Meraz standard in Texas

2022App. 2013); see also Cleveland v. State, 177 S.W.3d 374, 387 , 390–91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (applying Meraz standard to review factual sufficiency of jury’s negative sudden passion finding and cited with approval in Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671 n.32).

2020See, e.g., Cleveland, 177 S.W.3d at 390–91 (applying Meraz standard to review factual sufficiency of jury’s negative sudden passion finding). “[T]he Jackson v. Virginia standard advanced in Brooks applies to a sufficiency review of the elements of the offense the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, not to the jury’s negative finding of an issue on which the defendant had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Moncivais, 425 S.W.3d at 408 ; see Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 924 n. 67 (Cochran, J., concurring) (noting that factual sufficiency standard in Meraz is appropriate fo

2013Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at 155 ; Bernard v. State, — S.W.3d -,-, 2011 WL 1375570 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. refd) (concluding, post-Brooks, 3 that Meraz standard of factual sufficiency applies to review of issues defendants must prove by a preponderance of evidence).

2011See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 924 n. 67 (Cochran, J., concurring); see also Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (holding that the proper standard for review of factual sufficiency challenges to negative finding on issue that defendant had to prove by preponderance of the evidence is not Jackson v. Virginia standard); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (holding that Meraz standard was suitable for sufficiency reviews regarding affirmative defenses because burden of proof on defendant is preponderance of evidence), overruled on other grounds by Watson v.

1992However, we note that the Meraz standard does not apply in the absence of an affirmative defense or other issue upon which the defendant has the burden of proof See, e.g., Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Marsh v. State, 800 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); Hunter v. State, 799 S.W.2d 356, 358-59 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Mason v. State, 798 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Gaynor v. State, 788 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d)

1992However, we note that the Meraz standard does not apply in the absence of an affirmative defense or other issue upon which the defendant has the burden of proof See, e.g., Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Marsh v. State, 800 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); Hunter v. State, 799 S.W.2d 356, 358-59 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Mason v. State, 798 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Gaynor v. State, 788 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d)

2013Meraz v. State, 714 S.W.2d 108, 115 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1986) (rejecting defendant's claim that "the jury’s verdict [on competency] was contrary to the evidence as a matter of law”), aff'd, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). 40 .

2013Meraz v. State , 714 S.W.2d 108, 115 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986) (rejecting defendant's claim that "the jury's verdict [on competency] was contrary to the evidence as a matter of law"), aff'd , 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim.

1994Richard v. State, 830 S.W.2d 208, 213-14 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd); Mukes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Brouwn v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).

1994Richard v. State, 830 S.W.2d 208, 213-14 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd); Mukes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Brouwn v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).

2020See, e.g., Cleveland, 177 S.W.3d at 390–91 (applying Meraz standard to review factual sufficiency of jury’s negative sudden passion finding). “[T]he Jackson v. Virginia standard advanced in Brooks applies to a sufficiency review of the elements of the offense the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, not to the jury’s negative finding of an issue on which the defendant had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Moncivais, 425 S.W.3d at 408 ; see Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 924 n. 67 (Cochran, J., concurring) (noting that factual sufficiency standard in Meraz is appropriate fo

2011See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 924 n. 67 (Cochran, J., concurring); see also Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (holding that the proper standard for review of factual sufficiency challenges to negative finding on issue that defendant had to prove by preponderance of the evidence is not Jackson v. Virginia standard); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (holding that Meraz standard was suitable for sufficiency reviews regarding affirmative defenses because burden of proof on defendant is preponderance of evidence), overruled on other grounds by Watson v.

2015App. 2008) (applying Meraz standard in reviewing factual sufficiency of jury's punishment-phase negative finding on special issue of defendant's mental retardation); Bernard v. State, 401 S.W.3d 145, 147-50 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. refd) (applying Meraz standard in reviewing factual sufficiency of jury's punishment-phase fmding that defendant did not act under the immediate influence of sudden passion).

2015App. 2008) (applying Meraz standard in reviewing factual sufficiency of jury’s punishment-phase negative finding on special issue of defendant’s mental retardation); Bernard v. State, 401 S.W.3d 145 , 147–50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (applying Meraz standard in reviewing factual sufficiency of jury’s punishment-phase finding that defendant did not act under the immediate influence of sudden passion).

