reversal for legal error (Tennessee) · Go Syfert
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reversal for legal error in Tennessee

5 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2021 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Harrisgreen
tenn · 1996 · cited in 4 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2011–2021
2 sentences

2021Double jeopardy does not preclude “the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988); see also State v. Harris, 919 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tenn. 1996) (“[N]o constitutional provision prevents retrial after a reversal for legal error.”).

2021Double jeopardy does not preclude “the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988); see also State v. Harris, 919 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tenn. 1996) (“[N]o constitutional provision prevents retrial after a reversal for legal error.”).

44
Lockhart v. Nelsongreen
scotus · 1988 · cited in 3 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2011–2021
2 sentences

2021Double jeopardy does not preclude “the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988); see also State v. Harris, 919 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tenn. 1996) (“[N]o constitutional provision prevents retrial after a reversal for legal error.”).

2021Double jeopardy does not preclude “the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988); see also State v. Harris, 919 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tenn. 1996) (“[N]o constitutional provision prevents retrial after a reversal for legal error.”).

33
United States v. Ballgreen
scotus · 1896 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011As a general rule, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude “the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988) (citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896) (permitting retrial following reversal of conviction on direct appeal); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 464-66 (1964) (holding retrial permissible when conviction declared invalid on collateral attack)); see State v. Harris,

11
United States v. Tateogreen
scotus · 1964 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011As a general rule, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude “the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988) (citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896) (permitting retrial following reversal of conviction on direct appeal); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 464-66 (1964) (holding retrial permissible when conviction declared invalid on collateral attack)); see State v. Harris,

11
State v. Campbellgreen
tenn · 1982 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011As a general rule, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude “the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988) (citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896) (permitting retrial following reversal of conviction on direct appeal); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 464-66 (1964) (holding retrial permissible when conviction declared invalid on collateral attack)); see State v. Harris,

11
Pickens v. Stategreen
ark · 1987 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996Moreover, "upon appellate reversal of a conviction the Government is not limited at a new trial to evidence presented at the first trial, but is free to strengthen its case in any way it can by the introduction of new evidence." Pickens v. State, 292 Ark. 362 , 730 S.W.2d 230, 235 (1987), quoting, United States v. Shotwell Mfg.

1996Moreover, "upon appellate reversal of a conviction the Government is not limited at a new trial to evidence presented at the first trial, but is free to strengthen its case in any way it can by the introduction of new evidence." Pickens v. State, 292 Ark. 362 , 730 S.W.2d 230, 235 (1987), quoting, United States v. Shotwell Mfg.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
Price v. Georgia green
scotus · 1970
1 sentence

2011Implicit within this general rule “is the concept of ‘continuing jeopardy,’” a principle that applies “‘where criminal proceedings against an accused have not run their full course.’” Lydon, 466 U.S. at 308 (quoting Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 , 326- 29 (1970)).

12011–2011
Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon green
scotus · 1984
1 sentence

2011Implicit within this general rule “is the concept of ‘continuing jeopardy,’” a principle that applies “‘where criminal proceedings against an accused have not run their full course.’” Lydon, 466 U.S. at 308 (quoting Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 , 326- 29 (1970)).

12011–2011

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202 (3) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (3) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

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