Arbuckle rule in California

2017Werdegar, J. *298 In 1978, this court established a basic background rule applicable to plea negotiations in criminal cases, holding that "[a]s a general principle ... whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge." ( People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 , 756-757, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 ( Arbuckle ).) We later found the same rule applied to pleas in juvenile court. ( In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171 , 177, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 ( Mark L. ).) I

2017Werdegar, J. *298 In 1978, this court established a basic background rule applicable to plea negotiations in criminal cases, holding that "[a]s a general principle ... whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge." ( People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 , 756-757, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 ( Arbuckle ).) We later found the same rule applied to pleas in juvenile court. ( In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171 , 177, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 ( Mark L. ).) I

2021There was no discussion at this hearing of defendant waiving his right under People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 to be sentenced by the same judge accepting his plea, and defendant did not initial the Arbuckle waiver on his plea form.

2017Werdegar, J. *298 In 1978, this court established a basic background rule applicable to plea negotiations in criminal cases, holding that "[a]s a general principle ... whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge." ( People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 , 756-757, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778 , 587 P.2d 220 ( Arbuckle ).) We later found the same rule applied to pleas in juvenile court. ( In re Mark L. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 171 , 177, 193 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 666 P.2d 22 ( Mark L. ).) I

2017To do so, the prosecutor need only secure, at the time the plea is accepted, what has come to be known as an " Arbuckle waiver." (See People v. Martinez (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1156 , 1160, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 [defendant waived his Arbuckle rights]; People v. Letteer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1320, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ( Letteer ) ["the prosecution can protect **588 itself in advance from the withdrawal of a plea by requiring an Arbuckle waiver as a condition of the [plea] bargain"]; 6 People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360 , 1363, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 [trial judge "directed the clerk of

2017To do so, the prosecutor need only secure, at the time the plea is accepted, what has come to be known as an " Arbuckle waiver." (See People v. Martinez (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1156 , 1160, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 [defendant waived his Arbuckle rights]; People v. Letteer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1320, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ( Letteer ) ["the prosecution can protect **588 itself in advance from the withdrawal of a plea by requiring an Arbuckle waiver as a condition of the [plea] bargain"]; 6 People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360 , 1363, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 [trial judge "directed the clerk of

2019Were we to accept the People's argument, instead of opting out with an Arbuckle waiver , pleading defendants (and juveniles) would have to affirmatively opt in by providing an Arbuckle invocation ." ( Ibid. , emphasis in original.) In adopting its holding, the California Supreme Court noted that to the extent certain appellate court decisions "are inconsistent with this opinion, they are disapproved." 3 ( K.R. , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 313, fn.10 , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 451 , 396 P.3d 581 .) *348 B.

2019Were we to accept the People's argument, instead of opting out with an Arbuckle waiver , pleading defendants (and juveniles) would have to affirmatively opt in by providing an Arbuckle invocation ." ( Ibid. , emphasis in original.) In adopting its holding, the California Supreme Court noted that to the extent certain appellate court decisions "are inconsistent with this opinion, they are disapproved." 3 ( K.R. , supra , 3 Cal.5th at p. 313, fn.10 , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 451 , 396 P.3d 581 .) *348 B.

2019As posited in West, respondent argues that such forfeiture rule would prevent any gamesmanship on behalf of defendants who may only raise an Arbuckle claim if and when they find their sentencing unfavorable.4 West was decided in 1980, People v. Ruhl (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 311 (Ruhl), and In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911 (James H.). 4“[E]ven if a defendant could demand the same judge, he must do so; he does not have the option of taking his chances before the different judge and, if the result is 6. and predates the appellate court cases listed as disapproved by the Supreme Court in K.R.

2019As posited in West, respondent argues that such forfeiture rule would prevent any gamesmanship on behalf of defendants who may only raise an Arbuckle claim if and when they find their sentencing unfavorable.4 West was decided in 1980, People v. Ruhl (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 311 (Ruhl), and In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911 (James H.). 4“[E]ven if a defendant could demand the same judge, he must do so; he does not have the option of taking his chances before the different judge and, if the result is 6. and predates the appellate court cases listed as disapproved by the Supreme Court in K.R.

2017(See In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911 , 917, 212 Cal.Rptr. 61 ; In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge"].) Like the Harvey rule, the Arbuckle rule has entered the standard lexicon of California criminal procedure, and has been routinely applied in the courts. ( People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 , 837, 203 Cal.Rptr. 856 [noting the appellate courts had "consistently applied the rule of People v. Arbuckle "]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.

