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35 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1992–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences2021State v. Cardell, 180 Or App 104, 112, 116 , 41 P3d 1111 (2002). “[I]n deciding the applicability of the Oregon exclusionary rule, the critical inquiry is whether the state obtained the evidence sought to be suppressed as a result of a violation of the defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.” Hall, 339 Or at 24 . 2016Evidence that is the product of invalid consent is subject to suppression because “the aim of the Oregon exclusionary rule is to restore a defendant to the same position as if ‘the government’s officers had stayed within the law.’” Id. at 24 (quoting Davis, 295 Or at 234 ). | 5 | 20 |
State v. Sargentgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., State v. Smith, 327 Or 366, 379 , 963 P2d 642 (1998) (“This court * * * clearly has rejected that deterrence rationale as foreign to the Oregon search and seizure provision, holding, instead, that the Oregon exclusionary rule exists to vindicate a personal right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures.”); State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455 , 462 n 4, 918 P2d 819 (1996) (“Oregon does not follow the rationale that suppression is granted to deter unlawful police conduct”). 2014See, e.g., State v. Smith, 327 Or 366, 379 , 963 P2d 642 (1998) (“This court * * * clearly has rejected that deterrence rationale as foreign to the Oregon search and seizure provision, holding, instead, that the Oregon exclusionary rule exists to vindicate a personal right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures.”); State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455 , 462 n 4, 918 P2d 819 (1996) (“Oregon does not follow the rationale that suppression is granted to deter unlawful police conduct”). | 4 | 5 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., State v. Smith, 327 Or 366, 379 , 963 P2d 642 (1998) (“This court * * * clearly has rejected that deterrence rationale as foreign to the Oregon search and seizure provision, holding, instead, that the Oregon exclusionary rule exists to vindicate a personal right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures.”); State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455 , 462 n 4, 918 P2d 819 (1996) (“Oregon does not follow the rationale that suppression is granted to deter unlawful police conduct”). 2014See, e.g., State v. Smith, 327 Or 366, 379 , 963 P2d 642 (1998) (“This court * * * clearly has rejected that deterrence rationale as foreign to the Oregon search and seizure provision, holding, instead, that the Oregon exclusionary rule exists to vindicate a personal right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures.”); State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455 , 462 n 4, 918 P2d 819 (1996) (“Oregon does not follow the rationale that suppression is granted to deter unlawful police conduct”). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2022State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 253-54 , 834 P2d 1008 (1992). 2022State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 253-54 , 834 P2d 1008 (1992). | 3 | 7 |
State v. Ungergreen2 sentences2015Therefore, “[w]here [a] motion to suppress challenges evidence seized as the result of a warrantless search, the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the validity of the search is on the prosecution.” ORS 133.693(4); State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455, 461 , 918 P2d 819 (1996); see also State v. Ordner, 252 Or App 444, 447 , 287 P3d 1256 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 280 (2013) (the state has the burden of proving the lawfulness of a warrantless traffic stop) (citing Sargent, 323 Or at 461 ). 3 Here, as in cases like Hall, 339 Or at 40 , and State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 87-88 , 333 P3d 1009 2015We gave more weight to the second of those values, holding that to disallow the use of unlawfully obtained statements for impeachment would “simply license[] perjury.” Id. at 311 . 6 That reasoning cannot be reconciled with the basic principle of the Oregon exclusionary rule as it has come to be understood in the years since we decided Mills: “to restore a defendant to the same position as if the government’s officers had stayed within the law by suppressing evidence obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.” Unger, 356 Or at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Kostagreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553 , 748 P2d 72 (1987) (personal rights); State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 315 , 745 P2d 757 (1987) (same); compare with State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 397 , 623 P2d 630 (1981) (stating exclusionary rule under Article I, section 9, should be applied only as broadly as necessary to accomplish its “prophylactic” purposes). 2005See, e.g., State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553 , 748 P2d 72 (1987) (personal rights); State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 315 , 745 P2d 757 (1987) (same); compare with State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 397 , 623 P2d 630 (1981) (stating exclusionary rule under Article I, section 9, should be applied only as broadly as necessary to accomplish its “prophylactic” purposes). | 2 | 3 |
