intent and objective test in California

2025(People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 336 .) A “defendant who attempts to achieve sexual gratification by committing a number of base criminal acts on his victim is substantially more culpable than a defendant who commits only one such act.” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 553 .) Thus, the single intent and objective test is narrowly applied to sex crimes.

2016Defendant acknowledged this was the case in his reply brief. 8 pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335 (Harrison).) Subsequently, in People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203 , our Supreme Court characterized this single intent and objective test as a “ ‘judicial gloss’ that could defeat section 654’s purpose of matching punishment with culpability.

2025We therefore decline to extend the single intent and objective test of section 654 beyond its purpose to preclude punishment for each such act.” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 553 .) Section 667.6, subdivision (c) provides that “a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of an offense specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve the same victim on the same occasion.

2025(People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 336 .) A “defendant who attempts to achieve sexual gratification by committing a number of base criminal acts on his victim is substantially more culpable than a defendant who commits only one such act.” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 553 .) Thus, the single intent and objective test is narrowly applied to sex crimes.

1995Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people, by this light!'" (As quoted in Dukeminier & Johanson, Family Wealth Transactions: Wills, Trusts, Future Interests, and Estate Planning (1972) p. 680, fn. 6.) [14] The section's purpose is "to insure that a defendant's punishment [is] commensurate with his culpability. [Citation.]" ( People v. Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 552 .) [15] There are others besides the sex crime exception, for example, multiple victims of violent crimes (see People v. Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 1211-1212) and multiple victims of burglaries in one commercial buil

1995Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people, by this light!'" (As quoted in Dukeminier & Johanson, Family Wealth Transactions: Wills, Trusts, Future Interests, and Estate Planning (1972) p. 680, fn. 6.) [14] The section's purpose is "to insure that a defendant's punishment [is] commensurate with his culpability. [Citation.]" ( People v. Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 552 .) [15] There are others besides the sex crime exception, for example, multiple victims of violent crimes (see People v. Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 1211-1212) and multiple victims of burglaries in one commercial buil

1966(People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 760 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 .) Under the intent and objective test, where separate offenses occurring in a course of conduct are incident to a single objective the course of conduct is indivisible, constitutes one act within the meaning of section 654, and subjects the offender only to one punishment.

1966(People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 760 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 .) Under the intent and objective test, where separate offenses occurring in a course of conduct are incident to a single objective the course of conduct is indivisible, constitutes one act within the meaning of section 654, and subjects the offender only to one punishment.

2016The Attorney General argues that section 654 does not bar multiple punishment where the defendant commits two crimes in pursuit of two independent objectives even if they are simultaneous. ( People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203 , 1212, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 144 , 858 P.2d 611 .) Where "single act" circumstances exist, as is the case here, the "single act" test supplants "the intent and objective test" discussed in Neal v. State of California , supra , 55 Cal.2d at p. 19 , 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 and People v. Latimer , supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1208 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 144 , 858 P.2d 611 .

2016The Attorney General argues that section 654 does not bar multiple punishment where the defendant commits two crimes in pursuit of two independent objectives even if they are simultaneous. ( People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203 , 1212, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 144 , 858 P.2d 611 .) Where "single act" circumstances exist, as is the case here, the "single act" test supplants "the intent and objective test" discussed in Neal v. State of California , supra , 55 Cal.2d at p. 19 , 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 and People v. Latimer , supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1208 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 144 , 858 P.2d 611 .

2000None was spontaneous or uncontrollable.” (Ibid.) Consequently, the Trotter court rejected the single intent and objective analysis for application of section 654 and instead used the reasoning of cases arising in the context of multiple sex offenses committed on a single victim in rapid succession. ( 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 368 ; see People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 401 , 768 P.2d 1078 ].) Similarly, here it may be argued that evidence indicated the victim was shot with a revolver and expert testimony showed each shot at the victim with a revolver required a separate de

1995We found that “. . . under the long recognized ‘intent and objective’ test, each shot evinced a separate intent to do violence just as each new and separate penetration in Harrison evinced a new and separate intent and objective.” (People v. Trotter, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 368.) We erred by construing Harrison as a case “where the court allowed separate and consecutive punishment on the basis of defendant’s intent.” 8 ( 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 367 .) Harrison , like Perez , eschewed the intent and objective test and applied the sex offense exception. 9 And, our court erred as a matter of logic

2016(People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353 .) Where violations of different provisions of law are premised on multiple acts, a course of conduct is implicated, and the intent and objective test governs in determining whether Penal Code section 654 applies. ( Jones, supra, at p. 359 .) “If [the defendant] entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of co

1979(See e.g., People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 887 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 654 , 558 P.2d 552 ]; People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 189 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 68 , 507 P.2d 956 ]; People v. Isenor (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 324, 335-336 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 746 ].) As we noted in Beamon, the intent and objective test has a number of refinements. ( 8 Cal.3d at p. 638, fn. 10 .) For example, a defendant who entertained but a single principal objective during an indivisible course of conduct may nevertheless be punished for multiple convictions resulting from acts of violence against different victims.

