proposed pinpoint instruction in California

2024(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826 , 886–887; People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 422 [“failure to give a pinpoint instruction . . . is judged as state law error that is prejudicial only where there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result”].) The denial of a pinpoint instruction has been held harmless under Watson where the instructions that were given did not preclude findings consistent with the proposed pinpoint instruction’s theory and where defense counsel fully explained the point to the jury.

2023(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826 , 886–887; People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394 , 421–422 [“failure to give a pinpoint instruction . . . is judged as state law error that is prejudicial only where there is reasonable probability of a more favorable result”].) The denial of a pinpoint instruction is harmless under Watson where the instructions that were given do not preclude findings consistent with the proposed pinpoint instruction's theory and where the defense counsel fully argued the point to the jury.

2024(People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144 .) So, too, has the failure to provide a pinpoint instruction been found to be harmless where, ‘ “the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions.” ’ ” (People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542 , 594–595 (Scully).) Both scenarios are present here.

2023(People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144 .)19 Here, any error was harmless because, as set forth above, the standard causation instructions sufficiently addressed the principles stated in Zemek’s proposed pinpoint instruction.

2016The “ ‘cautionary nature of the instructions benefits the defense, admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence that might otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 142 .) Arguing by analogy to People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408 , which found a proposed pinpoint instruction by the defense to be unduly argumentative, defendant argues CALCRIM No. 371 is similarly defective.

2016The general rule is that “[a] trial court must instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case. [Citation.] In addition, a defendant has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the theory of the defense. [Citation.] The court must, however, refuse an argumentative instruction, that is, an instruction ‘of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of evidence.’” (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 890 , quoting People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437 .) We conclude that the proposed pinpoint instruction was arg

2026In addition to Evidence Code section 1103, Machleit relies on DelRio, supra, Cal.App.5th 47, People v. Rowland (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 790 , and People v. Smith (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 395 .

2026In addition to Evidence Code section 1103, Machleit relies on DelRio, supra, Cal.App.5th 47, People v. Rowland (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 790 , and People v. Smith (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 395 .

2026In addition to Evidence Code section 1103, Machleit relies on DelRio, supra, Cal.App.5th 47, People v. Rowland (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 790 , and People v. Smith (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 395 .

2026In addition to Evidence Code section 1103, Machleit relies on DelRio, supra, Cal.App.5th 47, People v. Rowland (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 790 , and People v. Smith (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 395 .

2024(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 887 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) While it is no doubt true, as Shavers argues, that her proposed pinpoint instruction addressed her level of knowledge about the firearm at issue, we disagree that the trial court was required to give it.

2014“A trial court is not required to give pinpoint instructions that merely duplicate other instructions.” (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 486 .) Assuming for the sake of argument the court’s refusal to give the pinpoint instruction was erroneous, any error was harmless because the instructions sufficiently covered the topic of possession (People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 277 ) and because “it is not reasonably probable that had the jury been given [the] proposed pinpoint instruction, it would have come to any different conclusion in this case.” (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4

2021While we acknowledge that an abuse of discretion standard may be applicable in some instances where the denial of a pinpoint instruction is at issue, because the People do not argue for an abuse of discretion review, and because one of the issues presented is whether the proposed pinpoint instruction incorrectly stated the law, we will independently review Brugman’s contention that his proposed pinpoint instruction was improperly denied. 13 find that the act would directly, naturally and probably result in a battery.” (Id. at p. 788, fn. 3.) Williams clarified that “[i]n adopting this knowledg

2021While we acknowledge that an abuse of discretion standard may be applicable in some instances where the denial of a pinpoint instruction is at issue, because the People do not argue for an abuse of discretion review, and because one of the issues presented is whether the proposed pinpoint instruction incorrectly stated the law, we will independently review Brugman’s contention that his proposed pinpoint instruction was improperly denied. 13 find that the act would directly, naturally and probably result in a battery.” (Id. at p. 788, fn. 3.) Williams clarified that “[i]n adopting this knowledg

2021While we acknowledge that an abuse of discretion standard may be applicable in some instances where the denial of a pinpoint instruction is at issue, because the People do not argue for an abuse of discretion review, and because one of the issues presented is whether the proposed pinpoint instruction incorrectly stated the law, we will independently review Brugman’s contention that his proposed pinpoint instruction was improperly denied. 13 find that the act would directly, naturally and probably result in a battery.” (Id. at p. 788, fn. 3.) Williams clarified that “[i]n adopting this knowledg

2021While we acknowledge that an abuse of discretion standard may be applicable in some instances where the denial of a pinpoint instruction is at issue, because the People do not argue for an abuse of discretion review, and because one of the issues presented is whether the proposed pinpoint instruction incorrectly stated the law, we will independently review Brugman’s contention that his proposed pinpoint instruction was improperly denied. 13 find that the act would directly, naturally and probably result in a battery.” (Id. at p. 788, fn. 3.) Williams clarified that “[i]n adopting this knowledg

