time of the jurisdictional hearing in California

2025(See § 300, subd. (g).) The Agency bore the burden of proving these jurisdictional grounds by a preponderance of the evidence, based on the circumstances existing at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. (§ 355, subd. (a); In re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078 (S.D.); In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 (Rocco M.), abrogated on other grounds by In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 628-630 .) During a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in April 2024, the juvenile court found that “mother clearly had a mental health break that brought this case to the [c]ourt’s attention”

2023Rather, the evidence must show that, as of the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the domestic violence is likely to reoccur and to place the child at “substantial risk” of “serious physical harm.” (§ 300, subds. (a) & (b); see In re C.V. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 566, 572 [“[j]urisdiction ‘may not be based on a single episode of endangering conduct in the absence of evidence that such conduct is likely to reoccur’ ”]; In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 [“[w]hile evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at t

2025Pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A), the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a child if it finds “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . : [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.” “[T]he purpose of section 300, subdivision (b) is to protect the child from a substantial risk of future serious physical harm and that risk is determined as of the time of the jurisdictional hearing.” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131

2022A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires “‘(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) “serious physical harm or illness” to the [minor], or a “substantial risk” of such harm or illness.’” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396 .) The third element “effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur).” (Ibid.) To establish a defin

2025(In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227 , 238; In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941 .) This risk of harm must exist at the time of the jurisdictional hearing (In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 719 ), so the risk arising from a child’s exposure to domestic 6 violence turns in part on whether “the violence is ongoing or likely to continue.” (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717 (Daisy H.), disapproved on other grounds by D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278; In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444 , 1453- 1454; In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402 , 411.) In examining this risk, h

2024(In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561 .) The relevant inquiry under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), is whether circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing “ ‘subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.’ ” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 .) In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting jurisdictional findings and related dispositional orders, we “consider the entire record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings.” (In re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 ; accord, In re I.J. (2013) 5 56

2025“There are three elements to jurisdiction under section 300: ‘(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) “serious physical harm or illness” to the minor, or a “substantial risk” of such harm or illness.’ ” (In re Travis C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1225 .) “The third element ‘effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur).’ ” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th

2024DISCUSSION Jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), “ ‘requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is 20 at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur).’ ” (In re B.T. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 685, 692 , emphasis in original.) “[E]vidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions.” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135 .) But to establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, “[t]here must be some reason beyond mere speculation t

2025Mother also relies on In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822 (David M.), to support her contention that “[e]ven if [her] initial refusal to have [K.N.] returned to her can be characterized as ‘previous neglect,’ she was willing to have [K.N.] returned with help from DCFS at the time of the jurisdictional hearing.” Her reliance is misplaced.

2025(See In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634 , 638–639.) The court sustained the challenged jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b), which requires “ ‘evidence indicating that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness. [Citation.]’ ” (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 829 .) This risk must exist as of the time of the jurisdictional hearing (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547 ), but may be based on a parent’s past conduct, so long as the evidence suggests that past conduct is likely to reoccur or otherwise establishes a

2026(In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 632 .) And while the harm or risk of harm must exist at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the court may consider past events if there is reason to believe the conduct will reoccur.

2025(In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 628–629.) In assessing whether there is a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to the minor, the juvenile court looks to whether such a risk is apparent at the time of the jurisdictional hearing.

2023(In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 803-804 .) The father asserts that section 300 as a whole requires a risk of harm at the time of the jurisdictional hearing.

2013(Id. at p. 838.) 10 or physical or emotional well-being if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor can be protected without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c).) The same standards apply to a subsequent petition alleging new facts and circumstances. (§ 342; see In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 806 .) “A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires: ‘ “(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the child, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or

2023Such neglect causes the risk.”], disapproved on another ground in In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 628–629 (R.T.).) The relevant inquiry under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), is whether circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing “ ‘subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.’ ” (T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 .) “The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the court’s protection.” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383 (Kadence P.); see T.V., at p. 133.) Indeed, in a domestic violence situation, past violence is highly p

2023Such neglect causes the risk.” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194 .)], disapproved on another ground in In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 628–629 (R.T.).) The relevant inquiry under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), is whether circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing “ ‘subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.’ ” (T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 .) “The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child currently needs the court’s protection.” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383 ; see T.V., at p. 133.) Indeed, in a domestic viole

2025(See § 300, subd. (g).) The Agency bore the burden of proving these jurisdictional grounds by a preponderance of the evidence, based on the circumstances existing at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. (§ 355, subd. (a); In re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078 (S.D.); In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 (Rocco M.), abrogated on other grounds by In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 628-630 .) During a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in April 2024, the juvenile court found that “mother clearly had a mental health break that brought this case to the [c]ourt’s attention”

2021“There is no ‘Go to jail, lose your child’ rule in California.” (In re S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077 .) Instead, “the issue is whether, as of the time of the jurisdictional hearing, [the parent] could arrange for the care.” (Id. at pp. 1077- 1078.) The children here were placed with grandparents.

