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35 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Duncangreen2 sentences2026Comm., 142 Ohio St. 446 (1944), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A declaration or statement, to be admissible as part of the res gestae, is not required to be exactly simultaneous with the primary fact in controversy, but it must be a spontaneous or an impulsive declaration or statement and not the mere narration of a past transaction.”). {¶18} A court that must determine whether a declarant's statement occurred while under stress of the startling occurrence must examine the particular facts of the case and not “ ‘ “attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which 2026Lucas at ¶ 40 , citing State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d 215 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[E]ach case must be decided on its own circumstances, since it is patently futile to attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which an oral utterance must be made in order that it be termed a spontaneous exclamation.” Duncan at 219-220 . | 5 | 31 |
State v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2026Comm., 142 Ohio St. 446 (1944), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A declaration or statement, to be admissible as part of the res gestae, is not required to be exactly simultaneous with the primary fact in controversy, but it must be a spontaneous or an impulsive declaration or statement and not the mere narration of a past transaction.”). {¶18} A court that must determine whether a declarant's statement occurred while under stress of the startling occurrence must examine the particular facts of the case and not “ ‘ “attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which 2026Comm., 142 Ohio St. 446 (1944), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A declaration or statement, to be admissible as part of the res gestae, is not required to be exactly simultaneous with the primary fact in controversy, but it must be a spontaneous or an impulsive declaration or statement and not the mere narration of a past transaction.”). {¶18} A court that must determine whether a declarant's statement occurred while under stress of the startling occurrence must examine the particular facts of the case and not “ ‘ “attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which | 2 | 10 |
In Re C.C., 88320 (5-10-2007)green2 sentences2024And that he was standing outside the car, shot at her, and they took off, like trying to get away from them, and that’s when they ended up on the highway after they flagged down an officer.” While Church had been detained when these statements were made, “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that, to be an excited utterance, the statement need not be strictly contemporaneous with the startling event.” Carstaphen, 2022- Ohio-3129, at ¶ 35 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d 215 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus. “‘“[E]ach case must be decided on its own circumstances, since it 2023See also In re C.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 88320 and 88321, 2007-Ohio-2226 (finding an excited utterance even though 27 days passed between the event and the statement); State v. Duke, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 52604, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3466 (Aug. 25, 1988) (finding an excited utterance when the statement was made ten days following an incident). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Wallacegreen2 sentences2004"Therefore the passage of time between the statement and the event is relevant but not dispositive of the question. `[E]ach case must be decided on its own circumstances, since it is patently futile to attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which an oral utterance must be made in order that it be termed a spontaneous exclamation.'" (Citations omitted.) State v. Taylor (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 295 , 303 . {¶ 15} Further, "the admission of a declaration as an excited utterance is not precluded by questioning which: (1) is neither coercive nor leading, (2) facilitat 1999Moreover, "it is patently futile to attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which an oral utterance must be made in order that it be termed a spontaneous exclamation." Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 90 , quoting Duncan, 53 Ohio St.2d at 219 -220 . | 1 | 4 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2026Comm., 142 Ohio St. 446 (1944), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A declaration or statement, to be admissible as part of the res gestae, is not required to be exactly simultaneous with the primary fact in controversy, but it must be a spontaneous or an impulsive declaration or statement and not the mere narration of a past transaction.”). {¶18} A court that must determine whether a declarant's statement occurred while under stress of the startling occurrence must examine the particular facts of the case and not “ ‘ “attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which 2026Comm., 142 Ohio St. 446 (1944), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A declaration or statement, to be admissible as part of the res gestae, is not required to be exactly simultaneous with the primary fact in controversy, but it must be a spontaneous or an impulsive declaration or statement and not the mere narration of a past transaction.”). {¶18} A court that must determine whether a declarant's statement occurred while under stress of the startling occurrence must examine the particular facts of the case and not “ ‘ “attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which | 1 | 2 |
