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30 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Caballesgreen2 sentences2025I write separately to reassert the position I stated in People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, ¶¶ 133-68 (Neville, J., dissenting), and People v. Clark, 2024 IL 127838, ¶¶ 118-25 (Neville, J., dissenting): this court should overrule People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 288-317 (2006), insofar as that case imposed the limited lockstep doctrine on Illinois courts. 2025Defendant argues that the difference in language between these two constitutional provisions is sufficient to warrant breaking from the limited lockstep doctrine, under which we will construe the Illinois Constitution as providing greater protection than the U.S. Constitution 13 when we can find “in the debates and the committee reports of the constitutional convention, something which will indicate that the provisions of our constitution are intended to be construed differently than are similar provisions in the Federal Constitution, after which they are patterned.” People v. Caballes, 221 Il | 10 | 13 |
People v. Fitzpatrickgreen2 sentences2021Id. at 316-17 . 19 ¶ 46 Our supreme court did a limited lockstep analysis for the purpose of article I, section 6, of our state constitution in Caballes and “determined that the framers intended for it to have the same scope as the fourth amendment.” Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 15 (citing Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d at 296-97 ). 2020Id. at 316-17 . 19 ¶ 46 Our supreme court did a limited lockstep analysis for the purpose of article I, section 6, of our state constitution in Caballes and “determined that the framers intended for it to have the same scope as the fourth amendment.” Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 15 (citing Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d at 296-97 ). | 7 | 9 |
People v. Tislergreen2 sentences2025Defendant argues that the difference in language between these two constitutional provisions is sufficient to warrant breaking from the limited lockstep doctrine, under which we will construe the Illinois Constitution as providing greater protection than the U.S. Constitution 13 when we can find “in the debates and the committee reports of the constitutional convention, something which will indicate that the provisions of our constitution are intended to be construed differently than are similar provisions in the Federal Constitution, after which they are patterned.” People v. Caballes, 221 Il 2011See People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 245 (1984) (“Any variance between the Supreme Court’s construction of the provisions of the fourth 14 There is no small amount of irony in the circuit court’s rulings to dispense with the defendants’ res judicata argument that the claims under the Illinois Constitution had to be resolved in state court and the court’s acceptance of the defendant’s collateral estoppel argument to preclude those same claims in state court. -24- amendment in the Federal Constitution and similar provisions in the Illinois Constitution must be based on more substantial grounds | 3 | 3 |
The Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Floresgreen2 sentences2020Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 2013 IL 112673, ¶ 47 (explaining the limited lockstep doctrine). 16 Supp. 2019)), and wagering tickets (230 ILCS 10/18(b)(1) (West 2018)); prohibiting their gun ownership without parental permission (430 ILCS 65/4(a)(2)(i) (West 2018)); and limiting Class X sentencing for recidivist offenders to those offenders “over the age of 21 years” (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2018)). 2020Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 2013 IL 112673, ¶ 47 (explaining the limited lockstep doctrine). -9- Leader Barbara Flynn Currie argued that under-21-year-olds are “young people” who “do not always have good judgment.” 100th Ill. Gen. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. William Curtis, IIIgreen2 sentences2010Rather, the Ramirez court determined that the error found to be reversible was not sufficiently egregious to give rise to an inference that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial: “[T]he reference to the defendant’s silence ***, which we held to be error, did not even prompt a defense objection, much less a motion for mistrial. ‘In view of the failure of both the defense counsel and the trial judge to recognize immediately the need for a mistrial, it is difficult to credit the premise that the prosecutor could not have committed such conduct without knowing and intending that mistrial w 2010Rather, the Ramirez court determined that the error found to be reversible was not sufficiently egregious to give rise to an inference that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial: "[T]he reference to the defendant's silence 16 No. 1-09-1001 ***, which we held to be error, did not even prompt a defense objection, much less a motion for mistrial. 'In view of the failure of both the defense counsel and the trial judge to recognize immediately the need for a mistrial, it is difficult to credit the premise that the prosecutor could not have committed such conduct without knowing and intendin | 2 | 2 |