2016(People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353 .) Where violations of different provisions of law are premised on multiple acts, a course of conduct is implicated, and the intent and objective test governs in determining whether Penal Code section 654 applies. ( Jones, supra, at p. 359 .) “If [the defendant] entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of co

2016(People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353 .) Where violations of different provisions of law are premised on multiple acts, a course of conduct is implicated, and the intent and objective test governs in determining whether Penal Code section 654 applies. ( Jones, supra, at p. 359 .) “If [the defendant] entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of co

2016If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.” (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 , disapproved on other grounds by People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 334, 336 .) “Because of the many differing circumstances wherein criminal conduct involving multiple violations may be deemed to arise out of an ‘act or omission,’ there can be no universal construction which directs the proper application of section 654 in every instance. [Citation.]” (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 636 .

1994(People v. Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 553-554; People v. Catelli (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1446-1447 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 452 ].) While Perez held that, for the purpose of section 654, each sexual act is considered to be complete before the next sexual act begins, the opinion did not address how the temporal duration of a sex crime is to be measured for the purpose of enhanced punishment, such as the felony-murder rule or a weapon-use enhancement.

1994(People v. Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 553-554; People v. Catelli (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1446-1447 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 452 ].) While Perez held that, for the purpose of section 654, each sexual act is considered to be complete before the next sexual act begins, the opinion did not address how the temporal duration of a sex crime is to be measured for the purpose of enhanced punishment, such as the felony-murder rule or a weapon-use enhancement.

1993Justice Schauer, the author of Brown and Chapman, supra, 43 Cal.2d 385 , disagreed sharply with the Neal test. ( Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 21-26 (dis. opn. of Schauer, J.); Seiterle v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 397, 403-406 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 369 P.2d 697 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Schauer, J.); People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 763-784 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Schauer, J.).) With more justification, Justice Schauer referred to the test superseded by Neal as the “Chapman-Brown rule.” (Seiterle v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d 397, 404 (conc. & di

1993Justice Schauer, the author of Brown and Chapman, supra, 43 Cal.2d 385 , disagreed sharply with the Neal test. ( Neal, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 21-26 (dis. opn. of Schauer, J.); Seiterle v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 397, 403-406 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 369 P.2d 697 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Schauer, J.); People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 763-784 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Schauer, J.).) With more justification, Justice Schauer referred to the test superseded by Neal as the “Chapman-Brown rule.” (Seiterle v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d 397, 404 (conc. & di

1991(People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 913 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ] [attempted robbery and attempted murder]; In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ] [multiple victims of a shooting melee].) Unlike theft or homicide offenses, the completion of a sex offense has been narrowly defined in order to avoid the multiple punishment proscription of section 654 and to permit imposition of multiple punishment of a defendant who commits multiple sex offenses against a single victim. (§ 667.6, subds. (c), (d).) Each criminal sexual act, even when one foll

1991(People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 913 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ] [attempted robbery and attempted murder]; In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ] [multiple victims of a shooting melee].) Unlike theft or homicide offenses, the completion of a sex offense has been narrowly defined in order to avoid the multiple punishment proscription of section 654 and to permit imposition of multiple punishment of a defendant who commits multiple sex offenses against a single victim. (§ 667.6, subds. (c), (d).) Each criminal sexual act, even when one foll

1991(People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 913 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ] [attempted robbery and attempted murder]; In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ] [multiple victims of a shooting melee].) Unlike theft or homicide offenses, the completion of a sex offense has been narrowly defined in order to avoid the multiple punishment proscription of section 654 and to permit imposition of multiple punishment of a defendant who commits multiple sex offenses against a single victim. (§ 667.6, subds. (c), (d).) Each criminal sexual act, even when one foll

1991(People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 913 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569 ] [attempted robbery and attempted murder]; In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330, 333 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ] [multiple victims of a shooting melee].) Unlike theft or homicide offenses, the completion of a sex offense has been narrowly defined in order to avoid the multiple punishment proscription of section 654 and to permit imposition of multiple punishment of a defendant who commits multiple sex offenses against a single victim. (§ 667.6, subds. (c), (d).) Each criminal sexual act, even when one foll

1979(See e.g., People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 887 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 654 , 558 P.2d 552 ]; People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 189 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 68 , 507 P.2d 956 ]; People v. Isenor (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 324, 335-336 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 746 ].) As we noted in Beamon, the intent and objective test has a number of refinements. ( 8 Cal.3d at p. 638, fn. 10 .) For example, a defendant who entertained but a single principal objective during an indivisible course of conduct may nevertheless be punished for multiple convictions resulting from acts of violence against different victims.

1979(See e.g., People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 887 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 654 , 558 P.2d 552 ]; People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 189 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 68 , 507 P.2d 956 ]; People v. Isenor (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 324, 335-336 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 746 ].) As we noted in Beamon, the intent and objective test has a number of refinements. ( 8 Cal.3d at p. 638, fn. 10 .) For example, a defendant who entertained but a single principal objective during an indivisible course of conduct may nevertheless be punished for multiple convictions resulting from acts of violence against different victims.