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32 California opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2026 28 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2026Legal principles A participant in the perpetration of certain enumerated felonies, including burglary, may be liable for murder if the People prove he or she “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life,” within the meaning of section 190.2, the special circumstances statute. (§ 189, subds. (a), (e)(3); see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 .) “Section 190.2, subdivision (d), by its text, imposes an actus reus requirement, i.e., major participation in the enumerated felony, and a mens rea requirement, i.e., reckless indifference to huma 2025A defendant who participates in a qualifying felony while harboring express malice does not fall into the class of offenders the new law was enacted to protect. [Citation.] In other words, because express malice is an element of [section 189(e)(2)] felony-murder liability, there is no reason to interpret the actus reus requirement as anything different than what the felony-murder actus reus requirement was before Senate Bill 1437—‘aiding and abetting the underlying felony or attempted felony that results in the murder.’ ” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 578, italics omitted, quoting People | 7 | 19 |
People v. Stronggreen2 sentences2026Legal principles A participant in the perpetration of certain enumerated felonies, including burglary, may be liable for murder if the People prove he or she “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life,” within the meaning of section 190.2, the special circumstances statute. (§ 189, subds. (a), (e)(3); see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 .) “Section 190.2, subdivision (d), by its text, imposes an actus reus requirement, i.e., major participation in the enumerated felony, and a mens rea requirement, i.e., reckless indifference to huma 2026Legal principles A participant in the perpetration of certain enumerated felonies, including burglary, may be liable for murder if the People prove he or she “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life,” within the meaning of section 190.2, the special circumstances statute. (§ 189, subds. (a), (e)(3); see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 .) “Section 190.2, subdivision (d), by its text, imposes an actus reus requirement, i.e., major participation in the enumerated felony, and a mens rea requirement, i.e., reckless indifference to huma | 4 | 5 |
People v. Banksgreen2 sentences2025(See Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794 .) Section 190.2, subdivision (d), by its text, imposes an actus reus requirement, i.e., major participation in the enumerated felony, and a mens rea requirement, i.e., reckless indifference to human life. 2023The statute, by its text, imposes an actus reus requirement, major participation in the enumerated felony, and a mens rea requirement, reckless indifference to human life.” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674 (Scoggins); accord, Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 ; Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 798 .) The Supreme Court in Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 , and more recently in Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th 667 , identified the factors courts must consider in assessing whether a defendant was a major participant in an underlying serious felony and acted with re | 2 | 15 |
People v. Corpeninggreen2 sentences2023(See People v. Corpening, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 316 [“Where the same physical act accomplishes the actus reus requirement for more than one crime, that single act cannot give rise to multiple punishment”].) Moreover, defendant had a single objective during the offenses: to find members of his family. 2022(People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 314-315 [forceful taking of a van was a single physical act “because that act simultaneously accomplished the actus reus requirement for both the robbery and carjacking. | 2 | 2 |
Tison v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2021The statute, by its text, imposes an actus reus requirement, major participation in the enumerated felony, and a mens rea requirement, reckless indifference to human life.” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 , 674 (Scoggins); accord, Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 ; People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 798 (Banks).) “Section 190.2(d) was designed to codify the holding of Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 . . . , which articulates the constitutional limits on executing felony murderers who did not personally kill. 2021(Scoggins, at p. 674.) Section 190.2, subdivision (d) codifies the holdings of Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), which brought California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 609 ; People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 ; In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999 , 1004–1005.)5 Enmund held that the death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed on an armed robbery getaway driver 5 “Although these standards were devel | 1 | 5 |
People v. Curielgreen2 sentences2024Code, § 189, subd. (e)(2), italics added.)1 Nor do I read a hypothetical posed by our Supreme Court last year in dicta to be controlling in this situation; I agree with the Kelly majority that the “hypothetical assumed the actus reus requirement for felony murder was established; it did not purport to define that requirement in the first instance.” (Kelly, p. 173; see People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 , 464.) Notably, the portion of the statute at issue here, section 189, subdivision (e), begins by describing the person who will be addressed in the subdivisions to follow as a participant 2024(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 464 .) Therefore, unlike the majority in Morris, we do not read the hypothetical as clarifying that requirement.3 3 At the time Curiel was decided, neither did the Attorney General. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Newtongreen1 sentence2025(See § 26 [no criminal liability for “[p]ersons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof”]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 376 [“unconsciousness is a complete defense to a charge of criminal homicide”].) To this point, then, it appears the only requirement in the statute is that the defendant’s acts be volitional rather than involuntary. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Holfordgreen1 sentence2025Code, § 31.) “Thus, a person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that crime even if someone else committed some or all of the criminal acts.