Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1793–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Olive D. Casey, Deceased Carlton D. Casey, C. Lewis Casey, Robert T. Casey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenuegreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Estate of Casey v. Comm'r, 948 F.2d 895, 898 (4th Cir.1991) ("When one considers the manifold opportunities and temptations for self-dealing that are opened up for persons holding general powers of attorney — of which outright transfers for less than value to the attorney-in-fact herself are the most obvious — the justification for such a flat rule is apparent. 2007See, e.g., Estate of Casey v. Comm'r, 948 F.2d 895, 898 (4th Cir.1991) ("When one considers the manifold opportunities and temptations for self-dealing that are opened up for persons holding general powers of attorney — of which outright transfers for less than value to the attorney-in-fact herself are the most obvious — the justification for such a flat rule is apparent. | 1 | 1 |
Praefke v. American Enterprise Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2007And its justification is made even more apparent when one considers the ease with which such a rule can be accommodated by principals and their draftsmen."); Praefke v. American Enterprise Life Ins., 257 Wis.2d 637 , 655 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Wis.2002) (explaining that "unless the power of attorney specifically allows the agent to gift property to himself or herself, or contains an `unlimited or unbridled' gifting power, the agent lacks authority to make gratuitous transfers"). 2007And its justification is made even more apparent when one considers the ease with which such a rule can be accommodated by principals and their draftsmen."); Praefke v. American Enterprise Life Ins., 257 Wis.2d 637 , 655 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Wis.2002) (explaining that "unless the power of attorney specifically allows the agent to gift property to himself or herself, or contains an `unlimited or unbridled' gifting power, the agent lacks authority to make gratuitous transfers"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences1992But we do hold that the circumstances under which such a defendant may invoke *185 the bar of double jeopardy in a second effort to try him are limited to those cases in which the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. 456 U.S. at 679 , 102 S.Ct. at 2091 , 72 L.Ed.2d at 426-27 . 1992But we do hold that the circumstances under which such a defendant may invoke *185 the bar of double jeopardy in a second effort to try him are limited to those cases in which the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. 456 U.S. at 679 , 102 S.Ct. at 2091 , 72 L.Ed.2d at 426-27 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hoyt's Estate
neutral
1 sentence1942The flat principle that the schedule of distribution, when required, is the final decree from which an appeal will lie is laid down in Brown’s Estate, 343 Pa. 19 , Forsyth’s Estate, 335 Pa. 281 , Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , Neafie’s Estate, 325 Pa. 561 , Maron’s Estate, 317 Pa. 476 , Levy’s Estate, 307 Pa. 522 , Kaeir’s Estate, 264 Pa. 224 , and Hoyt’s Estate, 232 Pa. 189 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Kaeir's Estate
neutral
1 sentence1942The flat principle that the schedule of distribution, when required, is the final decree from which an appeal will lie is laid down in Brown’s Estate, 343 Pa. 19 , Forsyth’s Estate, 335 Pa. 281 , Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , Neafie’s Estate, 325 Pa. 561 , Maron’s Estate, 317 Pa. 476 , Levy’s Estate, 307 Pa. 522 , Kaeir’s Estate, 264 Pa. 224 , and Hoyt’s Estate, 232 Pa. 189 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Brown's Estate
green
1 sentence1942The flat principle that the schedule of distribution, when required, is the final decree from which an appeal will lie is laid down in Brown’s Estate, 343 Pa. 19 , Forsyth’s Estate, 335 Pa. 281 , Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , Neafie’s Estate, 325 Pa. 561 , Maron’s Estate, 317 Pa. 476 , Levy’s Estate, 307 Pa. 522 , Kaeir’s Estate, 264 Pa. 224 , and Hoyt’s Estate, 232 Pa. 189 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Hood's Estate
green
1 sentence1942The flat principle that the schedule of distribution, when required, is the final decree from which an appeal will lie is laid down in Brown’s Estate, 343 Pa. 19 , Forsyth’s Estate, 335 Pa. 281 , Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , Neafie’s Estate, 325 Pa. 561 , Maron’s Estate, 317 Pa. 476 , Levy’s Estate, 307 Pa. 522 , Kaeir’s Estate, 264 Pa. 224 , and Hoyt’s Estate, 232 Pa. 189 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Forsyth's Estate
green
1 sentence1942The flat principle that the schedule of distribution, when required, is the final decree from which an appeal will lie is laid down in Brown’s Estate, 343 Pa. 19 , Forsyth’s Estate, 335 Pa. 281 , Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , Neafie’s Estate, 325 Pa. 561 , Maron’s Estate, 317 Pa. 476 , Levy’s Estate, 307 Pa. 522 , Kaeir’s Estate, 264 Pa. 224 , and Hoyt’s Estate, 232 Pa. 189 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Neafie's Estate
green