State v. DeJonggreen2 sentences2026See State v. DeJong, 368 Or 640, 647 , 497 P3d 710 (2021) (providing that “the purpose of Oregon’s exclusionary rule * * * is to vindicate a defendant’s personal right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures”); State v. Norton, 270 Or App 584, 588 , 349 P3d 576 (2015) (explaining that “the aim of the Oregon exclusionary rule is to restore a defendant to the same position as if the government’s officer’s had stayed within the law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2026See State v. DeJong, 368 Or 640, 647 , 497 P3d 710 (2021) (providing that “the purpose of Oregon’s exclusionary rule * * * is to vindicate a defendant’s personal right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures”); State v. Norton, 270 Or App 584, 588 , 349 P3d 576 (2015) (explaining that “the aim of the Oregon exclusionary rule is to restore a defendant to the same position as if the government’s officer’s had stayed within the law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ungergreen2 sentences2014To not require suppression in such circumstances would be inconsistent with the previously described rationale underlying the Oregon exclusionary rule, that is, to place a defendant in the same position as if the governmental officers had acted within the bounds of the law.’” Unger, 252 Or App at 485 (emphasis in original). 2014To not require suppression in such circumstances would be inconsistent with the previously described rationale underlying the Oregon exclusionary rule, that is, to place a defendant in the same position as if the governmental officers had acted within the bounds of the law.’ ” Unger, 252 Or App at 485 (emphasis in original). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Tannergreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553 , 748 P2d 72 (1987) (personal rights); State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 315 , 745 P2d 757 (1987) (same); compare with State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 397 , 623 P2d 630 (1981) (stating exclusionary rule under Article I, section 9, should be applied only as broadly as necessary to accomplish its “prophylactic” purposes). 2005See, e.g., State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553 , 748 P2d 72 (1987) (personal rights); State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 315 , 745 P2d 757 (1987) (same); compare with State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 397 , 623 P2d 630 (1981) (stating exclusionary rule under Article I, section 9, should be applied only as broadly as necessary to accomplish its “prophylactic” purposes). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cardellgreen2 sentences2021State v. Cardell, 180 Or App 104, 112, 116 , 41 P3d 1111 (2002). “[I]n deciding the applicability of the Oregon exclusionary rule, the critical inquiry is whether the state obtained the evidence sought to be suppressed as a result of a violation of the defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.” Hall, 339 Or at 24 . 2021State v. Cardell, 180 Or App 104, 112, 116 , 41 P3d 1111 (2002). “[I]n deciding the applicability of the Oregon exclusionary rule, the critical inquiry is whether the state obtained the evidence sought to be suppressed as a result of a violation of the defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9.” Hall, 339 Or at 24 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ordnergreen2 sentences2015Therefore, “[w]here [a] motion to suppress challenges evidence seized as the result of a warrantless search, the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the validity of the search is on the prosecution.” ORS 133.693(4); State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455, 461 , 918 P2d 819 (1996); see also State v. Ordner, 252 Or App 444, 447 , 287 P3d 1256 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 280 (2013) (the state has the burden of proving the lawfulness of a warrantless traffic stop) (citing Sargent, 323 Or at 461 ). 3 Here, as in cases like Hall, 339 Or at 40 , and State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 87-88 , 333 P3d 1009 2015Therefore, “[w]here [a] motion to suppress challenges evidence seized as the result of a warrantless search, the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the validity of the search is on the prosecution.” ORS 133.693(4); State v. Sargent, 323 Or 455, 461 , 918 P2d 819 (1996); see also State v. Ordner, 252 Or App 444, 447 , 287 P3d 1256 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 280 (2013) (the state has the burden of proving the lawfulness of a warrantless traffic stop) (citing Sargent, 323 Or at 461 ). 3 Here, as in cases like Hall, 339 Or at 40 , and State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 87-88 , 333 P3d 1009 | 1 | 1 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2011See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 484-88, 491-92 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) (applying *659 “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under the federal exclusionary rule to evidence obtained following violations of the United States Constitution); State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 21-36 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (applying similar “exploitation analysis” under the Oregon exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after violations of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution); cf. State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 475-76 , 236 P3d 691 (2010) (applying a “derives from” test to evidence obtained a 2011See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 484-88, 491-92 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) (applying *659 “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under the federal exclusionary rule to evidence obtained following violations of the United States Constitution); State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 21-36 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (applying similar “exploitation analysis” under the Oregon exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after violations of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution); cf. State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 475-76 , 236 P3d 691 (2010) (applying a “derives from” test to evidence obtained a | 1 | 1 |