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 .) “[A]ider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea— knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus— conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists t | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dominguezgreen1 sentence2022It matters not that this act . . . can be broken down into constituent parts.”]; see also People v. Dominguez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 420 [carjacking and robbery accomplished by same act where the defendant placed a purported gun on back of victim’s neck and demanded “ ‘everything he had,’ ” and the victim handed over jewelry and fled the vehicle].) Thus, for purposes of calculating the maximum time of confinement, the robbery and attempted robbery counts should have been stayed. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Medinagreen1 sentence2021(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 798 .) These elements “often overlap.” Major participation, while not sufficient to establish reckless indifference by itself, can “often provide significant support for such a finding.” (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158, fn. 12 ; accord, Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-615 [noting the “interrelationship” between the two elements and that they often overlap]; People v. Medina (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 778, 788 [noting, “[t]hese two requirements -- having a reckless disregard for human life and being a major participant -- will often overlap.”].) In evaluating e | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cavittgreen2 sentences2016(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 810.) The statutory definition of first degree felony murder is as follows: “All murder . . . which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate [certain enumerated felonies including robbery and burglary] ... is murder of the first degree.” (§ 189.) “The mental state required is simply the specific intent to commit the underlying felony [citation] . . . .” (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281 , 91 P.3d 222 ].) The actus reus requirement for an aider and abettor to first degree felony murder is aiding and abetting th 2016(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 810.) The statutory definition of first degree felony murder is as follows: “All murder . . . which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate [certain enumerated felonies including robbery and burglary] ... is murder of the first degree.” (§ 189.) “The mental state required is simply the specific intent to commit the underlying felony [citation] . . . .” (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 281 , 91 P.3d 222 ].) The actus reus requirement for an aider and abettor to first degree felony murder is aiding and abetting th | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Boldengreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Crandellgreen2 sentences2010For example, no unanimity instruction is required if the case falls within the continuous-course-of-conduct exception, which arises "when the acts are so closely connected in time as to form part of one transaction" ( People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 875 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 227 , 760 P.2d 423 ]), or "when ... the statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of time" ( People v. Thompson (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 220, 224 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 516 ]). 2010For example, no unanimity instruction is required if the case falls within the continuous-course-of-conduct exception, which arises "when the acts are so closely connected in time as to form part of one transaction" ( People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 875 [ 251 Cal.Rptr. 227 , 760 P.2d 423 ]), or "when ... the statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of time" ( People v. Thompson (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 220, 224 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 516 ]). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Thompsongreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mayfieldgreen1 sentence2010That's the difference." (See People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 994 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 905 , 750 P.2d 794 ] [the jury was not misled by omission of the intent-to-torture element in the torture-murder special-circumstance instruction, in part because the prosecution specifically explained to the jury that the special circumstance required an intent to kill].) In light of these circumstances, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error in omitting the actus reus requirement from the torture-murder special-circumstance instruction did not contribute to the jury's true f | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Diedrichgreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wadegreen2 sentences2010That's the difference." (See People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 994 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 905 , 750 P.2d 794 ] [the jury was not misled by omission of the intent-to-torture element in the torture-murder special-circumstance instruction, in part because the prosecution specifically explained to the jury that the special circumstance required an intent to kill].) In light of these circumstances, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error in omitting the actus reus requirement from the torture-murder special-circumstance instruction did not contribute to the jury's true f 2010That's the difference." (See People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 994 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 905 , 750 P.2d 794 ] [the jury was not misled by omission of the intent-to-torture element in the torture-murder special-circumstance instruction, in part because the prosecution specifically explained to the jury that the special circumstance required an intent to kill].) In light of these circumstances, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error in omitting the actus reus requirement from the torture-murder special-circumstance instruction did not contribute to the jury's true f | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Enmund v. Florida
green
