misc 2d 82 [Sup Ct, NY County 1972]), the court found that where the agreement contained support provisions and it was demonstrated that the parties did not live together after the agreement was signed, the agreement did qualify as a separation agreement under Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6). | 2 | 1995–1996 |
Littlejohns v. Littlejohns
neutral
1 sentence1996A clause explicitly stating that the parties shall live separate and apart pursuant to the agreement is not a prerequisite to a valid agreement of separation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) (see, Littlejohns v Littlejohns, 76 Misc 2d 82 , affd 42 AD2d 957 ; see also, Morhaim v Morhaim, 44 NY2d 785 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.