State v. Quinngreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553 , 748 P2d 72 (1987) (personal rights); State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 315 , 745 P2d 757 (1987) (same); compare with State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 397 , 623 P2d 630 (1981) (stating exclusionary rule under Article I, section 9, should be applied only as broadly as necessary to accomplish its “prophylactic” purposes). 2005On the surface, the state finds some support for that position in this court’s decision in State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), as well as its decisions in Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , scad Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2005On the surface, the state finds some support for that position in this court’s decision in State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), as well as its decisions in Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , scad Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 . 2005See, e.g., Rodriguez, 317 Or at 40 (evidence not rendered inadmissible under Article I, section 9, because it would not have been obtained “but for” unlawful police conduct). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Quinngreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553 , 748 P2d 72 (1987) (personal rights); State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 315 , 745 P2d 757 (1987) (same); compare with State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 397 , 623 P2d 630 (1981) (stating exclusionary rule under Article I, section 9, should be applied only as broadly as necessary to accomplish its “prophylactic” purposes). 2005On the surface, the state finds some support for that position in this court’s decision in State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), as well as its decisions in Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , scad Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2016Evidence that is the product of invalid consent is subject to suppression because “the aim of the Oregon exclusionary rule is to restore a defendant to the same position as if ‘the government’s officers had stayed within the law.’” Id. at 24 (quoting Davis, 295 Or at 234 ). 2015“That is so because ‘the aim of the Oregon exclusionary rule is to restore a defendant to the same position as if “the government’s officers had stayed within the law.’”” State v. Jackson, 268 Or App 139, 143 , 342 P3d 119 (2014) (quoting Hall, 339 Or at 24 (quoting State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 234 , 666 P2d 802 (1983))). | 8 | 1992–2016 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2013Instead, as this court recently explained in State v. Johnson, 335 Or 511, 520-21 , 73 P3d 282 (2003), after a defendant establishes the existence of a minimal factual nexus — that is, at minimum, the existence of a ‘but for’ relationship — between the evidence sought to be suppressed and prior unlawful police conduct, the state nevertheless may establish that the disputed evidence is admissible under Article I, section 9, by proving that the evidence did not derive from the preceding illegality. 2013Instead, as this court recently explained in State v. Johnson, 335 Or 511, 520-21 , 73 P3d 282 (2003), after a defendant establishes the existence of a minimal factual nexus — that is, at minimum, the existence of a ‘but for’ relationship — between the evidence sought to be suppressed and prior unlawful police conduct, the state nevertheless may establish that the disputed evidence is admissible under Article I, section 9, by proving that the evidence did not derive from the preceding illegality. | 4 | 2006–2013 |
State v. Norton
neutral
2 sentences2026See State v. DeJong, 368 Or 640, 647 , 497 P3d 710 (2021) (providing that “the purpose of Oregon’s exclusionary rule * * * is to vindicate a defendant’s personal right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures”); State v. Norton, 270 Or App 584, 588 , 349 P3d 576 (2015) (explaining that “the aim of the Oregon exclusionary rule is to restore a defendant to the same position as if the government’s officer’s had stayed within the law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2026See State v. DeJong, 368 Or 640, 647 , 497 P3d 710 (2021) (providing that “the purpose of Oregon’s exclusionary rule * * * is to vindicate a defendant’s personal right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures”); State v. Norton, 270 Or App 584, 588 , 349 P3d 576 (2015) (explaining that “the aim of the Oregon exclusionary rule is to restore a defendant to the same position as if the government’s officer’s had stayed within the law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2021Evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Article I, section 9, rights “is presumed [to be] tainted by the violation and must be suppressed.” State v. Jones, 275 Or App 771, 778 , 365 P3d 679 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2021Evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Article I, section 9, rights “is presumed [to be] tainted by the violation and must be suppressed.” State v. Jones, 275 Or App 771, 778 , 365 P3d 679 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Mills
green
2 sentences2015Returning a defendant to a position in which he may be able to successfully perjure himself may sometimes, at least in the abstract, frustrate “the truth-seeking purpose of our judicial process.” Mills, 76 Or App at 310-11 . 2015We gave more weight to the second of those values, holding that to disallow the use of unlawfully obtained statements for impeachment would “simply license[] perjury.” Id. at 311 . 6 That reasoning cannot be reconciled with the basic principle of the Oregon exclusionary rule as it has come to be understood in the years since we decided Mills: “to restore a defendant to the same position as if the government’s officers had stayed within the law by suppressing evidence obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.” Unger, 356 Or at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2015“That is so because ‘the aim of the Oregon exclusionary rule is to restore a defendant to the same position as if “the government’s officers had stayed within the law.’”” State v. Jackson, 268 Or App 139, 143 , 342 P3d 119 (2014) (quoting Hall, 339 Or at 24 (quoting State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 234 , 666 P2d 802 (1983))). 2015“That is so because ‘the aim of the Oregon exclusionary rule is to restore a defendant to the same position as if “the government’s officers had stayed within the law.’”” State v. Jackson, 268 Or App 139, 143 , 342 P3d 119 (2014) (quoting Hall, 339 Or at 24 (quoting State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 234 , 666 P2d 802 (1983))). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Vondehn