2016The general rule is that “[a] trial court must instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case. [Citation.] In addition, a defendant has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the theory of the defense. [Citation.] The court must, however, refuse an argumentative instruction, that is, an instruction ‘of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of evidence.’” (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 890 , quoting People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437 .) We conclude that the proposed pinpoint instruction was arg

2016The general rule is that “[a] trial court must instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case. [Citation.] In addition, a defendant has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the theory of the defense. [Citation.] The court must, however, refuse an argumentative instruction, that is, an instruction ‘of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of evidence.’” (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 890 , quoting People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437 .) We conclude that the proposed pinpoint instruction was arg

2025“Courts have found [preliminary alcohol screening] breath test results to be admissible . . . if they either comply with the regulations set forth in California Code of Regulations, title 17 . . . or satisfy three foundational elements set forth in [People v. Adams (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 559, 561 ]: (1) properly functioning equipment, (2) a properly administered test, and (3) a qualified operator.” (Kazelka v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1239 , 1247-1248, fn. omitted; see People v. Williams (2002) 28 Cal.4th 408, 417 [approving of the holding in Adams].) Thus, the trial c

2025(Jo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174 .) “The trial court may properly refuse an instruction highlighting a defense theory if it is ‘duplicative or potentially confusing.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]here standard instructions fully and adequately advise the jury upon a particular issue, a pinpoint instruction on that point is properly refused.’ [Citations.] Put another way, ‘[t]here is no error in a trial court’s failing or refusing to instruct on one matter, unless the remaining instructions, considered as a whole, fail to cover the material issues raised at trial.’” (Ibid.) Here, the trial court proper

2025Because “we assume that jurors are intelligent persons capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions” (Jo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1152 ), we find the court’s provided jury instructions aptly covered the proposed pinpoint instruction, rendering it duplicative and unnecessary. 2 The court instructed, “Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .

2024(People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144 .) So, too, has the failure to provide a pinpoint instruction been found to be harmless where, ‘ “the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions.” ’ ” (People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542 , 594–595 (Scully).) Both scenarios are present here.

2024“A defendant has the right, on request, to instructions that pinpoint the theory of the defense, not specific evidence as such.” (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1063 , italics added.) A trial court may refuse requested instructions where they “merely invite[] the jury to draw inferences favorable to [the defendant] from selected items of evidence.” (Ibid.) Even if a trial court errs in refusing to give a proposed pinpoint instruction, reversal is appropriate only if it is reasonably probable that had the jury been given the proposed instruction, the jury would have come to a different conclusi

2024(See Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 923–924 [concluding that it was error to fail to instruct the jury with the correct portion of an otherwise faulty limiting instruction]; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1110 [concluding that to the extent defendant’s proposed pinpoint instruction was argumentative, “the trial court should have tailored the instruction to conform to the requirements [of the law], rather than deny the instruction outright”]; cf. People v. Bolden (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1591, 1597 [concluding that although defendant’s proposed instruction on the defense theory of the

2023(People v. Mora and Rangel, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 497 ; cf. People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608 , 621, fn. 3 20. [applying a de novo standard to the defendant’s claim that a pinpoint instruction was improperly denied where the People did not argue for an abuse of discretion standard and because one of the issues is whether the proposed pinpoint instruction incorrectly stated the law].) Appellant does not claim the unmodified CALCRIM No. 357 instruction was an incorrect statement of law, nor that the reasonable doubt standard was implicated by the trial court’s failure to make the prop

2023(People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 720 .) The court may, however, refuse such instructions where they are incorrect statements of the law, argumentative, duplicative, potentially confusing, or not supported by substantial evidence.

2023Rather, while informing the jury that it can infer guilt from flight, it both leaves it ‘up to you [the jury] to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct’ and further, limits the use of flight evidence by providing that it is not alone sufficient to prove guilt.” (Price, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 458 ; see Hernández Ríos, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159 6. [rejecting the defendant’s arguments that CALCRIM No. 372 “impermissibly presumes the existence of his guilt and lowers the prosecution’s burden of proof”]; see also People v. Pettigrew (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 477 , 502 [adopting t

2022The trial court’s determination that it would be confusing to instruct the jury on a crime that was neither charged nor a lesser included offense was not “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.” ’ ” (Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390 .) Defendant argues that the proposed pinpoint instruction “correctly laid out the elements of robbery” and was “no more ‘confusing’ than any other jury instruction on 10 Citing People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547 (Manriquez), defendant asserts that the standard of review is de novo.