flat rule in Ohio

2011Briganti v. Briganti (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 220, 222 , 459 N.E.2d 896 .

1999However, a flat rule to determine value cannot be established as equity depends on the totality of the circumstances." Briganti v. Briganti (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 220 , 222 .

2024Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983). (“It is ill-advised and impossible for any court to set down a flat rule concerning property division upon divorce” citing Cherry, supra, 66 Ohio St.2d at 355 ).

2024Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983). (“It is ill-advised and impossible for any court to set down a flat rule concerning property division upon divorce” citing Cherry, supra, 66 Ohio St.2d at 355 ).

2008A trial court must have discretion to do what is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Berish v. Berish (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 318 , 320 , citing Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348 , 355 .

2006Id., at 320 , citing Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348 , 355 .

2005(Id. at 23). {¶ 16} The Ohio Supreme Court in the syllabus to Worthington v. Worthington (1986), 21 Ohio St.3d 73 , 488 N.E.2d 150 , held that: {¶ 17} "A trial court in determining the division of property pursuant to the factors contained in R.C. 3105.18 and all other relevant factors, does not abuse its discretion by apportioning the appreciation in value of non-marital property as a marital asset, where significant marital funds and labor are expended to improve and maintain such property." {¶ 18} The Ohio Supreme Court in Worthington, supra, at 75 , 488 N.E.2d at 152 , reiterated its state

2005(Id. at 23). {¶ 16} The Ohio Supreme Court in the syllabus to Worthington v. Worthington (1986), 21 Ohio St.3d 73 , 488 N.E.2d 150 , held that: {¶ 17} "A trial court in determining the division of property pursuant to the factors contained in R.C. 3105.18 and all other relevant factors, does not abuse its discretion by apportioning the appreciation in value of non-marital property as a marital asset, where significant marital funds and labor are expended to improve and maintain such property." {¶ 18} The Ohio Supreme Court in Worthington, supra, at 75 , 488 N.E.2d at 152 , reiterated its state

2021Geauga No. 2014-G-3191, 2015-Ohio-5519, ¶10 , quoting Kuper v. Halbach, 10th Dist.

2008In so doing, the trial court put undue emphasis on the plaintiffs unilateral actions.” Id. at 157-158 , 532 N.E.2d 201 .

2008In so doing, the trial court put undue emphasis on the plaintiffs unilateral actions.” Id. at 157-158 , 532 N.E.2d 201 .

2005Atkins v. Walker (1979), 65 Ohio App.2d 136 , 140 [.] * * * {¶ 15} In Kalb v. Morehead (May 19, 1998), Scioto App. No. 97CA2499, the Fourth District Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court wrongfully issued a protective order prohibiting the plaintiffs from obtaining documents and information regarding the defendant doctor's credibility and the defendant hospital's negligent credentialing based upon the privilege set forth in R.C. 2305.251 .

1999"This is why it is ill-advised and impossible for any court to set down a flat rule concerning property division upon divorce." Id. at 355 .

1999In its opinion in State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 146-147 , the Ohio Supreme Court, quoting from Strickland , supra , at 694, noted: "* * * The alleged errors constituting ineffective assistance of counsel, even when viewed cumulatively, do not, in our view, show `that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' * * *" After a careful review of the record, we are not convinced that the trial result would have been any different had counsel conducted the trial in the ways now argued by app

1990In holding that the trial court was not permitted to omit valuation altogether, the court stated: "A flat rule to determine value cannot be established as equity depends on the totality of the circumstances. *** However, the court does have broad discretion to develop some measure of value." Id. at 48 .

1990In Collier v. Collier (1987) 36 Ohio App. 3d 130 , the Crawford County Court of Appeals described the trial court's valuation of appellee’s interest in a professional corporation as "unreasonable." The standard followed by the Collier court was "abuse of discretion"; however, its analysis was primarily focused on the division of property rather than its valuation.