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33 California opinions name it 3 courts 1993–2025 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burris v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2023(See, e.g., Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1019 [“[f]elony prosecutions . . . are subject to a two-dismissal rule; two previous dismissals of charges for the same offense will bar a new felony charge”].) Furthermore, our review does not disclose that defendant was prejudiced by the delay in bringing defendant to trial on the first filing of the felony charges. 2022In no case shall the additional refiling of charges provided under this section be permitted where the conduct of the prosecution amounted to bad faith.” (Id., subd. (a).) “‘[E]xcusable neglect’ includes, but is not limited to, error on the part of the court, prosecution, law enforcement agency, or witnesses.” (Id., subd. (b).) 4. previous dismissals of charges for the same offense will bar a new felony charge.’” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 255 , quoting Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1019 (Burris).) However, section 1387.1 provides an exception to the two-dism | 9 | 13 |
People v. Superior Court (Martinez)green2 sentences2016Even a dismissal in the superior court following an order setting aside an information or indictment is no bar to a future prosecution for the same offense. (... § 999; see also § 1387.)" ( People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662 , 666, 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ( Uhlemann ).) *849 Section 1387 " 'is sometimes loosely described as establishing a two-dismissal rule.' " ( *1241 People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260 , 270, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80 , 991 P.2d 165 ( Hatch ), citing People v. Superior Court ( Martinez ) (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 738 , 744, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 733 .) Section 1387, subdivision 2016Even a dismissal in the superior court following an order setting aside an information or indictment is no bar to a future prosecution for the same offense. (... § 999; see also § 1387.)" ( People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662 , 666, 108 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 511 P.2d 609 ( Uhlemann ).) *849 Section 1387 " 'is sometimes loosely described as establishing a two-dismissal rule.' " ( *1241 People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260 , 270, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80 , 991 P.2d 165 ( Hatch ), citing People v. Superior Court ( Martinez ) (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 738 , 744, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 733 .) Section 1387, subdivision | 5 | 7 |
People v. Woodsgreen2 sentences2021Section 1387.1 creates an exception to the two- dismissal rule, and permits a third filing, where the action involves a “violent felony” as defined in section 667.5, and where either of the prior dismissals was “due solely to excusable neglect” and the conduct of the prosecution did not “amount[ ] to bad faith.”2 (§1387.1, subd. (a).) The exception was “designed to save serious-felony prosecutions from improvident loss.” (People v. Woods (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1157 .) “ ‘[E]xcusable neglect’ includes, but is not limited to, error on the part of the court, prosecution, law enforcement agen 2020(Id. at p. 1197, citing People v. Woods (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1155 ; Dunn v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1114 .) Section 1387.1, subdivision (a) creates an exception to the two-dismissal rule for violent felonies: “Where an offense is a violent felony, as defined in Section 667.5 and the prosecution has had two prior dismissals, as defined in Section 1387, the people shall be permitted one additional opportunity to refile charges where either of the prior dismissals under Section 1387 were due solely to excusable neglect. | 3 | 5 |
People v. Cossiogreen2 sentences2016Section 1387, subdivision (c), provides: "An order terminating an action is not a bar to prosecution if a complaint is dismissed before the commencement of a preliminary hearing in favor of an indictment filed pursuant to [s]ection 944 and the indictment *850 is based upon the same subject matter as charged in the dismissed complaint, information, or indictment." An exception to the two-dismissal rule is when after a complaint has been filed the prosecution seeks an indictment based on the same charges prior to the preliminary hearing on the complaint. ( Uhlemann, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 666 , 1 2016Section 1387, subdivision (c), provides: "An order terminating an action is not a bar to prosecution if a complaint is dismissed before the commencement of a preliminary hearing in favor of an indictment filed pursuant to [s]ection 944 and the indictment *850 is based upon the same subject matter as charged in the dismissed complaint, information, or indictment." An exception to the two-dismissal rule is when after a complaint has been filed the prosecution seeks an indictment based on the same charges prior to the preliminary hearing on the complaint. ( Uhlemann, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 666 , 1 | 3 | 5 |
