party claiming waiver in Florida

2025“A party claiming waiver of arbitration must show: 1) knowledge of an existing right to arbitrate and 2) active participation in litigation or other acts inconsistent with the right.” Marine Env’t Partners, Inc. v. Johnson, 863 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citation omitted).

2025“A party claiming waiver of arbitration must show: 1) knowledge of an existing right to arbitrate and 2) active participation in litigation or other acts inconsistent with the right.” Marine Env’t Partners, Inc. v. Johnson, 863 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

2006"A party claiming waiver of arbitration must demonstrate: 1) knowledge of an existing right to arbitrate and 2) active participation in litigation or other acts inconsistent with the right." Breckenridge v. Farber, 640 So.2d 208, 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)(citing Mike Bradford & Co. v. Gulf States Steel Co., 184 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)).

2005"A party claiming waiver of arbitration must demonstrate: 1) knowledge of an existing right to arbitrate and 2) active participation in litigation or other acts inconsistent with the right." Id. at 211 .

2022Failure to Conduct an In Camera Review For over thirty years, we have stated: “If a party seeks to compel the disclosure of documents that the opposing party claims are protected by attorney-client privilege, the party claiming the privilege is entitled to an in camera review of the documents by the trial court prior to disclosure.” Id. (citing Old Holdings, Ltd. v. Taplin, Howard, Shaw & Miller, P.A., 584 So. 2d 1128 , 1128–29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)); see also RC/PB, Inc. v. Ritz- Carlton Hotel Co., L.L.C., 132 So. 3d 325, 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (finding an in camera inspection was warranted be

2012See Old Holdings, Ltd. v. Taplin, Howard, Shaw & Miller, P.A., 584 So.2d 1128, 1128-29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (finding that where documents may be protected by both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, the petitioners are entitled to an in camera review of the documents by the trial court prior to disclosure); see also Nationwide Mut.

2026In accordance with our Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, we have repeatedly held that, for us to find “the [sovereign] waived its immunity, the party claiming the waiver must ‘show a clear, express and unmistakable waiver of sovereign immunity by the [sovereign].’” Miccosukee Tribe of 5 Indians v. Lewis Tein, P.L., 227 So. 3d 656, 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting Cupo v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 860 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)).

2017This is a waiver case (there is no allegation that Congress abrogated the Tribe’s sovereign immunity), and for us to find the Tribe waived its immunity, the party claiming the waiver must “show a clear, express and unmistakable waiver of sovereign immunity by the Tribe.” Cupo v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 860 So.2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). 1.

2022Failure to Conduct an In Camera Review For over thirty years, we have stated: “If a party seeks to compel the disclosure of documents that the opposing party claims are protected by attorney-client privilege, the party claiming the privilege is entitled to an in camera review of the documents by the trial court prior to disclosure.” Id. (citing Old Holdings, Ltd. v. Taplin, Howard, Shaw & Miller, P.A., 584 So. 2d 1128 , 1128–29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)); see also RC/PB, Inc. v. Ritz- Carlton Hotel Co., L.L.C., 132 So. 3d 325, 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (finding an in camera inspection was warranted be

2015Grp., 22 So.3d 779, 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“If a party seeks to compel the disclosure of documents that the opposing party claims are protected by attorney-client privilege, the party claiming the privilege is entitled to an in camera review of the documents by the trial court prior to disclosure.”) (citations omitted).

2006"A party claiming waiver of arbitration must demonstrate: 1) knowledge of an existing right to arbitrate and 2) active participation in litigation or other acts inconsistent with the right." Breckenridge v. Farber, 640 So.2d 208, 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)(citing Mike Bradford & Co. v. Gulf States Steel Co., 184 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)).

1994Bradford, 184 So.2d at 915 .

2026In accordance with our Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, we have repeatedly held that, for us to find “the [sovereign] waived its immunity, the party claiming the waiver must ‘show a clear, express and unmistakable waiver of sovereign immunity by the [sovereign].’” Miccosukee Tribe of 5 Indians v. Lewis Tein, P.L., 227 So. 3d 656, 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting Cupo v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 860 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)).

2025“Active participation in [a] suit works [as] a waiver because it is generally presumed to be inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.” Id. at 427 . “[O]nce a party has waived the right to arbitration by active participation in a lawsuit, the party may not reclaim the arbitration right without the consent of his or her adversary.” Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. McLeod, 15 So. 3d 682, 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

2022Failure to Conduct an In Camera Review For over thirty years, we have stated: “If a party seeks to compel the disclosure of documents that the opposing party claims are protected by attorney-client privilege, the party claiming the privilege is entitled to an in camera review of the documents by the trial court prior to disclosure.” Id. (citing Old Holdings, Ltd. v. Taplin, Howard, Shaw & Miller, P.A., 584 So. 2d 1128 , 1128–29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)); see also RC/PB, Inc. v. Ritz- Carlton Hotel Co., L.L.C., 132 So. 3d 325, 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (finding an in camera inspection was warranted be

2019Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1978)); see also Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Clipper Bay Investments, LLC, 160 So. 3d 858, 863-65 (Fla. 2015) (noting that the MRTA is a curative act and eliminates stale claims to real property, with certain enumerated exceptions, and that the burden of demonstrating the applicability of an exception to marketability rests with the party claiming the exception).

