section 13 five year limitations period in Illinois

2001Corrigan Construction Co. , 149 Ill. 2d 190, 196 (1992) (holding that the limitations period in section 13--214(a) takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13--202 of the Code); Tatara , 283 Ill. App. 3d at 1038 (same); Zimmer v. Village of Willowbrook , 242 Ill. App. 3d 437, 443, 446-47 (1993) (finding that (1) in suit against municipality, limitations period for construction-related actions found in section 13--214(a) of the Code applies over limitations period found in section 8--101 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunit

2001Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 196 (1992) (holding that the limitations period in section 13 — 214(a) takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13 — 202 of the Code); Tatara, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 1038 (same); Zimmer v. Village of Willowbrook, 242 Ill. App. 3d 437, 443, 446-47 (1993) (finding that (1) in suit against municipality, limitations period for construction-related actions found in section 13 — 214(a) of the Code applies over limitations period found in section 8 — 101 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immuni

1992App. 3d 464 , 532 N.E.2d 314 , which rejected a similar argument, finding that “the statute of repose of section 13 — 214(b) must be read in conjunction with the statute of limitations of section 13 — 214(a). [Citation.] [The] distinction between the statute of limitations and statute of repose does not change the result of this case.” LaSalle, 177 Ill.

1992App. 3d 464 , 532 N.E.2d 314 , which rejected a similar argument, finding that “the statute of repose of section 13 — 214(b) must be read in conjunction with the statute of limitations of section 13 — 214(a). [Citation.] [The] distinction between the statute of limitations and statute of repose does not change the result of this case.” LaSalle, 177 Ill.

2011See Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502 (2007); Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill. 2d 1 (2007).

2011See Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502 (2007); Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill. 2d 1 (2007).

2008Andreoli v. John Henry Homes, Inc., 297 Ill.

2008Andreoli v. John Henry Homes, Inc., 297 Ill.

2008In Shaw v. Lorenz, 42 Ill. 2d 246, 248 (1969), this court noted the general rule that although a defense not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal by an appellant, “the appellee may urge any point in support of the judgment on appeal, even though not directly ruled on by the -7- trial court, so long as the factual basis for such point was before the trial court.” Here, defendants were the appellees, urging the appellate court to affirm the circuit court’s decision.

2008In Shaw v. Lorenz, 42 Ill. 2d 246, 248 (1969), this court noted the general rule that although a defense not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal by an appellant, “the appellee may urge any point in support of the judgment on appeal, even though not directly ruled on by the trial court, so long as the factual basis for such point was before the trial court.” Here, defendants were the appellees, urging the appellate court to affirm the circuit court’s decision.

2006However, where a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action is under a legal disability such as mental incompetency at the time the cause of action accrued, the plaintiffs action is subject to the tolling provision of section 13— 212(c) and not the four-year repose period of section 13 — 212(a) for adults or the eight-year repose period of section 13 — 212(b) for minors. 735 ILCS 13 — 212 (West 2002); see Bruso, 178 Ill. 2d at 461 .

1998See Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 Ill. 2d 445 (1997) (holding that where a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action is a minor and also under another legal disability such as mental incompetency, the plaintiff’s action is subject to the tolling provision of section 13 — 212(c) and not the eight-year repose period of section 13 — 212(b)).

2006Thereafter, in Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 37-38 (2001), this court concluded that it did not have to decide whether section 13 — 215 tolled the statute of limitations in section 13 — 214.3(b), or whether the defendants had fraudulently concealed plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim, because plaintiff had admitted that he knew of the facts forming the basis of his claim shortly after the cause of action arose.

2006Thereafter, in Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 37-38 (2001), this court concluded that it did not have to decide whether section 13B215 tolled the statute of limitations in section 13B214.3(b), or whether the defendants had fraudulently concealed plaintiff=s breach of fiduciary duty claim, because plaintiff had admitted that he knew of the facts forming the basis of his claim shortly after the cause of action arose.

2005Because Osman’s action was a counterclaim, the subject of section 13–207, and Osman had owned the claim before it was barred, section 13–207 seemingly would apply to negate the two-year limitation of section 13–204. 352 Ill.

2005Because Osman’s action was a counterclaim, the subject of section 13 — 207, and Osman had owned the claim before it was barred, section 13 — 207 seemingly would apply to negate the two-year limitation of section 13 — 204. 352 Ill.

2001App. 3d 860, 868 (1993); Partipilo v. Hallman, 156 Ill.