People v. Masongreen2 sentences2023(People v. Mason (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1195 (Mason).) Section 1387.1 carves out an exception to the two-dismissal rule when the action involves a violent felony, as defined in section 667.5. 2021DISCUSSION I Section 1387 and the Two Dismissal Rule Section 1387, subdivision (a), provides, in part and with four enumerated exceptions not relevant here: “An order terminating an action pursuant to this chapter, or Section 859b, 861, 871, or 995, is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense if it is a felony . . . and the action has been previously terminated pursuant to this chapter, or Section 859b, 861, 871, or 995. . . .” “This commonly is called in felony cases the two dismissal rule.” (People v. Mason (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1195 .) 12 Defendant’s contentions, summarize | 3 | 4 |
People v. Trujequegreen2 sentences2023I Legal Background “Under section 1387, felony prosecutions are generally ‘subject to a two-dismissal rule; two previous dismissals of charges for the same offense will bar a new felony charge.’ [Citation.] . . . [Section 1387.1] provides an exception to the ‘two-dismissal rule’: it permits the prosecution to file a violent felony charge a third time if either of the prior dismissals were due to ‘excusable neglect,’ and the prosecution did not act in ‘bad faith.’ (§ 1387.1, subd. (a); see Miller v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 728, 739 .)” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 25 2022In no case shall the additional refiling of charges provided under this section be permitted where the conduct of the prosecution amounted to bad faith.” (Id., subd. (a).) “‘[E]xcusable neglect’ includes, but is not limited to, error on the part of the court, prosecution, law enforcement agency, or witnesses.” (Id., subd. (b).) 4. previous dismissals of charges for the same offense will bar a new felony charge.’” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 255 , quoting Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1019 (Burris).) However, section 1387.1 provides an exception to the two-dism | 3 | 4 |
People v. Masseygreen2 sentences2023Under section 1387.1, a third filing is permitted where (1) either of the prior dismissals were “due solely to excusable neglect,” and (2) the conduct of the prosecution did not “amount[] to bad faith.” ( Mason, supra, at p. 1196 .) The statute broadly defines excusable neglect by stating it “includes, but is not limited to, error on the part of the court, prosecution, law enforcement agency, or witnesses.” (§ 1387.1, subd. (b).) “ ‘ “[E]xcusable neglect is neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” ’ ” (People v. M 2023(Miller v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 728, 741 (Miller); People v. Massey (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 204, 211 (Massey); People v. Woods (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1149 (Woods).) In Miller, the appellate court denied a writ petition challenging the denial of a section 1387 motion to dismiss the prosecution of charges, including robbery and first degree burglary, after a third filing. | 3 | 3 |
Miller v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2023The Legislature had created an exception to the two-dismissal rule that would likely apply in this instance, but the exception is reserved for violent felonies.5 (§ 1387.1.) “Where an offense is a violent felony, as defined in Section 667.5 and the prosecution has had two prior dismissals, as defined in Section 1387, the people shall be permitted one additional opportunity to refile charges where either of the prior dismissals under Section 1387 were due solely to excusable neglect.” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “Simply expressed, ‘excusable neglect is neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reas 2023The Legislature had created an exception to the two-dismissal rule that would likely apply in this instance, but the exception is reserved for violent felonies.5 (§ 1387.1.) “Where an offense is a violent felony, as defined in Section 667.5 and the prosecution has had two prior dismissals, as defined in Section 1387, the people shall be permitted one additional opportunity to refile charges where either of the prior dismissals under Section 1387 were due solely to excusable neglect.” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “Simply expressed, ‘excusable neglect is neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reas | 2 | 6 |
Sutton Place Development Company, a Florida Corporation, Henry Weiss and Carol Weiss v. Abacus Mortgage Investment Companygreen2 sentences2023(See Sutton Place, supra, 826 F.2d at p. 640 [in considering the two-dismissal rule of Rule 41(a)(1)(B), “it must be remembered that federal rules are carefully-crafted instruments designed to achieve, by their uniform application, fairness and expedition in the conduct of federal litigation”]; see also 9 Wright & Miller, § 2368, fns. omitted [“two[-]dismissal rule applies in federal court actions whether the first dismissal was in a state or a federal court”].) The fact that Rule 41(a) is centered on federal court proceedings is underscored by the application of the two-dismissal rule. 2023(See Sutton Place, supra, 826 F.2d at p. 640 [in considering the two-dismissal rule of Rule 41(a)(1)(B), “it must be remembered that federal rules are carefully-crafted instruments designed to achieve, by their uniform application, fairness and expedition in the conduct of federal litigation”]; see also 9 Wright & Miller, § 2368, fns. omitted [“two[-]dismissal rule applies in federal court actions whether the first dismissal was in a state or a federal court”].) The fact that Rule 41(a) is centered on federal court proceedings is underscored by the application of the two-dismissal rule. | 2 | 3 |