2 sentences2021(Scoggins, at p. 674.) Section 190.2, subdivision (d) codifies the holdings of Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), which brought California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 609 ; People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 ; In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999 , 1004–1005.)4 Enmund held that the death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed on an armed robbery getaway driver 4 “Although these standards were devel 2021(Scoggins, at p. 674.) Section 190.2, subdivision (d) codifies the holdings of Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), which brought California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 609 ; People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 ; In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999 , 1004–1005.)5 Enmund held that the death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed on an armed robbery getaway driver 5 “Although these standards were devel | 3 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Beeman
green
2 sentences2025Code, § 31.) “Thus, a person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that crime even if someone else committed some or all of the criminal acts.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 .) “[A]ider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea— knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus— conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists t 2025A. Evidence of actus reus The actus reus requirement for aiding and abetting is satisfied where the aider and abettor “by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” (Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 561 .) In the context of implied malice mens rea, “ ‘the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Booker
green
2 sentences2023(People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 175 .) “The actus reus requirement for an aider and abettor to first degree felony murder is aiding and abetting the underlying felony or attempted felony that results in the murder.” (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615 .) Thus, for decades under the felony murder law, a defendant needed only intend a crime like robbery and act to aid the robbery. 2023(People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 175 .) “The actus reus requirement for an aider and abettor to first degree felony murder is aiding and abetting the underlying felony or attempted felony that results in the murder.” (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615 .) Thus, for decades under the felony murder law, a defendant needed only intend a crime like robbery and act to aid the robbery. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Pulido
green
2 sentences2023(People v. McDonald (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 16, 24-25 ; 5 see People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 716 .) The getaway driver’s act can establish only that he is an accessory after the fact to murder, a “separate criminal offense.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 668 ; see § 32.) Likewise, the actus reus requirement means that other participants with a small role in a robbery, such as a person who drove the robbers to the scene, may have a plausible jury argument that they did not aid the actual killer in the commission of murder, even if they are found to have intent to kill based 2023(People v. McDonald (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 16, 24-25 ; 5 see People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 716 .) The getaway driver’s act can establish only that he is an accessory after the fact to murder, a “separate criminal offense.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 668 ; see § 32.) Likewise, the actus reus requirement means that other participants with a small role in a robbery, such as a person who drove the robbers to the scene, may have a plausible jury argument that they did not aid the actual killer in the commission of murder, even if they are found to have intent to kill based | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Jennings
green
2 sentences2023(People v. McDonald (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 16, 24-25 ; 5 see People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 716 .) The getaway driver’s act can establish only that he is an accessory after the fact to murder, a “separate criminal offense.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 668 ; see § 32.) Likewise, the actus reus requirement means that other participants with a small role in a robbery, such as a person who drove the robbers to the scene, may have a plausible jury argument that they did not aid the actual killer in the commission of murder, even if they are found to have intent to kill based 2023(People v. McDonald (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 16, 24-25 ; 5 see People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 716 .) The getaway driver’s act can establish only that he is an accessory after the fact to murder, a “separate criminal offense.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 668 ; see § 32.) Likewise, the actus reus requirement means that other participants with a small role in a robbery, such as a person who drove the robbers to the scene, may have a plausible jury argument that they did not aid the actual killer in the commission of murder, even if they are found to have intent to kill based | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. McDonald
green
2 sentences2023(People v. McDonald (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 16, 24-25 ; 5 see People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 716 .) The getaway driver’s act can establish only that he is an accessory after the fact to murder, a “separate criminal offense.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 668 ; see § 32.) Likewise, the actus reus requirement means that other participants with a small role in a robbery, such as a person who drove the robbers to the scene, may have a plausible jury argument that they did not aid the actual killer in the commission of murder, even if they are found to have intent to kill based 2023(People v. McDonald (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 16, 24-25 ; 5 see People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 716 .) The getaway driver’s act can establish only that he is an accessory after the fact to murder, a “separate criminal offense.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 668 ; see § 32.) Likewise, the actus reus requirement means that other participants with a small role in a robbery, such as a person who drove the robbers to the scene, may have a plausible jury argument that they did not aid the actual killer in the commission of murder, even if they are found to have intent to kill based | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Estrada
green