2001App. 3d 860, 868 (1993); Partipilo v. Hallman , 156 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13 — 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g., Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560-61 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g., Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13–205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g. , Hagney v. Lopeman , 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc. , 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560-61 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g. , Rohter v. Passarella , 246 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13 — 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g., Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560-61 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g., Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13–205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g. , Hagney v. Lopeman , 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc. , 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560-61 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g. , Rohter v. Passarella , 246 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13 — 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g., Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560-61 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g., Rohter v. Passarella, 246 Ill.

2001Specifically, courts have applied the limitations bar of section 13–205 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its predecessor provisions to constructive trust cases sounding in equity (see, e.g. , Hagney v. Lopeman , 147 Ill. 2d 458, 462 (1992), citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc. , 78 Ill. 2d 555, 560-61 (1980)), as well as to implied contract or assumpsit actions at law (see, e.g. , Rohter v. Passarella , 246 Ill.

2001“If at the time the plaintiff discovers the ‘fraudulent concealment’ a reasonable time remains within the applicable statute of limitations, [section 13–215] does not toll the running of the limitation period.” Anderson v. Wagner , 79 Ill. 2d 295, 322 (1979); accord Serafin v. Seith , 284 Ill.

2001“If at the time the plaintiff discovers the ‘fraudulent concealment’ a reasonable time remains within the applicable statute of limitations, [section 13 — 215] does not toll the running of the limitation period.” Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 322 (1979); accord Serafin v. Seith, 284 Ill.

1997The Court stated as follows: “In Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 450 , our Court ruled that an action for contribution must be filed within the four year time limit specified in section 13 — 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 — 212(a).) The dissenting opinions (Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 450, 471 (Clark, J. dissenting), 473 (Calvo, J., joined by Ward and Clark, JJ., dissenting), believed that in this case such an interpretation denied a constitutional right for ‘certain remedy.’ Justice Clark, in his dissent, observe

1997The Court stated as follows: “In Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 450 , our Court ruled that an action for contribution must be filed within the four year time limit specified in section 13 — 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 — 212(a).) The dissenting opinions (Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 450, 471 (Clark, J. dissenting), 473 (Calvo, J., joined by Ward and Clark, JJ., dissenting), believed that in this case such an interpretation denied a constitutional right for ‘certain remedy.’ Justice Clark, in his dissent, observe

2006Plaintiffs argument rests on the dissent authored by Justice McMorrow in Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186, 201 , 720 N.E.2d 1075 (1999) (McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Rathje, J.).

2006Plaintiffs argument rests on the dissent authored by Justice McMorrow in Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186, 201 , 720 N.E.2d 1075 (1999) (McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Rathje, J.).

2009Miller, 186 Ill.

2006“The phrase ‘arising out of’ is broad and generally means ‘originating from,’ ‘growing out of,’ or ‘flowing from.’ ” Miller v. Tobin, 186 Ill.

2002Blacke, 268 Ill.

2000See Krantz v. Industrial Comm’n, 289 Ill. App. 3d 447, 450, 452 (1997) (holding that claimant must seek relief under Rule 137 (134 Ill. 2d R. 137) against employer for employer’s frivolous appeal because Commission had no power to make such an award since the Act contained no provision therefor); Blache v. Industrial Comm’n, 268 Ill. App. 3d 26, 29 (1994) (applying statute of limitations found in section 13 — 205 of the Code to section 19(g) of the Act; stating that in the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary, court will apply Code provision where it is deemed necessary to facilitat

2001Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 8--101) because former statute was enacted after latter provision; and (2) section 13--214(a), as a specific statutory provision, takes precedence over the limitations period for certain actions found in section 13--205 of the Code); American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Booth/Hansen Associates, Ltd. , 186 Ill. App. 3d 865, 867-69 (1989) (holding that the then two-year statute of limitations for construction-related actions found in section 13--214(a) of the Code applies over the five-year statute of limitations period for certain actions found in section 13

2001Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 8 — 101) because former statute was enacted after latter provision; and (2) section 13 — 214(a), as a specific statutory provision, takes precedence over the limitations period for certain actions found in section 13 — 205 of the Code); American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Booth/Hansen Associates, Ltd., 186 Ill. App. 3d 865, 867-69 (1989) (holding that the then two-year statute of limitations for construction-related actions found in section 13 — 214(a) of the Code applies over the five-year statute of limitations period for certain actions found in section