In Re EHgreen2 sentences2018It is settled that “cases should be decided on nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible, reaching constitutional issues only as a last resort.” In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (2006) (collecting cases). 2017It is settled that "cases should be decided on nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible, reaching constitutional issues only as a last resort." In re E.H. , 224 Ill.2d 172 , 178, 309 Ill.Dec. 1 , 863 N.E.2d 231 (2006) (collecting cases). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Millerred2 sentences2011The appellate court also refused to adopt as a matter of state law the holding of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 , 96 S.Ct. 1619 , 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976), which stated that a person had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her bank records. 2011The appellate court also refused to adopt as a matter of state law the holding of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976), which stated that a person had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her bank records. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sneedgreen1 sentence2025I write separately to reassert the position I stated in People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, ¶¶ 133-68 (Neville, J., dissenting), and People v. Clark, 2024 IL 127838, ¶¶ 118-25 (Neville, J., dissenting): this court should overrule People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 288-317 (2006), insofar as that case imposed the limited lockstep doctrine on Illinois courts. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Clarkgreen1 sentence2025I write separately to reassert the position I stated in People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, ¶¶ 133-68 (Neville, J., dissenting), and People v. Clark, 2024 IL 127838, ¶¶ 118-25 (Neville, J., dissenting): this court should overrule People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 288-317 (2006), insofar as that case imposed the limited lockstep doctrine on Illinois courts. | 1 | 1 |
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organizationgreen1 sentence2023See Dobbs, 597 U.S. at ___ , 142 S. Ct. at 2301 (Thomas, J., concurring). ¶ 161 The limited lockstep doctrine adopted in Caballes requires this court to allow the expansion of governmental powers whenever five justices of the United States Supreme Court approve such expansion, even when this court believes the United States Supreme Court’s decision does not persuasively state the intention of the framers of the Illinois Constitution, unless this court finds one of the very limited bases allowed under Caballes for refusing to adopt the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation. | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2023This Court Should Not Apply Fisher to This Case ¶ 170 The majority uses the lockstep doctrine as authority for inflicting dicta from Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976), on the citizens of Illinois, despite the unpersuasive reasoning of Fisher and the inapplicability of the case to the facts in Sneed’s case. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Carreragreen1 sentence2018See Carrera, 203 Ill. 2d 1 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Jones
green
2 sentences2021People v. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 28 . ¶ 31 It is plaintiff’s contention that, because the City requires food trucks to install a GPS device on their vehicles as a condition of their licensure, there is no voluntary consent to this physical intrusion on their private property and, therefore, the GPS requirement is a search pursuant to the property-based framework in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 2019People v. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 28 . ¶ 31 It is plaintiff’s contention that because the City requires food trucks to install a GPS device on their vehicles as a condition of their licensure, there is no voluntary consent to this physical intrusion on their private property and, therefore, the GPS requirement is a search pursuant to the property-based framework in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). | 2 | 2019–2021 |
United States v. Erick Charles
green
2 sentences2020It explained that “[b]ecause probable cause is a component of both the federal and state search and seizure provisions, [Illinois courts] follow federal law pursuant to the limited lockstep doctrine” and “[f]ederal case law holds that probable cause for arrest would not be retroactively invalidated by subsequent declaration of a statute’s unconstitutionality on federal grounds.” Id. ¶ 39 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), and United States v. Charles, 801 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2015)). ¶ 17 Quoting at length from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in DeFillippo, the Holmes 2020It explained that “[b]ecause probable cause is a component of both the federal and state search and seizure provisions, [Illinois courts] follow federal law pursuant to the limited lockstep doctrine” and “[f]ederal case law holds that probable cause for arrest would not be retroactively invalidated by subsequent declaration of a statute’s unconstitutionality on federal grounds.” Id. ¶ 39 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), and United States v. Charles, 801 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2015)). ¶ 17 Quoting at length from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in DeFillippo, the Holmes | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Michigan v. DeFillippo