2017(See In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911 , 917, 212 Cal.Rptr. 61 ; In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge"].) Like the Harvey rule, the Arbuckle rule has entered the standard lexicon of California criminal procedure, and has been routinely applied in the courts. ( People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 , 837, 203 Cal.Rptr. 856 [noting the appellate courts had "consistently applied the rule of People v. Arbuckle "]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.

2017To do so, the prosecutor need only secure, at the time the plea is accepted, what has come to be known as an " Arbuckle waiver." (See People v. Martinez (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1156 , 1160, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 [defendant waived his Arbuckle rights]; People v. Letteer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1320, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ( Letteer ) ["the prosecution can protect **588 itself in advance from the withdrawal of a plea by requiring an Arbuckle waiver as a condition of the [plea] bargain"]; 6 People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360 , 1363, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 [trial judge "directed the clerk of

2017To do so, the prosecutor need only secure, at the time the plea is accepted, what has come to be known as an " Arbuckle waiver." (See People v. Martinez (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1156 , 1160, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 [defendant waived his Arbuckle rights]; People v. Letteer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1320, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ( Letteer ) ["the prosecution can protect **588 itself in advance from the withdrawal of a plea by requiring an Arbuckle waiver as a condition of the [plea] bargain"]; 6 People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360 , 1363, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 [trial judge "directed the clerk of

2019He made his election and is bound by it." ( West , supra , 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 992 , 165 Cal.Rptr. 24 .) The dissent noted the following concerns: "[A] defendant may thereby try to delay his or her sentencing or retain a potential right to withdraw his or her plea. [¶] And given that a same-judge term will hereafter always be implied in negotiated pleas, without reference to the record, and that some defendants may strategically decline to enter an Arbuckle waiver, the routine rotation of assignments for judges in multi-judge courts, perhaps sitting in different locations, may be hampered.

2019He made his election and is bound by it." ( West , supra , 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 992 , 165 Cal.Rptr. 24 .) The dissent noted the following concerns: "[A] defendant may thereby try to delay his or her sentencing or retain a potential right to withdraw his or her plea. [¶] And given that a same-judge term will hereafter always be implied in negotiated pleas, without reference to the record, and that some defendants may strategically decline to enter an Arbuckle waiver, the routine rotation of assignments for judges in multi-judge courts, perhaps sitting in different locations, may be hampered.

2017(People v. Horn (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 701, 707-708 ; 4 accord, In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911 ; People v. Ruhl (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 311 ; People v. Serrato (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 761 ; People v. Adams (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1540 ; People v. Hsu (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 397 ; People v. McIntosh, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 534 .)1 Such understanding by the courts of appeal is solidly rooted in our method of reasoning in both Arbuckle and Mark L., 1 According to the majority opinion, the Arbuckle rule, as understood by the appellate courts in Rosaia, DeJesus, and Ray O., ―has entered the stand

2017(People v. Horn (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 701, 707-708 ; 4 accord, In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911 ; People v. Ruhl (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 311 ; People v. Serrato (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 761 ; People v. Adams (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1540 ; People v. Hsu (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 397 ; People v. McIntosh, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 534 .)1 Such understanding by the courts of appeal is solidly rooted in our method of reasoning in both Arbuckle and Mark L., 1 According to the majority opinion, the Arbuckle rule, as understood by the appellate courts in Rosaia, DeJesus, and Ray O., ―has entered the stand

2017(See In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911 , 917, 212 Cal.Rptr. 61 ; In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge"].) Like the Harvey rule, the Arbuckle rule has entered the standard lexicon of California criminal procedure, and has been routinely applied in the courts. ( People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 , 837, 203 Cal.Rptr. 856 [noting the appellate courts had "consistently applied the rule of People v. Arbuckle "]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.

2017(See In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911 , 917, 212 Cal.Rptr. 61 ; In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136 , 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 ["whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge"].) Like the Harvey rule, the Arbuckle rule has entered the standard lexicon of California criminal procedure, and has been routinely applied in the courts. ( People v. Rosaia (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 832 , 837, 203 Cal.Rptr. 856 [noting the appellate courts had "consistently applied the rule of People v. Arbuckle "]; People v. DeJesus (1980) 110 Cal.

2025(People v Dunn (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 572, 575 (Dunn); contra, People v. Letteer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316 (Letteer), disapproved on another ground in Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1258, fn. 6 .) Defendant Jesi Ray Lant contends the trial court violated his right under Arbuckle when it denied his motion to withdraw his no contest plea and sentenced him after the judge who had accepted his plea recused herself and later retired and was not available for sentencing.