green
2 sentences2011See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 484-88, 491-92 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) (applying *659 “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under the federal exclusionary rule to evidence obtained following violations of the United States Constitution); State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 21-36 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (applying similar “exploitation analysis” under the Oregon exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after violations of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution); cf. State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 475-76 , 236 P3d 691 (2010) (applying a “derives from” test to evidence obtained a 2011See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 484-88, 491-92 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) (applying *659 “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under the federal exclusionary rule to evidence obtained following violations of the United States Constitution); State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 21-36 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (applying similar “exploitation analysis” under the Oregon exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after violations of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution); cf. State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 475-76 , 236 P3d 691 (2010) (applying a “derives from” test to evidence obtained a | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Ayles
green
2 sentences2010To not require suppression in such circumstances would be inconsistent with the * * * rationale underlying the Oregon exclusionary rule, that is, to place a defendant in the same position as if the government officers had acted within the bounds of the law." Hall, 339 Or. at 27-28 , 115 P.3d 908 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). [8] Because the first sentence of the Court of Appeals' statement contained the full legal answer to defendant's argument, we need not discuss whether the balance of the quoted statement is correct or adds anything to the analysis. [9] The circumstances that w 2010To not require suppression in such circumstances would be inconsistent with the * * * rationale underlying the Oregon exclusionary rule, that is, to place a defendant in the same position as if the government officers had acted within the bounds of the law." Hall, 339 Or. at 27-28 , 115 P.3d 908 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). [8] Because the first sentence of the Court of Appeals' statement contained the full legal answer to defendant's argument, we need not discuss whether the balance of the quoted statement is correct or adds anything to the analysis. [9] The circumstances that w | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Hitchcock
green
1 sentence2009Hitchcock/Winters, 224 Or App at 87 (citing Hall, 339 Or at 21 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Goree
green
2 sentences2008Because defendant prevails on those issues, we do not reach his federal constitutional arguments. 3 Defendant’s inability to leave the police car distinguishes this case from Smith and State v. Goree, 151 Or App 621 , 950 P2d 919 (1997), rev den, 327 Or 123 (1998), in each of which the defendant was held in a facility for a reason that was not related to the subject of the interrogation but was free at any time to stop the interrogation and leave the room in which it occurred without leaving the facility. 4 In the trial court, defendant focused on the voluntariness of his consent, but he also 2008Because defendant prevails on those issues, we do not reach his federal constitutional arguments. 3 Defendant’s inability to leave the police car distinguishes this case from Smith and State v. Goree, 151 Or App 621 , 950 P2d 919 (1997), rev den, 327 Or 123 (1998), in each of which the defendant was held in a facility for a reason that was not related to the subject of the interrogation but was free at any time to stop the interrogation and leave the room in which it occurred without leaving the facility. 4 In the trial court, defendant focused on the voluntariness of his consent, but he also | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences2005On the surface, the state finds some support for that position in this court’s decision in State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 623 P2d 630 (1981), as well as its decisions in Kennedy, 290 Or 493 , scad Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 . 2005On the surface, the state finds some support for that position in this court's decision in State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383 , 623 P.2d 630 (1981), as well as its decisions in Kennedy, 290 Or. 493 , 624 P.2d 99 , and Rodriguez, 317 Or. 27 , 854 P.2d 399 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Rogers
green
2 sentences1993This court has consistently reaffirmed that personal rights underlie the Oregon exclusionary rule.” 314 Or at 119 . 1993The question of whether the Oregon exclusionary rule should be applied in a particular proceeding can only be answered by looking at the rationale behind the Oregon rule. 314 Or at 119 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Nettles
green
2 sentences1993Dept. v. Rogers, supra. In that case, the court limited State v. Nettles, 287 Or 131 , 597 P2d 1243 (1979), in which the court had held that the Oregon exclusionary rule did not apply to probation revocation proceedings. 1993Dept. v. Rogers, supra. In that case, the court limited State v. Nettles, 287 Or 131 , 597 P2d 1243 (1979), in which the court had held that the Oregon exclusionary rule did not apply to probation revocation proceedings. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.