Dunn v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2020(Id. at p. 1197, citing People v. Woods (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1155 ; Dunn v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1114 .) Section 1387.1, subdivision (a) creates an exception to the two-dismissal rule for violent felonies: “Where an offense is a violent felony, as defined in Section 667.5 and the prosecution has had two prior dismissals, as defined in Section 1387, the people shall be permitted one additional opportunity to refile charges where either of the prior dismissals under Section 1387 were due solely to excusable neglect. 2020(Id. at p. 1197, citing People v. Woods (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1155 ; Dunn v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1114 .) Section 1387.1, subdivision (a) creates an exception to the two-dismissal rule for violent felonies: “Where an offense is a violent felony, as defined in Section 667.5 and the prosecution has had two prior dismissals, as defined in Section 1387, the people shall be permitted one additional opportunity to refile charges where either of the prior dismissals under Section 1387 were due solely to excusable neglect. | 2 | 3 |
| People v. Salcidogreen | 2 | 2 |
Jackson v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty.green2 sentences2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, | 2 | 2 |
Tarrant Regional Water Dist. v. Herrmanngreen2 sentences2023(See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 880 [“ ‘When the Legislature “has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.” ’ ”]; Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann (2013) 569 U.S. 614, 629 [“ ‘ “[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed [that] Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” ’ ”].) Finally, a dismissal under section 1385 is different than the other grounds of dismissal lis 2023(See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 880 [“ ‘When the Legislature “has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.” ’ ”]; Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann (2013) 569 U.S. 614, 629 [“ ‘ “[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed [that] Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” ’ ”].) Finally, a dismissal under section 1385 is different than the other grounds of dismissal lis | 2 | 2 |
Fred Engelhardt, D/B/A Engelhardt's Camera Store v. Bell & Howell Company, a Corporationgreen2 sentences2023(See Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co. (8th Cir. 1962) 299 F.2d 480, 484 [plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of second federal diversity suit following dismissal of prior federal diversity suit was an “ ‘adjudication [on] the merits’ ” barring third federal action].) Here, however, Appellants filed a state court action alleging only state-law claims, having abandoned the federal claims they had asserted in the first and second federal suits. 2023(See Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co. (8th Cir. 1962) 299 F.2d 480, 484 [plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of second federal diversity suit following dismissal of prior federal diversity suit was an “ ‘adjudication [on] the merits’ ” barring third federal action].) Here, however, Appellants filed a state court action alleging only state-law claims, having abandoned the federal claims they had asserted in the first and second federal suits. | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Buycksgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Hatchgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Uhlemanngreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Juarezgreen2 sentences2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 2023“These are questions of statutory interpretation that we must consider de novo.” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 [reviewing questions of statutory interpretation of section 1387 under the de novo review standard].) The Two-Dismissal Rule Under Section 1387, Subdivision (a) “[S]ection 1387 limits the number of times the prosecution may dismiss and refile charges.” (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 107 .) “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, | 1 | 4 |
| People v. Standishgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commercial Space Management Company, Inc. v. The Boeing Company, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Louie v. BFS Retail & Commercial Operations, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hardy v. America's Best Home Loansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Geiergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Zamudiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Traylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hernandezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mancebogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Poseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robles v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Navarettegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yeroushalmi