green
2 sentences2020It explained that “[b]ecause probable cause is a component of both the federal and state search and seizure provisions, [Illinois courts] follow federal law pursuant to the limited lockstep doctrine” and “[f]ederal case law holds that probable cause for arrest would not be retroactively invalidated by subsequent declaration of a statute’s unconstitutionality on federal grounds.” Id. ¶ 39 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), and United States v. Charles, 801 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2015)). ¶ 17 Quoting at length from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in DeFillippo, the Holmes 2020It explained that “[b]ecause probable cause is a component of both the federal and state search and seizure provisions, [Illinois courts] follow federal law pursuant to the limited lockstep doctrine” and “[f]ederal case law holds that probable cause for arrest would not be retroactively invalidated by subsequent declaration of a statute’s unconstitutionality on federal grounds.” Id. ¶ 39 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), and United States v. Charles, 801 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2015)). ¶ 17 Quoting at length from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in DeFillippo, the Holmes | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Hauschild
yellow
2 sentences2018Oct. 23, 2007), which amended the armed violence statute, revived the sentencing enhancement in the armed robbery statute that this court held unconstitutional in People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007). 2017Oct. 23, 2007), which amended the armed violence statute, revived the sentencing enhancement in the armed robbery statute that this court held unconstitutional in People v. Hauschild , 226 Ill. 2d 63 , 312 Ill.Dec. 601 , 871 N.E.2d 1 (2007). | 2 | 2017–2018 |
People v. Blair
green
2 sentences2018Strict application of the Illinois void ab initio doctrine, to the -7- literal extent posited by defendant, would conflict with our continued adherence to the limited lockstep doctrine. ¶ 30 People v. Blair and People v. McFadden ¶ 31 Our conclusion is consistent with this court’s recent decisions in People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122 , and People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424 . ¶ 32 First, in Blair, this court considered whether Public Act 95-688 (eff. 2017Strict application of the Illinois void ab initio doctrine, to the literal extent posited by defendant, would conflict with our continued adherence to the limited lockstep doctrine. *420 ¶ 30 People v. Blair and People v. McFadden ¶ 31 Our conclusion is consistent with this court's recent decisions in People v. Blair , 2013 IL 114122 , 369 Ill.Dec. 126 , 986 N.E.2d 75 , and People v. McFadden , 2016 IL 117424 , 406 Ill.Dec. 470 , 61 N.E.3d 74 . ¶ 32 First, in Blair , this court considered whether Public Act 95-688 (eff. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
People v. McFadden
green
2 sentences2018Strict application of the Illinois void ab initio doctrine, to the -7- literal extent posited by defendant, would conflict with our continued adherence to the limited lockstep doctrine. ¶ 30 People v. Blair and People v. McFadden ¶ 31 Our conclusion is consistent with this court’s recent decisions in People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122 , and People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424 . ¶ 32 First, in Blair, this court considered whether Public Act 95-688 (eff. 2017Strict application of the Illinois void ab initio doctrine, to the literal extent posited by defendant, would conflict with our continued adherence to the limited lockstep doctrine. *420 ¶ 30 People v. Blair and People v. McFadden ¶ 31 Our conclusion is consistent with this court's recent decisions in People v. Blair , 2013 IL 114122 , 369 Ill.Dec. 126 , 986 N.E.2d 75 , and People v. McFadden , 2016 IL 117424 , 406 Ill.Dec. 470 , 61 N.E.3d 74 . ¶ 32 First, in Blair , this court considered whether Public Act 95-688 (eff. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
People v. Nesbitt
green
2 sentences2011The Nesbitt court held that, although the limited lockstep doctrine applied to the state's search and seizure clause, the limited lockstep doctrine did not apply when "determining the parameters of the Illinois Constitution's privacy provision." Nesbitt, 405 Ill.App.3d at 828 , 345 Ill.Dec. 161 , 938 N.E.2d 600 . 2011The Nesbitt court held that, although the limited lockstep doctrine applied to the state’s search and seizure clause, the limited lockstep doctrine did not apply when “determining the parameters of the Illinois Constitution’s privacy provision.” Nesbitt, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 828 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Ramirez
