due weight standard in Wisconsin

2017"Under the due weight standard, 'a court need not defer to an agency's interpretation which, while reasonable, is not the interpretation which the court considers best and most reasonable.' " Id. at 286 (quoting Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 660 n.4).

2017"Under the due weight standard, 'a court need not defer to an agency's interpretation which, while reasonable, is not the interpretation which the court considers best and most reasonable.'" Id. at 286 (quoting Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 660 n.4).

2011Under the due weight standard of deference, "we will sustain the agency's reasonable determination unless an opposing interpretation is more reasonable, while under the great-weight deference rule, the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation is the only question." Id.

2011Menasha Corp., 311 Wis. 2d 579, ¶ 49 . ¶ 29.

2011Thus, "[u]nder the due weight standard, we will uphold the agency's interpretation and application of a statute if it is reasonable and comports with the purpose of the statute, and no other interpretation is more reasonable." Xerox Corp. v. DOR, 2009 WI App 113, ¶ 48 , 321 Wis. 2d 181 , 772 N.W.2d 677 . ¶ 9.

2011Thus, "[u]nder the due weight standard, we will uphold the agency's interpretation and application of a statute if it is reasonable and comports with the purpose of the statute, and no other interpretation is more reasonable." Xerox Corp. v. DOR, 2009 WI App 113, ¶ 48 , 321 Wis. 2d 181 , 772 N.W.2d 677 . ¶ 9.

2009Gilbert, 315 Wis. 2d 726, ¶ 9 .

2007Id. (quoting UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 286-87 , 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996)). ¶ 29.

2007Id. (quoting UFE, Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis.2d 274, 286-87 , 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996)). ¶ 29 We apply de novo review when "there is no evidence that the agency has any special expertise or experience interpreting the statute[,] . . . the issue before the agency is clearly one of first impression, or . . . the agency's position on an issue has been so inconsistent so as to provide no real guidance." Brauneis v. LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶ 18 , 236 Wis.2d 27 , 612 N.W.2d 635 (citations omitted). ¶ 30 Stoughton contends that we should apply de novo review because LIRC's decision was based on an interpretation of

2006STAT. § 227.57(10). ¶ 19 Franklin claims that the great-weight standard should be applied because policy decisions are inextricably part of the basis for the agency's decision. "[W]hen a legal question calls for value and policy judgments that require the expertise and experience of an agency, the agency's decision, although not controlling, is given great weight deference." Brown v. LIRC, 2003 WI 142, ¶ 16 , 267 Wis.2d 31 , 671 N.W.2d 279 . ¶ 20 We conclude the PSC's decision will be reviewed under the due-weight standard.

2006STAT. § 227.57(10). ¶ 19 Franklin claims that the great-weight standard should be applied because policy decisions are inextricably part of the basis for the agency's decision. "[W]hen a legal question calls for value and policy judgments that require the expertise and experience of an agency, the agency's decision, although not controlling, is given great weight deference." Brown v. LIRC, 2003 WI 142, ¶ 16 , 267 Wis.2d 31 , 671 N.W.2d 279 . ¶ 20 We conclude the PSC's decision will be reviewed under the due-weight standard.

2002Applying the great weight standard, we will affirm WERC's conclusion that teacher prep time is a permissive subject of bargaining if "the agency's view of the law is reasonable even though an alternative view is also reasonable." West Bend, 121 Wis. 2d at 13-14 .

2002Applying the great weight standard, we will affirm WERC's conclusion that teacher prep time is a permissive subject of bargaining if "the agency's view of the law is reasonable even though an alternative view is also reasonable." West Bend, 121 Wis. 2d at 13-14 .

2002Applying the due weight standard of review to this issue, we therefore disagree with the dissent's conclusion that the Association's definition of fringe benefit is more reasonable than WERC's definition. [15] In Brown County Attorneys Association v. Brown County, 169 Wis. 2d 737 , 487 N.W.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1992), the court of appeals interpreted fringe benefits under Wis. Stat. § 978.12 (6), which provided that prosecutors making the transition to state employment could opt to remain covered by a county's fringe benefit plan in lieu of state benefits. [1] In relevant part, Commissioner Hempe s

2002Applying the due weight standard of review to this issue, we therefore disagree with the dissent's conclusion that the Association's definition of fringe benefit is more reasonable than WERC's definition. [15] In Brown County Attorneys Association v. Brown County, 169 Wis. 2d 737 , 487 N.W.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1992), the court of appeals interpreted fringe benefits under Wis. Stat. § 978.12 (6), which provided that prosecutors making the transition to state employment could opt to remain covered by a county's fringe benefit plan in lieu of state benefits. [1] In relevant part, Commissioner Hempe s

1998Under the due weight standard, "[W]e will not overturn a reasonable agency decision that furthers the purpose of the statute unless we determine that there is a more reasonable interpretation under the applicable facts than that made by the agency." Currie, 210 Wis. 2d at 388 , 565 N.W.2d at 257 . *149 Finally, the "de novo" standard is the least deferential.

1998Under the due weight standard, "[W]e will not overturn a reasonable agency decision that furthers the purpose of the statute unless we determine that there is a more reasonable interpretation under the applicable facts than that made by the agency." Currie, 210 Wis. 2d at 388 , 565 N.W.2d at 257 . *149 Finally, the "de novo" standard is the least deferential.