defendant than the constitutional standard in Massachusetts

2019L. c. 278, § 33E, which is more favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel." See Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 598 (2011); Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).

2014L. c. 278, § 33E, which is more favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 808 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992).

2014L. c. 278, § 33E, which is more favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 808 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992).

2013L. c. 278, § 33E, which is more favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 808 (2005), citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992).

2019This standard is more favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).

2017L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether counsel’s action, or the failure to act, created a “substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice,” a standard more favorable to the defendant than the constitutional standard otherwise applied under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).

2019L. c. 278, § 33E, which is more favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel." See Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 598 (2011); Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).

2014Likewise, when “the defendant has been convicted of murder in the first degree, ‘we consider his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel to determine whether there exists a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice . . . which is more favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel.’ ” Commonwealth v. Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 909 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 598 (2011).

2019See Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 29 , cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 330 (2017).

2017“Where, as here, the defendant has been convicted of murder in the first degree, we review his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether the alleged lapse created a ‘substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice,’ a standard more favorable to the defendant than the constitutional standard otherwise applied under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).” Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 29 (2017), quoting Wright, 411 Mass. at 681-682.

2013Under this standard, “we . . . consider whether there was an error in the course of the trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have influenced the jury’s conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Wright, supra. “Under this more favorable standard of review, we consider a defendant’s claim even if the action by trial counsel does not constitute conduct ‘falling measurably below that ... of an ordinary fallible lawyer.’ ” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, supra at 808 809, quoting Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 413 Mass. 498, 517 (1992). a.

2013Under this standard, “we consider a defendant’s claim even if the action by trial counsel does not constitute conduct ‘falling measurably below that . . . of an ordinary fallible lawyer.’ ” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, supra at 808-809 , quoting Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 413 Mass. 498, 517 (1992).

2009“Thus, we consider whether there was error during the course of the trial, and, if so, whether the error was ‘likely to have influenced the jury’s conclusion.’ ” Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 205 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992).

2009Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 204 (2009).

2024See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 452 Mass. 662, 666 (2008) (substantial likelihood standard under § 33E review "is more favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for determining the ineffectiveness of counsel").

2024"In conducting this review, we 'accord tactical decisions of trial counsel due deference,'" and conclude that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance only if trial counsel's decision was "manifestly unreasonable." Kirkland, supra, quoting Don, supra at 704-705. "'[O]nly strategy and tactics which lawyers of ordinary training and skill in the criminal law would not consider competent' rise to the level of manifestly unreasonable." Kirkland, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017).

2019See Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 29 , cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 330 (2017).

2019See Ayala, supra. In conducting this review, we "accord tactical decisions of trial counsel due deference" (quotation and citation omitted).

2017“We focus more broadly on whether there was error and, if so, whether any such error ‘was likely to have influenced the jury’s conclusion.’ ” Fulgiam, supra, quoting Wright, supra. “The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that something inappropriate was likely to have unfairly influenced the jury’s verdict.” Commonwealth v. Painten, 429 Mass. 536, 550 (1999).

2014Likewise, when “the defendant has been convicted of murder in the first degree, ‘we consider his claim of ineffectiveness of counsel to determine whether there exists a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice . . . which is more favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel.’ ” Commonwealth v. Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 909 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 598 (2011).

2014See Commonwealth v. Leng, 463 Mass. 779, 781 (2012) (“Where the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial is considered in conjunction with his direct appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree, our review proceeds under the more exacting standard required by G.

2013Under this standard, we consider “whether there was an error in the course of the trial (by defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there was, whether that error was likely to have influenced the jury’s conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Frank, 433 Mass. 185, 187-188 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, supra at 682 .

2013“This standard is more favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for determining the ineffectiveness of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 804 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681-682 (1992).