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33 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Spera v. Stategreen2 sentences2016We agree with the trial court that Appellant’s allegations were conclusory; however, the appropriate action is to afford Appellant at least one opportunity to amend those portions of his motion in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(f)(3); Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754, 761 (Fla.2007); Stokes v. State, 107 So.3d 510, 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); and Luckey v. State, 979 So.2d 353, 354-55 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). 2011In this appeal, Emmert contends that he should have been given leave to amend *304 claim 8(b) pursuant to Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754 (Fla.2007). | 2 | 3 |
Occhicone v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Occhicone, 768 So.2d at 1048 . 2014See Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048 . | 2 | 2 |
Stano v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Relying on Stano v. State , 520 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1988), the postconviction court held that Minix was attempting to go behind his plea and precluded him from contesting any events that occurred prior to the plea. 2011See Stano v. State, 520 So.2d 278, 279-80 (Fla.1988) (holding that a defendant cannot relitigate the plea when it was clear the plea was voluntarily entered). | 1 | 2 |
Luckey v. Stategreen2 sentences2016We agree with the trial court that Appellant’s allegations were conclusory; however, the appropriate action is to afford Appellant at least one opportunity to amend those portions of his motion in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(f)(3); Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754, 761 (Fla.2007); Stokes v. State, 107 So.3d 510, 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); and Luckey v. State, 979 So.2d 353, 354-55 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). 2012In Luckey v. State, 979 So.2d 353 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), a case involving a prisoner not sentenced to death, the postconviction court denied a rule 3.850 claim even though the prisoner exhibited signs of incompetence at the evi-dentiary hearing on his claim. | 1 | 2 |
Simmons v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 493 (Fla. 2012) (testimony from a confession expert would not have significantly diminished the incriminating effect of the other evidence). | 1 | 1 |
Peede v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Fitzpatrick v. Statered1 sentence2017The test for suppressing an out-of-court or in-court identification is: 1) whether the State used an “unnecessarily suggestive procedure to obtain the out-of-court identification”; and 2) whether that procedure “gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 517-518 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Rimmer v. State, 825 So.2d 304, 316 (Fla. 2002)). | 1 | 1 |
Rimmer v. Stategreen1 sentence2017The test for suppressing an out-of-court or in-court identification is: 1) whether the State used an “unnecessarily suggestive procedure to obtain the out-of-court identification”; and 2) whether that procedure “gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 517-518 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Rimmer v. State, 825 So.2d 304, 316 (Fla. 2002)). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2016See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 . 2016See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 . | 1 | 1 |
Stokes v. Stategreen1 sentence2016We agree with the trial court that Appellant’s allegations were conclusory; however, the appropriate action is to afford Appellant at least one opportunity to amend those portions of his motion in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(f)(3); Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754, 761 (Fla.2007); Stokes v. State, 107 So.3d 510, 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); and Luckey v. State, 979 So.2d 353, 354-55 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Novaton v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Novaton v. State, 634 So.2d 607, 609 (Fla.1994). | 1 | 1 |
Behr v. Bellgreen1 sentence2013The postconviction court denied the claim, concluding that standby counsel had no obligation to request a competency hearing on Barnes’ behalf because Barnes acted pro se and a “defendant who represents himself has the entire responsibility for his own defense even if he has standby counsel and cannot later claim that the quality of his defense was a denial of effective assistance of counsel,” citing Behr v. Bell, 665 So.2d 1055, 1056-57 (Fla.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Hankins v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Hankins v. State, 42 So.3d 871, 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Ponton v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Ponton, 16 So.3d at 918 (“There is *74 no sequential conviction requirement for an adjudication as an HVFO.”). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See id. | 1 | 1 |
Livingston v. Stategreen2 sentences2009However, the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify depends on “whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.” Thompson v. State, 990 So.2d 482, 490 (Fla.2008) (quoting Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983)). 2009However, the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify depends on "whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial." Thompson v. State, 990 So.2d 482, 490 (Fla.2008) (quoting Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Roberti v. Stategreen1 sentence2009The postconviction court denied the claim, in part, on the ground that “forfeiture of accumulated gain time by DOC is a collateral consequence of a plea and neither the Court nor counsel must advise a defendant of this consequence for the plea to be valid.” 3 However, “[affirmative misadvice about even a collateral consequence of a plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and provides a basis on which to withdraw the plea.” Roberti v. State, 782 So.2d 919, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2009However, the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify depends on “whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.” Thompson v. State, 990 So.2d 482, 490 (Fla.2008) (quoting Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983)). 2009However, the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify depends on "whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial." Thompson v. State, 990 So.2d 482, 490 (Fla.2008) (quoting Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912, 913 (Fla.1989) ("A defendant may not simply file a motion for postconviction relief containing conclusory allegations that his or her trial counsel was ineffective and then expect to receive an evidentiary hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Leach v. Stategreen1 sentence2008"No Florida rule of criminal procedure directly controls a post-conviction sentencing bargain." Leach v. State, 914 So.2d 519, 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). | 1 | 1 |