2025(People v Dunn (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 572, 575 (Dunn); contra, People v. Letteer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316 (Letteer), disapproved on another ground in Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1258, fn. 6 .) Defendant Jesi Ray Lant contends the trial court violated his right under Arbuckle when it denied his motion to withdraw his no contest plea and sentenced him after the judge who had accepted his plea recused herself and later retired and was not available for sentencing.

2025(People v Dunn (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 572, 575 (Dunn); contra, People v. Letteer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316 (Letteer), disapproved on another ground in Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1258, fn. 6 .) Defendant Jesi Ray Lant contends the trial court violated his right under Arbuckle when it denied his motion to withdraw his no contest plea and sentenced him after the judge who had accepted his plea recused herself and later retired and was not available for sentencing.

2025(People v Dunn (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 572, 575 (Dunn); contra, People v. Letteer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316 (Letteer), disapproved on another ground in Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1258, fn. 6 .) Defendant Jesi Ray Lant contends the trial court violated his right under Arbuckle when it denied his motion to withdraw his no contest plea and sentenced him after the judge who had accepted his plea recused herself and later retired and was not available for sentencing.

2017To do so, the prosecutor need only secure, at the time the plea is accepted, what has come to be known as an " Arbuckle waiver." (See People v. Martinez (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1156 , 1160, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 [defendant waived his Arbuckle rights]; People v. Letteer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1320, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ( Letteer ) ["the prosecution can protect **588 itself in advance from the withdrawal of a plea by requiring an Arbuckle waiver as a condition of the [plea] bargain"]; 6 People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360 , 1363, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 [trial judge "directed the clerk of

2017To do so, the prosecutor need only secure, at the time the plea is accepted, what has come to be known as an " Arbuckle waiver." (See People v. Martinez (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1156 , 1160, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 [defendant waived his Arbuckle rights]; People v. Letteer (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1320, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 723 ( Letteer ) ["the prosecution can protect **588 itself in advance from the withdrawal of a plea by requiring an Arbuckle waiver as a condition of the [plea] bargain"]; 6 People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360 , 1363, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 [trial judge "directed the clerk of

2015On the latter point (waiver), the appellate court in Ray O. observed early on that the right to be sentenced by the same judge who accepted the negotiated plea could be relinquished by "a clear waiver." ( In re Ray O., supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at pp. 139-140, 158 Cal.Rptr. 550 .) Two years later, the court in Thomas S. first employed the term " Arbuckle waiver" to describe such a relinquishment. ( In re Thomas S., supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 937 , 177 Cal.Rptr. 742 .) On the former point (admonishment), the court in Thomas S. also concluded that "a juvenile court should advise a minor of his Arbuc

1985(In re Ray O., supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at pp. 139-140.) In re Thomas S., supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at page 941 , summarizes the clear waiver standard as applicable to this case: “We are in no position to speculate on what percentage of records will clearly reflect an Arbuckle waiver in the absence of an admonishment.

2017(Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 757 .) However, one court has considered whether the minor was prejudiced by alleged Arbuckle error, applying the prejudice standard from People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ] (Watson).

2017(Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 757 .) However, one court has considered whether the minor was prejudiced by alleged Arbuckle error, applying the prejudice standard from People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ] (Watson).

2014(People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80, 84 [“To be enforceable, a defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary”]; People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1659 [“express waiver of the right to appeal made pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement is valid providing defendant’s waiver is 9 2.

2014(People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80, 84 [“To be enforceable, a defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary”]; People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1659 [“express waiver of the right to appeal made pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement is valid providing defendant’s waiver is 9 2.

2014(People v. McIntosh (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 534, 540-542 [a defendant’s right to sentencing by the trial court taking the plea is only a “contractual right” found in the express or implied terms of the plea bargain]; Taylor v. Bowersox (8th Cir. 2003) 329 F.3d 963, 967-969 [there is no independent federal constitutional right to be sentenced by the same judge who took a guilty plea and no federal constitutional provision guarantees such a right]; see Davis v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2006) 446 F.3d 957, 960-963 .) We would also find we cannot address appellant’s Arbuckle claim on appeal.

2014(People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9 ; Kinney v. Vaccari (1980) 27 Cal.3d 348, 356, fn. 6 .) Furthermore, were we to address these issues, we would find a voluntary, knowing and intelligent negotiated plea and waiver of the right to appeal appellant’s Arbuckle issue and no violation of appellant’s federal due process right to an impartial judge.