v. Miramar Sheratongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Unzueta v. Ocean View School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Landrum v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Buena Vista Mines, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Garciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lee v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIVgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| People v. MacKeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Casey v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2021We are inclined to agree with the Casey court that a dismissal in substance for lack of jurisdiction is not a dismissal for purposes of section 1387. ( Casey, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 842-846.) Lack of jurisdiction is not a ground supporting a section 995 motion by its terms, and the section that does authorize a demurrer for such defect is not among the provisions section 1387 sets forth as constituting a prior termination of an action thus subject to the two dismissal rule. 2016So the two-dismissal rule of section 1387 does not apply. ( Casey, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 844-845, 255 Cal.Rptr. 81 .) In sum, Judge Evans's dismissal for lack of territorial jurisdiction in case No. 13CF0463 was not a dismissal within the meaning of section 1385 and the two-dismissal rule of section 1387 did not apply. | 5 | 2016–2023 |
Ramos v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1997In Ramos v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 26 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 648 P.2d 589 ], our Supreme Court held that a “special circumstances” allegation, because of its dire consequence, comes within the two-dismissal rule. 1997In Ramos v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 26 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 648 P.2d 589 ], our Supreme Court held that a “special circumstances” allegation, because of its dire consequence, comes within the two-dismissal rule. | 4 | 1997–2023 |
Jeffrey R. Cooper v. Phillip Glasser
green
2 sentences2023(See Cooper v. Glasser (Tenn. 2013) 419 S.W.3d 924 (Cooper).) There, the plaintiff filed and voluntarily dismissed a suit in California state court. 2023Gray also relied on the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Cooper v. Glasser (Tenn. 2013) 419 S.W.3d 924 , in which the Tennessee court held a second dismissal in the federal court did not have claim-preclusive effect. | 3 | 2023–2023 |
Berardi v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2017But the rationale for this exception is that an indictment ordinarily continues existing, uninterrupted criminal proceedings that were initiated by the complaint. ( Berardi v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 210 , 222, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 664 .) Here, the prosecution did not merely continue prior proceedings; it sought to reinitiate criminal proceedings by having Jackson rearrested and having a new competency hearing. 2017But the rationale for this exception is that an indictment ordinarily continues existing, uninterrupted criminal proceedings that were initiated by the complaint. ( Berardi v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 210 , 222, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 664 .) Here, the prosecution did not merely continue prior proceedings; it sought to reinitiate criminal proceedings by having Jackson rearrested and having a new competency hearing. | 3 | 2013–2017 |
ASX Investment Corp. v. Newton
green
2 sentences2023Corp. v. Newton (11th Cir. 1999) 183 F.3d 1265 , 1267 [the court “take[s] care not to construe the [two-dismissal] rule too broadly”].) Rule 41(a)(1)(B) “applies in federal court actions whether the first dismissal was in a state or a federal court.” (9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (4th. ed.) Voluntary Dismissal—Effect of Second Dismissal on Same Claim, § 2368 (Wright & Miller), fns. omitted, italics added.) The two-dismissal rule does not apply to bar a federal suit following the voluntary dismissal of two state court actions. 2023Corp. v. Newton (11th Cir. 1999) 183 F.3d 1265 , 1267 [the court “take[s] care not to construe the [two-dismissal] rule too broadly”].) Rule 41(a)(1)(B) “applies in federal court actions whether the first dismissal was in a state or a federal court.” (9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (4th. ed.) Voluntary Dismissal—Effect of Second Dismissal on Same Claim, § 2368 (Wright & Miller), fns. omitted, italics added.) The two-dismissal rule does not apply to bar a federal suit following the voluntary dismissal of two state court actions. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
City of San Jose v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023This is consistent with rules of statutory interpretation, which provide all terms of the statute have meaning. “ ‘ “A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.” ’ ” (T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 334, 351 .) “We ordinarily reject interpretations that render particular terms of a statute mere surplusage, instead giving every word so 2023This is consistent with rules of statutory interpretation, which provide all terms of the statute have meaning. “ ‘ “A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.” ’ ” (T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 334, 351 .) “We ordinarily reject interpretations that render particular terms of a statute mere surplusage, instead giving every word so | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Camacho v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (In re Camacho)