2022App. 2013); see also Cleveland v. State, 177 S.W.3d 374, 387 , 390–91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (applying Meraz standard to review factual sufficiency of jury’s negative sudden passion finding and cited with approval in Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671 n.32).

2021Under the Meraz standard, we review all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the judgment is so “against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or clearly biased.” Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671 .

2021“We may not, however, intrude on the fact finder’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony.” Moncivais, 425 S.W.3d at 409 . 2.

2020See, e.g., Cleveland, 177 S.W.3d at 390–91 (applying Meraz standard to review factual sufficiency of jury’s negative sudden passion finding). “[T]he Jackson v. Virginia standard advanced in Brooks applies to a sufficiency review of the elements of the offense the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, not to the jury’s negative finding of an issue on which the defendant had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Moncivais, 425 S.W.3d at 408 ; see Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 924 n. 67 (Cochran, J., concurring) (noting that factual sufficiency standard in Meraz is appropriate fo

2011Cleveland, 177 S.W.3d at 390-91 (applying the Meraz standard as cited in Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 482 ); see also Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 924 n. 67.

2011See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 924 n. 67 (Cochran, J., concurring); see also Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (holding that the proper standard for review of factual sufficiency challenges to negative finding on issue that defendant had to prove by preponderance of the evidence is not Jackson v. Virginia standard); Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (holding that Meraz standard was suitable for sufficiency reviews regarding affirmative defenses because burden of proof on defendant is preponderance of evidence), overruled on other grounds by Watson v.

2011See Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 273 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (applying Meraz standard of review in reviewing factual sufficiency of jury’s punishment-phase finding that defendant did not prove by preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded); Woods v. State, 301 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (applying Meraz standard of review in reviewing factual sufficiency of jury’s punishment-phase finding that defendant did not prove by preponderance of the evidence that he voluntarily released the kidnapping victim in a safe place); Harrell v. State, 65 S.W.3d 7

2005Accordingly, this court applied the Meraz standard in Harrell v. State as the standard of review for factual sufficiency of the jury = s rejection of the punishment issue raised by the defendant as to whether he voluntarily released the victim in a safe place after a kidnapping conviction. 65 S.W.3d 768, 772 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref = d); see also Cleveland v. State , No. 01-03-01040-CR, 2005 WL 826943, at *13 (Tex. App. C Houston [1st Dist.] April 7, 2005, pet. ref = d) (applying the Meraz standard, as cited in Zuniga , when the appellate court conducts a factual suffi

1993See Mukes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Coleman v. State, 804 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.); Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Lopez v. State, 824 S.W.2d 298, 303-04 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.).

1993See Mukes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Coleman v. State, 804 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.); Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Lopez v. State, 824 S.W.2d 298, 303-04 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.).

1992However, we note that the Meraz standard does not apply in the absence of an affirmative defense or other issue upon which the defendant has the burden of proof See, e.g., Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Marsh v. State, 800 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); Hunter v. State, 799 S.W.2d 356, 358-59 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Mason v. State, 798 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Gaynor v. State, 788 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d)

1992However, we note that the Meraz standard does not apply in the absence of an affirmative defense or other issue upon which the defendant has the burden of proof See, e.g., Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Marsh v. State, 800 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); Hunter v. State, 799 S.W.2d 356, 358-59 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Mason v. State, 798 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Gaynor v. State, 788 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d)

1992However, we note that the Meraz standard does not apply in the absence of an affirmative defense or other issue upon which the defendant has the burden of proof See, e.g., Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Marsh v. State, 800 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); Hunter v. State, 799 S.W.2d 356, 358-59 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Mason v. State, 798 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Gaynor v. State, 788 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d)

1992However, we note that the Meraz standard does not apply in the absence of an affirmative defense or other issue upon which the defendant has the burden of proof See, e.g., Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Marsh v. State, 800 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); Hunter v. State, 799 S.W.2d 356, 358-59 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Mason v. State, 798 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Gaynor v. State, 788 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d)

1992However, we note that the Meraz standard does not apply in the absence of an affirmative defense or other issue upon which the defendant has the burden of proof See, e.g., Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Marsh v. State, 800 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); Hunter v. State, 799 S.W.2d 356, 358-59 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Mason v. State, 798 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Gaynor v. State, 788 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d)

1992However, we note that the Meraz standard does not apply in the absence of an affirmative defense or other issue upon which the defendant has the burden of proof See, e.g., Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Marsh v. State, 800 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d); Hunter v. State, 799 S.W.2d 356, 358-59 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Mason v. State, 798 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.); Gaynor v. State, 788 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d)

2015App. 2004) (holding that Meraz standard was suitable for sufficiency reviews regarding affirmative defenses because burden of proof on defendant is preponderance of evidence), overruled on other grounds by Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim.