1 sentence1942The flat principle that the schedule of distribution, when required, is the final decree from which an appeal will lie is laid down in Brown’s Estate, 343 Pa. 19 , Forsyth’s Estate, 335 Pa. 281 , Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , Neafie’s Estate, 325 Pa. 561 , Maron’s Estate, 317 Pa. 476 , Levy’s Estate, 307 Pa. 522 , Kaeir’s Estate, 264 Pa. 224 , and Hoyt’s Estate, 232 Pa. 189 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Maron's Estate
neutral
1 sentence1942The flat principle that the schedule of distribution, when required, is the final decree from which an appeal will lie is laid down in Brown’s Estate, 343 Pa. 19 , Forsyth’s Estate, 335 Pa. 281 , Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , Neafie’s Estate, 325 Pa. 561 , Maron’s Estate, 317 Pa. 476 , Levy’s Estate, 307 Pa. 522 , Kaeir’s Estate, 264 Pa. 224 , and Hoyt’s Estate, 232 Pa. 189 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Levy's Estate
green
1 sentence1942The flat principle that the schedule of distribution, when required, is the final decree from which an appeal will lie is laid down in Brown’s Estate, 343 Pa. 19 , Forsyth’s Estate, 335 Pa. 281 , Hood’s Estate, 323 Pa. 253 , Neafie’s Estate, 325 Pa. 561 , Maron’s Estate, 317 Pa. 476 , Levy’s Estate, 307 Pa. 522 , Kaeir’s Estate, 264 Pa. 224 , and Hoyt’s Estate, 232 Pa. 189 . | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Ex Parte Virginia
green
1 sentence1923In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 , it was held that: “A state acts by its legislature and its executive or judicial authorities. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Bladen v. Philadelphia
green
1 sentence1911It is a flat bar to any recovery by the plaintiff in an action at law.” The one method by which a contract can be made binding upon the city of Philadelphia is “an appropriation to pay the same previously made by councils:” Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. 464 ; Perrot v. City of Philadelphia, 83 Pa., 479 ; Matthews v. City of Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 147 . | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Perrot v. City of Philadelphia
neutral
1 sentence1911It is a flat bar to any recovery by the plaintiff in an action at law.” The one method by which a contract can be made binding upon the city of Philadelphia is “an appropriation to pay the same previously made by councils:” Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. 464 ; Perrot v. City of Philadelphia, 83 Pa., 479 ; Matthews v. City of Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 147 . | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Mathews v. City of Philadelphia
green
1 sentence1911It is a flat bar to any recovery by the plaintiff in an action at law.” The one method by which a contract can be made binding upon the city of Philadelphia is “an appropriation to pay the same previously made by councils:” Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. 464 ; Perrot v. City of Philadelphia, 83 Pa., 479 ; Matthews v. City of Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 147 . | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Sloan v. James
neutral
1 sentence1908In Sloan v. James, 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 399 , we said: “The fifteenth and sixteenth specifications offend against rule XV., in that they each embrace more than one point, and specify the failure of the court to find in accordance with two distinct requests for findings of fact upon the part of the defendants, and said specifications are not to be considered.” In addition to this, the answers of the court to the points quoted in the fifth assignment are not given and we cannot find from the record that the points referred to were presented to the court at all. | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Maginn v. Dollar Savings Bank
neutral
1 sentence1894In Maginn v. Dollar Savings Bank, 131 Pa. 362 , we held that the act of 1881 was a flat bar to a recovery upon a bank check which had been presented for payment and refused, and one of the officers had told the holder it would be payable in seven weeks, for the explicit reason that the check was not accepted in writing. | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Kilheffer v. Herr
neutral
1 sentence1836The court charged the jury, in substance, that if the swell of the water remained as it was at the time of the former verdict and judgment for defendant, it was a flat bar to the plaintiff’s recovery, and this opinion is in conformity to the case of Kellkoffer v. Herr, 17 Serg. & Rawle 319. | 1 | 1836–1836 |
Fitzgerald v. Caldwell
neutral
1 sentence1793Explained in 13 S. & R., 226, where Duncan, J., says: “Fitzgerald v. Caldwell, as reported in 1 Yeates, 274 , seems to convey the opinion of Chief Justice McKean, that the interest only ceases on the sum for which the attachment is laid; he says no interest is 'to be allowed in that particular case, because the attachment was laid for a larger sum than the debt attached.” Cited in 2 W. & S., 208 , to support the proposition that if the judgment in an attachment is equal to, or exceeds the amount demanded from the garnishee on the original debt, it is a flat bar; if for less, it is a bar pro ta | 1 | 1793–1793 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.