neutral
2 sentences2023Cal. 2013) 489 B.R. 837, 843 , italics added [under Rule 41(a)(1)(B), a voluntary dismissal that is an “ ‘adjudication [on] the merits,’ is a dismissal that does bar the plaintiff from returning to the federal court with the same claim”].) Rule 41(a)(1)(B) says nothing about the application of the two-dismissal rule—i.e., whether the second federal court dismissal has claim-preclusive effect—when the third action is filed in state court. 20 There is no question that had Appellants, after voluntarily dismissing the second federal action, filed the present claim in the United Stated District Cou 2023Cal. 2013) 489 B.R. 837, 843 , italics added [under Rule 41(a)(1)(B), a voluntary dismissal that is an “ ‘adjudication [on] the merits,’ is a dismissal that does bar the plaintiff from returning to the federal court with the same claim”].) Rule 41(a)(1)(B) says nothing about the application of the two-dismissal rule—i.e., whether the second federal court dismissal has claim-preclusive effect—when the third action is filed in state court. 20 There is no question that had Appellants, after voluntarily dismissing the second federal action, filed the present claim in the United Stated District Cou | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Kowalski
green
2 sentences2023(See Curry v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 221 ; People v. Kowalski (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 174 .) Neither case has been extended to apply to the 60-day requirement to hold a preliminary hearing under section 859b, let alone to the two-dismissal rule of section 1387. 2023(See Curry v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 221 ; People v. Kowalski (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 174 .) Neither case has been extended to apply to the 60-day requirement to hold a preliminary hearing under section 859b, let alone to the two-dismissal rule of section 1387. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Malone v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023(See Ramos v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 26, 37 ; Malone v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 313 , 319–320.) Moreover, judicial resources are conserved by addressing questions of law now and avoiding an unwarranted prosecution and trial. 2023(See Ramos v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 26, 37 ; Malone v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 313 , 319–320.) Moreover, judicial resources are conserved by addressing questions of law now and avoiding an unwarranted prosecution and trial. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Padilla green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Ramos v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023(Ramos v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 736 .) Further, the only reason petitioner’s constitutional right played a role was due to the People setting the preliminary hearing too close to the end of the 60-day period, and petitioner’s quarantine due to COVID-19 exposure prevented him from appearing before the deadline. 2023(Ramos v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 736 .) Further, the only reason petitioner’s constitutional right played a role was due to the People setting the preliminary hearing too close to the end of the 60-day period, and petitioner’s quarantine due to COVID-19 exposure prevented him from appearing before the deadline. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Curry v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2023(See Curry v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 221 ; People v. Kowalski (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 174 .) Neither case has been extended to apply to the 60-day requirement to hold a preliminary hearing under section 859b, let alone to the two-dismissal rule of section 1387. 2023(See Curry v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 221 ; People v. Kowalski (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 174 .) Neither case has been extended to apply to the 60-day requirement to hold a preliminary hearing under section 859b, let alone to the two-dismissal rule of section 1387. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
green
2 sentences2023(Ibid.) The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the state court suit was barred by claim preclusion under the two-dismissal rule of Rule 41(a)(1)(B). ( Cooper, supra, at p. 926 .) The Tennessee Supreme Court, relying on Semtek, supra, 531 U.S.497, reversed. 2023(See Cooper, supra, at p. 929 [“we are firmly convinced that Semtek’s reasoning controls the outcome of this case”].) The Cooper court held that the two-dismissal rule did not bar the third suit in Tennessee state court alleging state-law claims, because “it [could not] reasonably be said that the conclusion of Mr. Cooper’s case in federal court ‘pass[ed] on the substantive merits’ of his claims. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 930.) The court held further that whether the prior federal court dismissal had claim-preclusive effect would be determined under Tennessee law, which “permit[ted] a plaintiff | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| Stewart v. Stearman green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| T-Mobile West LLC v. City & County of San Francisco green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| Curle v. Superior Court of Shasta County green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Prunty green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
