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5 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1998–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
S.H. v. Diocese of Brooklyngreen2 sentences2022The interpretation of the statutory language of CPLR 214-g presents a question of law for this Court to resolve de novo ( see S.H. v Diocese of Brooklyn , 205 AD3d at 185). "'[S]pecial laws,' such as CPLR 214-g, 'that revive causes of action are extreme example[s] of legislative power and are narrowly construed'" ( id. at 188, quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. 2022The interpretation of the statutory language of CPLR 214-g presents a question of law for this Court to resolve de novo ( see S.H. v Diocese of Brooklyn , 205 AD3d at 185). "'[S]pecial laws,' such as CPLR 214-g, 'that revive causes of action are extreme example[s] of legislative power and are narrowly construed'" ( id. at 188, quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. | 1 | 1 |
Santiago v. 1370 Broadway Associates, LPgreen1 sentence2003Contrary to the court’s finding, the malpractice and/or negligence causes were not time-barred under the three-year statutory period prescribed in CPLR 214 (6) since that statutory period only applies to allegations of “malpractice” and “the alleged misfeasance of insurance agents and brokers toward their clients is not ‘malpractice’ within CPLR 214 (6)” (Santiago v 1370 Broadway Assoc., 96 NY2d 765, 766 [2001]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Meyer
neutral
1 sentence2006Vehicle and Traffic Law § 214 creates a statutory exception to the hearsay rule in which an affidavit of regularity/proof of mailing, order of suspension/revocation and a defendant’s driving abstract are admissible into evidence, despite their ability to be independently admitted pursuant to any evidentiary hearsay exception, which, in turn, creates a presumption of mailing (and knowledge) which may be rebutted by the defendant (see People v Meyer, 177 Misc 2d 537 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 1998]). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Britt v. Legal Aid Society, Inc.
green
1 sentence2001Accrual of Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action Under General Business Law § 349 In general, a cause of action accrues, triggering commencement of the limitations period, when all of the factual circumstances necessary to establish a right of action have occurred, so that the plaintiff would be entitled to relief (see, Britt v Legal Aid Socy., 95 NY2d 443, 446 ; Matter of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Kollore
neutral
1 sentence1998Vehicle and Traffic Law § 214 creates a statutory exception to the hearsay rule in which the affidavit of regularity/proof of mailing, order of suspension and an electronically generated driving abstract are admissible, and create a presumption of mailing (and knowledge) which may be rebutted by defendant (see, People v Kollore, 151 Misc 2d 384 ). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.