2013App. 2004) (holding that Meraz standard was suitable for sufficiency reviews regarding affirmative defenses because burden of proof on defendant is preponderance of evidence), overruled on other grounds by Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 , 416–17 (Tex. Crim.

1999The Dallas court reasoned that, since the defendant has the same burden of proof under Section 19.02(d) of the Texas Penal Code as he does with an affirmative defense, i.e., by a preponderance of the evidence, then it is appropriate to use the Meraz standard (as followed by Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)) to review a jury’s rejection of the mitigating issue of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause.

1999The Dallas court reasoned that, since the defendant has the same burden of proof under Section 19.02(d) of the Texas Penal Code as he does with an affirmative defense, i.e., by a preponderance of the evidence, then it is appropriate to use the Meraz standard (as followed by Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)) to review a jury’s rejection of the mitigating issue of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause.

2012App. 2006); Smith, 355 S.W.3d at 148 .

2011See Moncivais v. State, No. 01-09- 01131-CR, 2011 WL 2936360, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 21, 2011, pet. filed); Bernard v. State, No. 14-10- 00044-CR, 2011 WL 1375570, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 12, 2011, pet. ref’d); Smith v. State, No. 01-09- 00634-CR, 2011 WL 1233367, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2011, pet. ref’d); Johnson v. State, No. 05-09- 00133-CR, 2010 WL 5142392 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 20, 2010, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication); see also Godin v. State, No. 04-10-00784-CR, 2011 WL 4828484 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 1

1998See Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref'd, untimely filed); see also Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Clems v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

1998See Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref'd, untimely filed); see also Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Clems v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

2011See Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 273 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (applying Meraz standard of review in reviewing factual sufficiency of jury’s punishment-phase finding that defendant did not prove by preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded); Woods v. State, 301 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (applying Meraz standard of review in reviewing factual sufficiency of jury’s punishment-phase finding that defendant did not prove by preponderance of the evidence that he voluntarily released the kidnapping victim in a safe place); Harrell v. State, 65 S.W.3d 7

2011See Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 273 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (applying Meraz standard of review in reviewing factual sufficiency of jury’s punishment-phase finding that defendant did not prove by preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded); Woods v. State, 301 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (applying Meraz standard of review in reviewing factual sufficiency of jury’s punishment-phase finding that defendant did not prove by preponderance of the evidence that he voluntarily released the kidnapping victim in a safe place); Harrell v. State, 65 S.W.3d 7

2011See Trevino , 157 S.W.3d at 822 (finding evidence sufficient under the Meraz standard even though: (1) defendant testified that he was in state of terror during murder because complainant shot revolver at him; (2) police recovered revolver from crime scene; (3) a bullet hole in wall was present at scene; and (4) witness testified that complainant had previously pointed gun at defendant when she was angry).

2011See Trevino , 157 S.W.3d at 822 (finding evidence sufficient under the Meraz standard even though: (1) defendant testified that he was in state of terror during murder because complainant shot revolver at him; (2) police recovered revolver from crime scene; (3) a bullet hole in wall was present at scene; and (4) witness testified that complainant had previously pointed gun at defendant when she was angry).

1998See Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref'd, untimely filed); see also Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Clems v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

1998See Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref'd, untimely filed); see also Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Clems v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

1994Richard v. State, 830 S.W.2d 208, 213-14 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd); Mukes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Brouwn v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).

1994Richard v. State, 830 S.W.2d 208, 213-14 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd); Mukes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Brouwn v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd).

1994Jones v. State, 817 S.W.2d 854, 855 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.).

1994Jones v. State, 817 S.W.2d 854, 855 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.).

1993See Mukes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Coleman v. State, 804 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.); Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Lopez v. State, 824 S.W.2d 298, 303-04 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.).

1993See Mukes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); Coleman v. State, 804 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.); Brown v. State, 804 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d); Lopez v. State, 824 S.W.2d 298, 303-04 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.).