California State University, Fresno Ass'n v. County of Fresno
green
2 sentences2023Standard of Review “ ‘Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo.’ ” (California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 250, 265 .) At issue is whether the exception to the two-dismissal rule found in section 1387, subdivision (c), applies to the undisputed facts of this case. 2023Standard of Review “ ‘Questions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo.’ ” (California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 250, 265 .) At issue is whether the exception to the two-dismissal rule found in section 1387, subdivision (c), applies to the undisputed facts of this case. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Elk Hills Power v. Board of Equalization
green
2 sentences2023It is inferred from the People’s argument the prosecution is subject to the two-dismissal rule. 7 Statutory Interpretation of Section 1387, Subdivision (c) To interpret the meaning of section 1387, subdivision (c), “we must begin by considering the statute’s language and structure, bearing in mind that our fundamental task in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the law’s intended purpose.” (Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1246 .) “We examine the ordinary meaning of the statutory language, the text of related provisions, and the overarching structure 2023It is inferred from the People’s argument the prosecution is subject to the two-dismissal rule. 7 Statutory Interpretation of Section 1387, Subdivision (c) To interpret the meaning of section 1387, subdivision (c), “we must begin by considering the statute’s language and structure, bearing in mind that our fundamental task in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the law’s intended purpose.” (Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1246 .) “We examine the ordinary meaning of the statutory language, the text of related provisions, and the overarching structure | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Weatherford v. City of San Rafael
green
2 sentences2023It is inferred from the People’s argument the prosecution is subject to the two-dismissal rule. 7 Statutory Interpretation of Section 1387, Subdivision (c) To interpret the meaning of section 1387, subdivision (c), “we must begin by considering the statute’s language and structure, bearing in mind that our fundamental task in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the law’s intended purpose.” (Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1246 .) “We examine the ordinary meaning of the statutory language, the text of related provisions, and the overarching structure 2023It is inferred from the People’s argument the prosecution is subject to the two-dismissal rule. 7 Statutory Interpretation of Section 1387, Subdivision (c) To interpret the meaning of section 1387, subdivision (c), “we must begin by considering the statute’s language and structure, bearing in mind that our fundamental task in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the law’s intended purpose.” (Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1246 .) “We examine the ordinary meaning of the statutory language, the text of related provisions, and the overarching structure | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber
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2 sentences2023Claim Preclusion Generally As the California Supreme Court has explained, the term “ ‘res judicata’ [has frequently been used] as an umbrella term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which [the Supreme Court has] described as two separate ‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine. [Citations.] Claim preclusion, the ‘ “ ‘primary aspect’ ” ’ of res judicata, acts to bar claims that were, or should have been, advanced in a previous suit involving the same parties. [Citations.] Issue preclusion, the ‘ “ ‘secondary aspect’ ” ’ historically called collateral estoppel, describes the b 2023Claim Preclusion Generally As the California Supreme Court has explained, the term “ ‘res judicata’ [has frequently been used] as an umbrella term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which [the Supreme Court has] described as two separate ‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine. [Citations.] Claim preclusion, the ‘ “ ‘primary aspect’ ” ’ of res judicata, acts to bar claims that were, or should have been, advanced in a previous suit involving the same parties. [Citations.] Issue preclusion, the ‘ “ ‘secondary aspect’ ” ’ historically called collateral estoppel, describes the b | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| cluster 335136 green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Guerrero v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Villanueva green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Tapp v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Owens v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Van Eyk green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.