2 sentences2021(Scoggins, at p. 674.) Section 190.2, subdivision (d) codifies the holdings of Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), which brought California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 609 ; People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 ; In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999 , 1004–1005.)4 Enmund held that the death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed on an armed robbery getaway driver 4 “Although these standards were devel 2021(Scoggins, at p. 674.) Section 190.2, subdivision (d) codifies the holdings of Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), which brought California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 609 ; People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 ; In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999 , 1004–1005.)5 Enmund held that the death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed on an armed robbery getaway driver 5 “Although these standards were devel | 2 | 2021–2021 |
In re Ramirez
green
2 sentences2021(Scoggins, at p. 674.) Section 190.2, subdivision (d) codifies the holdings of Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), which brought California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 609 ; People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 ; In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999 , 1004–1005.)4 Enmund held that the death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed on an armed robbery getaway driver 4 “Although these standards were devel 2021(Scoggins, at p. 674.) Section 190.2, subdivision (d) codifies the holdings of Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), which brought California law “into conformity with prevailing Eighth Amendment doctrine.” (In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 393 ; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 609 ; People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 ; In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999 , 1004–1005.)5 Enmund held that the death penalty could not constitutionally be imposed on an armed robbery getaway driver 5 “Although these standards were devel | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Smith
green
1 sentence2025Defendant does not dispute that Ellis’s actions amounted to attempted 15 murder. “ ‘The act of firing toward a victim at a close, but not point blank, range “in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the bullet been on target is sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill. . . .” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741 .) With respect to defendant’s liability as an aider and abettor, he drove Ellis into position to fire the second shot, aiding Ellis’s direct but ineffectual act toward killing R.T., satisfying the actus reus requirement. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Partee
green
1 sentence2025Code, § 31.) “Thus, a person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that crime even if someone else committed some or all of the criminal acts.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 .) “[A]ider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea— knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus— conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Perez
green
1 sentence2025Code, § 31.) “Thus, a person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that crime even if someone else committed some or all of the criminal acts.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 .) “[A]ider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea— knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus— conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. McCoy
green
1 sentence2025Code, § 31.) “Thus, a person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that crime even if someone else committed some or all of the criminal acts.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 .) “[A]ider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea— knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus— conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Trevino
green
1 sentence2024Indeed, the law is well established that when “the Legislature uses materially different language in statutory provisions addressing the same subject or related subjects, the normal inference is that the Legislature intended a difference in meaning.” (People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 242 .) 10 Comparing subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(3) of section 189 side by side, it is reasonable to conclude the Legislature was aware of and intended to draw a distinction between mere involvement in the underling felony and involvement in the murder itself. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Britt
green
1 sentence2023In this regard, People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944 is instructive. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2010That's the difference." (See People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 994 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 905 , 750 P.2d 794 ] [the jury was not misled by omission of the intent-to-torture element in the torture-murder special-circumstance instruction, in part because the prosecution specifically explained to the jury that the special circumstance required an intent to kill].) In light of these circumstances, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error in omitting the actus reus requirement from the torture-murder special-circumstance instruction did not contribute to the jury's true f 2010That's the difference." (See People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 994 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 905 , 750 P.2d 794 ] [the jury was not misled by omission of the intent-to-torture element in the torture-murder special-circumstance instruction, in part because the prosecution specifically explained to the jury that the special circumstance required an intent to kill].) In light of these circumstances, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error in omitting the actus reus requirement from the torture-murder special-circumstance instruction did not contribute to the jury's true f | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Chapman v. California
red
1 sentence2010(See *677 People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802 , 58 P.3d 931 ] [failure to instruct on an essential element of a special circumstance is subject to a harmless error analysis under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18 ].) In light of defendant's admissions, the arguments of counsel, the totality of the jury instructions, and the overwhelming evidence on this point, there simply is no possibility that the jury's special circumstance finding was based on a mere intent to torture unrealized by an act of torture. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Crittenden green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Sandstrom v. Montana green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.