2025Pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A), the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a child if it finds “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . : [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.” “[T]he purpose of section 300, subdivision (b) is to protect the child from a substantial risk of future serious physical harm and that risk is determined as of the time of the jurisdictional hearing.” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131

2023(In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010 , 1022.) “[P]revious acts . . . , standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of future harm; there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur.” (In re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1 , 15, citing In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 565 .) We find insufficient evidence that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, K.Z. was at substantial risk of serious harm due to Father’s violent history.

2025(In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227 , 238; In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941 .) This risk of harm must exist at the time of the jurisdictional hearing (In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 719 ), so the risk arising from a child’s exposure to domestic 6 violence turns in part on whether “the violence is ongoing or likely to continue.” (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717 (Daisy H.), disapproved on other grounds by D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278; In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444 , 1453- 1454; In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402 , 411.) In examining this risk, h

2025Considered together, these facts could reasonably lead the court to doubt Mother had yet sufficiently separated from Father or taken sufficient steps to break the cycle she had been in for many years, and thus that the children continued to be at substantial risk of harm as of the time of the jurisdictional hearing. 15 Mother’s reliance on In re Ma.V. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 11 , In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.5th 1444 , and In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713 , disapproved on another ground in In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 , 278, to argue there was no current risk of harm is unpersuasiv

2023(See E.B., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) Here, we have no difficulty concluding that L.B. was subject to a defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdictional hearing.

2013(Ibid.) “On appeal from an order making jurisdictional findings, we must uphold the court’s findings unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we determine there is no substantial evidence to support the findings. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (Ibid.) “‘In dependency proceedings, a trial court’s determination will not be disturbed unless it exceeds the bounds of reason. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re E.B. (2

2020“Physical violence between a child’s parents may support the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) but only if there is evidence that the violence is ongoing or likely to continue and that it directly harmed the child physically or placed the child at risk of physical harm.” (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717 , italics added, citing In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 391 .) “This is so because under subdivision (b) [of section 300,] a child may be considered dependent ‘only so long as is necessary’ to protect the child from risk of suffering serious ph

2020“Physical violence between a child’s parents may support the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) but only if there is evidence that the violence is ongoing or likely to continue and that it directly harmed the child physically or placed the child at risk of physical harm.” (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717 , italics added, citing In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 391 .) “This is so because under subdivision (b) [of section 300,] a child may be considered dependent ‘only so long as is necessary’ to protect the child from risk of suffering serious ph

2020The parents[’] violent conduct endangers the child’s physical health and safety, and places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage and danger.” 4 sufficient, standing alone, to establish dependency jurisdiction under these subdivisions.” (In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426 , 1435, fn. omitted.) If the jurisdictional allegations are based solely on risk to the child, that risk must be shown to exist at the time of the jurisdictional hearing.

2015The child shall continue to be a dependent child pursuant to this subdivision only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b).) “A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires: ‘ “(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the child, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] The third element ‘effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the chi

2024“A jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires [DCFS] to prove three elements: (1) the parent’s . . . neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591 , 601.) The statute permits jurisdiction under this subdivision “only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(3).) Thus, “[t]he relevant inquiry . . . is whether circumst

2017There are three elements for jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of section 300 : (1) neglectful conduct or substance abuse by a parent in one of the specified forms, (2) causation, and (3) serious physical harm to the child, or a substantial risk of such harm. ( In re Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720 , 724-725, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 .) The third element "effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur)." ( In re

2022A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires “‘(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) “serious physical harm or illness” to the [minor], or a “substantial risk” of such harm or illness.’” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396 .) The third element “effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur).” (Ibid.) To establish a defin

2020(See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge.”]) 12 This case is unlike In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142 , in which our colleagues in Division One concluded although the father had stored a loaded gun in his child’s room, circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing established there was no risk of future physical harm to the child.

2025Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding over the siblings Citing In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th 766 , Father argues A.G.’s siblings, I.G., Alexis, and Isaac, were not at any risk of sexual abuse by Father at the time of the jurisdictional hearing based on the fact he sexually abused A.G. one time when she was four years old.