green
2 sentences2010Rather, the Ramirez court determined that the error found to be reversible was not sufficiently egregious to give rise to an inference that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial: “[T]he reference to the defendant’s silence ***, which we held to be error, did not even prompt a defense objection, much less a motion for mistrial. ‘In view of the failure of both the defense counsel and the trial judge to recognize immediately the need for a mistrial, it is difficult to credit the premise that the prosecutor could not have committed such conduct without knowing and intending that mistrial w 2010Rather, the Ramirez court determined that the error found to be reversible was not sufficiently egregious to give rise to an inference that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial: "[T]he reference to the defendant's silence 16 No. 1-09-1001 ***, which we held to be error, did not even prompt a defense objection, much less a motion for mistrial. 'In view of the failure of both the defense counsel and the trial judge to recognize immediately the need for a mistrial, it is difficult to credit the premise that the prosecutor could not have committed such conduct without knowing and intendin | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Curtis v. United States
green
2 sentences2010Rather, the Ramirez court determined that the error found to be reversible was not sufficiently egregious to give rise to an inference that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial: “[T]he reference to the defendant’s silence ***, which we held to be error, did not even prompt a defense objection, much less a motion for mistrial. ‘In view of the failure of both the defense counsel and the trial judge to recognize immediately the need for a mistrial, it is difficult to credit the premise that the prosecutor could not have committed such conduct without knowing and intending that mistrial w 2010Rather, the Ramirez court determined that the error found to be reversible was not sufficiently egregious to give rise to an inference that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial: "[T]he reference to the defendant's silence 16 No. 1-09-1001 ***, which we held to be error, did not even prompt a defense objection, much less a motion for mistrial. 'In view of the failure of both the defense counsel and the trial judge to recognize immediately the need for a mistrial, it is difficult to credit the premise that the prosecutor could not have committed such conduct without knowing and intendin | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Dusanek v. O'Donnell
green
2 sentences2010Rather, the Ramirez court determined that the error found to be reversible was not sufficiently egregious to give rise to an inference that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial: “[T]he reference to the defendant’s silence ***, which we held to be error, did not even prompt a defense objection, much less a motion for mistrial. ‘In view of the failure of both the defense counsel and the trial judge to recognize immediately the need for a mistrial, it is difficult to credit the premise that the prosecutor could not have committed such conduct without knowing and intending that mistrial w 2010Rather, the Ramirez court determined that the error found to be reversible was not sufficiently egregious to give rise to an inference that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial: "[T]he reference to the defendant's silence 16 No. 1-09-1001 ***, which we held to be error, did not even prompt a defense objection, much less a motion for mistrial. 'In view of the failure of both the defense counsel and the trial judge to recognize immediately the need for a mistrial, it is difficult to credit the premise that the prosecutor could not have committed such conduct without knowing and intendin | 2 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Chapman
green
2 sentences2010The court then stated in dictum that, given Caballes’s reaffirmation of the limited-lockstep doctrine, “we believe the Supreme Court of Illinois would likely adhere to Hudson.” Chapman, 379 Ill. 2010The court then stated in dictum that, given Caballes's reaffirmation of the limited-lockstep doctrine, "we believe the Supreme Court of Illinois would likely adhere to Hudson . " Chapman, 379 Ill.App.3d at 325 , 318 Ill.Dec. 279 , 883 N.E.2d 510 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Stehman
green
2 sentences2007In People v. Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d 26 (2002), the issue presented was "whether Belton's bright-line rule extends to a situation where the first contact the defendant has with the officer occurs after [the defendant has exited] the vehicle." Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 36 . 2007In People v. Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d 26 (2002), the issue presented was "whether Belton's bright-line rule extends to a situation where the first contact the defendant has with the officer occurs after [the defendant has exited] the vehicle." Stehman, 203 Ill. 2d at 36 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.