| Plowman v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Salazar v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ferenc v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Spellagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henry v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Spencer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2014The postconviction court denied the claim that trial counsel were deficient for not requesting a limiting instruction, finding that counsel did not engage in an “unsound trial strategy” by deciding to proceed “in a manner that would not call attention to Vitale’s testimony.” Although this Court stated on direct appeal that “the prejudicial impact of the evidence could have been ameliorated to some extent by an instruction to consider the evidence solely on the issue of the defendant’s intent,” id., trial counsels’ failure to object or move for a limiting instruction cannot be deemed deficient 2014The postconviction court denied the claim that trial counsel were deficient for not requesting a limiting instruction, finding that counsel did not engage in an “unsound trial strategy” by deciding to proceed “in a manner that would not call attention to Vitale’s testimony.” Although this Court stated on direct appeal that “the prejudicial impact of the evidence could have been ameliorated to some extent by an instruction to consider the evidence solely on the issue of the defendant’s intent,” id., trial counsels’ failure to object or move for a limiting instruction cannot be deemed deficient | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Bradley v. State
green
1 sentence2015Relying on Bradley v. State, 971 So.2d 957 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), approved by 3 So.3d 1168 (Fla.2009), the court found that because the complaint affidavit showed that each sale occurred on a different date, the charging document contained a clerical error to which Burkhead implicitly consented when he entered his plea. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bradley v. State
green
1 sentence2015Relying on Bradley v. State, 971 So.2d 957 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), approved by 3 So.3d 1168 (Fla.2009), the court found that because the complaint affidavit showed that each sale occurred on a different date, the charging document contained a clerical error to which Burkhead implicitly consented when he entered his plea. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Morgan v. State
green
1 sentence2012Indeed, in Morgan v. State, 991 So.2d 835 (Fla.2008), the supreme court held that the defendant’s allegation that he rejected a plea offer at trial counsel’s urging based on counsel’s incorrect assertion that the defendant would prevail at trial was not in itself sufficient to establish a basis for postconviction relief. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Mohr v. State
green
1 sentence2011Since Spera , this court has considered a claim of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s alleged failure to impeach a witness with her prior inconsistent statements in Mohr v. State, 17 So.3d 1249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Whitted v. State
green
1 sentence2010The postconviction court denied this claim on the ground that the determination of whether Gee’s pocketknife constituted a weapon would be up to the jury and that Gee’s counsel could not be found deficient for failing to file a motion to dismiss the charge, citing Whitted v. State, 992 So.2d 352 (Fla. 4th DGA 2008), for this proposition. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Carratelli v. State
green
1 sentence2009The postconviction court noted that these excerpts established that Wasson was not actually biased against Solorzano, and thus the court concluded that Solorzano could not state a facially sufficient claim of juror bias under the requirements set forth in Carratelli v. State, 915 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), review granted, 935 So.2d 499 (Fla.2006). 1 It is apparent from the limited postconviction record that the court denied this claim on its merits rather than for pleading deficiencies. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Bender
green
1 sentence2009Mr. Murphy cited United States v. Bender, 304 F.3d 161 (1st Cir.2002), to support his claim that “Knowledge of these findings must be imputed to the prosecutor, as the FBI Crime Lab was acting on behalf of the State.” The postconviction court denied this claim because Mr. Murphy did not suggest that “the prosecution in this ease knew or should have known, at the time of trial or even after, that their evidence was deficient.” On his motion for rehearing, Mr. Murphy pointed out that his rule 3.850 motion alleged that the FBI’s knowledge of the favorable reports must be imputed to the State unde | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Carratelli v. State
green
1 sentence2009The postconviction court noted that these excerpts established that Wasson was not actually biased against Solorzano, and thus the court concluded that Solorzano could not state a facially sufficient claim of juror bias under the requirements set forth in Carratelli v. State, 915 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), review granted, 935 So.2d 499 (Fla.2006). 1 It is apparent from the limited postconviction record that the court denied this claim on its merits rather than for pleading deficiencies. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Clark v. State
green
1 sentence2008The postconviction court denied this claim, first noting that defense counsel did not concede to a crime which was at issue, but simply acknowledged a crime for which the defendant had already been convicted and used this concession "as a cornerstone of his defense." The court concluded that "[t]his tactic was not only reasonable, but even in retrospect, it was quite clever." Williams challenges this ruling, contending that the Court has already condemned a similar argument in Clark v. State, 690 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1997). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Ruiz v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Floyd v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.