2025Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding over the siblings Citing In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th 766 , Father argues A.G.’s siblings, I.G., Alexis, and Isaac, were not at any risk of sexual abuse by Father at the time of the jurisdictional hearing based on the fact he sexually abused A.G. one time when she was four years old.

2023(In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010 , 1022.) “[P]revious acts . . . , standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of future harm; there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur.” (In re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1 , 15, citing In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 565 .) We find insufficient evidence that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, K.Z. was at substantial risk of serious harm due to Father’s violent history.

2016(In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194-196 .) “The three elements for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) are: ‘“(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the [child], or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.”’ [Citations.] ‘The third element, however, effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur)

2018Citing In re Anthony G. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1060 , 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 660 ( Anthony G. ) and Aaron S., supra, 228 Cal.App.3d 202 , 278 Cal.Rptr. 861 , Father asserts the juvenile court was correct-where the record shows that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is living in a stable home with a caretaker, exercising jurisdiction under section 300(g) is unwarranted.

2018Citing In re Anthony G. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1060 , 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 660 ( Anthony G. ) and Aaron S., supra, 228 Cal.App.3d 202 , 278 Cal.Rptr. 861 , Father asserts the juvenile court was correct-where the record shows that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is living in a stable home with a caretaker, exercising jurisdiction under section 300(g) is unwarranted.

2022The juvenile court was permitted to infer that mother’s 9 We note that—in contrast to this case—at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the mother in Destiny S. “had tested clean for marijuana and methamphetamine for three months.” (In re Destiny S., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1004 .) 24 failure to meet her obligations resulted from her constant use of marijuana.

2015The child shall continue to be a dependent child pursuant to this subdivision only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.” “A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires: ‘“(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the child, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] The third element ‘effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial

2016(In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194-196 .) “The three elements for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) are: ‘“(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the [child], or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.”’ [Citations.] ‘The third element, however, effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur)

2015In sum, the three elements for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) are: “‘(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) “serious physical harm or illness” to the [child], or a “substantial risk” of such harm or illness.’” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396 , quoting In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 .) “The third element, however, effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a subst

2014The prima facie evidence constitutes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.’ ” (In re P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347 .) Although we acknowledged that “section 355.1, subdivision (d), was not triggered . . . because there was no prior dependency proceeding at the time of the jurisdictional hearing,” we reasoned the statute “nonetheless evinces a legislative determination that siblings of sexually abused children are at substantial risk of harm and are entitled to protection by the juvenile courts.” (Ibid.) In I.J., the Supreme Court adopted this reasoning, noting tha

2013The prima facie evidence constitutes a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.’ [c[[] Although section 355.1, subdivision (d), was not triggered here because there was no prior dependency proceeding at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, it nonetheless evinces a legislative determination that siblings of sexually abused children are at substantial risk of harm and are entitled to protection by the juvenile courts.” (In re P.A., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347 .) A relatively early case overturning the jurisdictional finding is In re Rubisela E., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 177

2025(In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227 , 238; In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941 .) This risk of harm must exist at the time of the jurisdictional hearing (In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 719 ), so the risk arising from a child’s exposure to domestic 6 violence turns in part on whether “the violence is ongoing or likely to continue.” (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717 (Daisy H.), disapproved on other grounds by D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278; In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444 , 1453- 1454; In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402 , 411.) In examining this risk, h

2023While commendable, and although we look at risk at the time of the jurisdictional hearing (see In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 719 ), father’s last-minute efforts have not ameliorated the risk to Ayden because Ayden is still without his medication or services to address his ADHD.

2026(Id., subd. (b)(1)(D).) The Legislature has declared that “[t]he provision of a home environment free from the negative effects of substance abuse is a necessary condition for the safety, protection and physical and emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 300.2.) To establish jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the Agency must “demonstrate the following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) neglectful conduct, failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (

2024(In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 (T.V.).) To establish jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1), the Agency must show “(1) neglectful conduct, failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848 .) The third element requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future.

2016Mother cites In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 758-759 (Drake M.), for the proposition that the agency must produce evidence that, at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, there is a substantial risk that a child will suffer serious physical harm or illness.

2014But when the courts are dealing with the youngest of children, “the finding of substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical harm.” (Drake, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 766–767.) Because the minors were two years old, one year old and five months old at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, we conclude that mother’s substance abuse is sufficient evidence of a risk of harm under Drake.