In Re D.M.green1 sentence2025(Citations omitted.) State v. Triplett, 2013-Ohio-3114, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.). “[E]ach case must be decided on its own circumstances, since it is patently futile to attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which an oral utterance must be made in order that it be termed a spontaneous exclamation.” (Citations omitted.) Taylor, supra at 303 . {¶44} “The excited-utterance hearsay exception is treated differently when the declarant is an alleged sexually abused child; the test is extremely liberal.” In re D.M., 158 Ohio App.3d 780, ¶ 13 (8th Dist. 2004), citing State v. S | 1 | 1 |
State v. Shoopgreen1 sentence2025(Citations omitted.) State v. Triplett, 2013-Ohio-3114, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.). “[E]ach case must be decided on its own circumstances, since it is patently futile to attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which an oral utterance must be made in order that it be termed a spontaneous exclamation.” (Citations omitted.) Taylor, supra at 303 . {¶44} “The excited-utterance hearsay exception is treated differently when the declarant is an alleged sexually abused child; the test is extremely liberal.” In re D.M., 158 Ohio App.3d 780, ¶ 13 (8th Dist. 2004), citing State v. S | 1 | 1 |
State v. Triplettgreen1 sentence2025(Citations omitted.) State v. Triplett, 2013-Ohio-3114, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.). “[E]ach case must be decided on its own circumstances, since it is patently futile to attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which an oral utterance must be made in order that it be termed a spontaneous exclamation.” (Citations omitted.) Taylor, supra at 303 . {¶44} “The excited-utterance hearsay exception is treated differently when the declarant is an alleged sexually abused child; the test is extremely liberal.” In re D.M., 158 Ohio App.3d 780, ¶ 13 (8th Dist. 2004), citing State v. S | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stough v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2026Comm., 142 Ohio St. 446 (1944), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A declaration or statement, to be admissible as part of the res gestae, is not required to be exactly simultaneous with the primary fact in controversy, but it must be a spontaneous or an impulsive declaration or statement and not the mere narration of a past transaction.”). {¶18} A court that must determine whether a declarant's statement occurred while under stress of the startling occurrence must examine the particular facts of the case and not “ ‘ “attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which 2026Comm., 142 Ohio St. 446 (1944), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A declaration or statement, to be admissible as part of the res gestae, is not required to be exactly simultaneous with the primary fact in controversy, but it must be a spontaneous or an impulsive declaration or statement and not the mere narration of a past transaction.”). {¶18} A court that must determine whether a declarant's statement occurred while under stress of the startling occurrence must examine the particular facts of the case and not “ ‘ “attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which | 2 | 2023–2026 |
State v. Harr
green
2 sentences2011Hearsay exceptions should be narrowly construed by the trial court when the constitutional rights of the accused are directly affected by the admission of the hearsay testimony.” State v. Harr, 158 Ohio App.3d 704 , 2004-Ohio-5771, at ¶140 . 2011Hearsay exceptions should be narrowly construed by the trial court when the constitutional rights of the accused are directly affected by the admission of the hearsay testimony.” State v. Harr, 158 Ohio App.3d 704 , 2004-Ohio-5771, at ¶140 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Nitz, Unpublished Decision (12-6-2004)
green
1 sentence2009See, e.g., State v. Wallace (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 87 , 90-91 (finding a statement was admissible after 15 hours); State v. Nitz , Butler App. No. CA2003-09-228, 2004-Ohio-6478 , ¶ 24 (finding a statement admissible after one week); but, see, Butcher , 170 Ohio App.3d at ¶ 29-34 (finding statements made after two months were inadmissible as an excited utterance). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Boston
red
2 sentences1993Therefore the passage of time between the statement and the event is relevant but not dispositive of the question. “[E]ach case must be decided on its own circumstances, since it is patently futile to attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which an oral utterance must be made in order that it be termed a spontaneous exclamation.” State v. Duncan, supra, 53 Ohio St.2d at 219-220 , 7 O.O.3d at 383 , 373 N.E.2d at 1237 ; State v. Boston (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 117-118 , 545 N.E.2d 1220, 1230-1231 . 1993Therefore the passage of time between the statement and the event is relevant but not dispositive of the question. “[E]ach case must be decided on its own circumstances, since it is patently futile to attempt to formulate an inelastic rule delimiting the time limits within which an oral utterance must be made in order that it be termed a spontaneous exclamation.” State v. Duncan, supra, 53 Ohio St.2d at 219-220 , 7 O.O.3d at 383 , 373 N.E.2d at 1237 ; State v. Boston (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 117-118 , 545 N.E.2d 1220, 1230-1231 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.