2016See Northup v. Acken, 865 So.2d 1267, 1271 (Fla. 2004) (“We conclude and specifically announce today that all materials reasonably expected or intended to be used at trial, including documents intended solely for witness impeachment, are ... not protected by the work product privilege.”).

2015See generally Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036, 1043 (Fla.2000) (holding that a divorced mother did not waive or abandon her right to privacy in raising her child when she allowed the child to be raised by the paternal grandparents on a temporary basis while she worked and obtained a college, degree); Forbes v. Chapin, 917 So.2d 948, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (finding that the father of a child did not waive his right to privacy by entering into an agreed order for grandparent visitation rights); see also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) (holding

2015See generally Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036, 1043 (Fla.2000) (holding that a divorced mother did not waive or abandon her right to privacy in raising her child when she allowed the child to be raised by the paternal grandparents on a temporary basis while she worked and obtained a college, degree); Forbes v. Chapin, 917 So.2d 948, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (finding that the father of a child did not waive his right to privacy by entering into an agreed order for grandparent visitation rights); see also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) (holding

2015See generally Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036, 1043 (Fla.2000) (holding that a divorced mother did not waive or abandon her right to privacy in raising her child when she allowed the child to be raised by the paternal grandparents on a temporary basis while she worked and obtained a college, degree); Forbes v. Chapin, 917 So.2d 948, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (finding that the father of a child did not waive his right to privacy by entering into an agreed order for grandparent visitation rights); see also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) (holding

2015See generally Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So.2d 1036, 1043 (Fla.2000) (holding that a divorced mother did not waive or abandon her right to privacy in raising her child when she allowed the child to be raised by the paternal grandparents on a temporary basis while she worked and obtained a college, degree); Forbes v. Chapin, 917 So.2d 948, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (finding that the father of a child did not waive his right to privacy by entering into an agreed order for grandparent visitation rights); see also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 , 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966) (holding

2015Patrowicz v. Wolff, 110 So.3d 973, 974 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), disagreed with on other grounds by Lyons v. Lyons, No. 4D14-3429, 162 So.3d 212 , 2015 WL 543106 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 11, 2015).

2014See Black v. State, 920 So.2d 668, 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

2012I Ass’n, v. Spender, 939 So.2d 1159, 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting Breckenridge v. Farber, 640 So.2d 208, 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)).

2012See Peterson, 983 So.2d at 29 (A party claiming immunity whose motion to dismiss was denied “is not precluded from submitting the matter to the jury as an affirmative defense in his criminal trial.”).

1999A showing of prejudicial error requires a showing from the record that under the evidence the jury might and probably would have returned a different verdict if the alleged error had not occurred."); Wilson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tex.App.1982) ("It is encumbent [sic] upon the appellant to show harm or prejudice when he alleges error."); State v. Bushey, 147 Vt. 140 , 513 A.2d 1177, 1182 (1986) ("[D]efendant bears the burden of showing prejudicial error."); Dotson v. State, 712 P.2d 365, 366 (Wyo.1986) ("Error which does not affect substantial rights is regarded as harmless and `shall b

1999See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 500 (Colo.1986) ("Because the defendant does not allege a deprivation of constitutional rights ... the defendant has the burden of showing prejudice."); State v. McKnight, 47 Conn.App. 664 , 706 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1998) ("When a trial error ... does not involve a constitutional violation the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the harmfulness of the court's error."); Stewart v. State, 180 Ga.App. 266 , 349 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1986) ("The burden is on the party claiming error not only to show error, but error which injured him and unless the error result

1999See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 500 (Colo.1986) ("Because the defendant does not allege a deprivation of constitutional rights ... the defendant has the burden of showing prejudice."); State v. McKnight, 47 Conn.App. 664 , 706 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1998) ("When a trial error ... does not involve a constitutional violation the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the harmfulness of the court's error."); Stewart v. State, 180 Ga.App. 266 , 349 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1986) ("The burden is on the party claiming error not only to show error, but error which injured him and unless the error result

1999See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 500 (Colo.1986) ("Because the defendant does not allege a deprivation of constitutional rights ... the defendant has the burden of showing prejudice."); State v. McKnight, 47 Conn.App. 664 , 706 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1998) ("When a trial error ... does not involve a constitutional violation the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the harmfulness of the court's error."); Stewart v. State, 180 Ga.App. 266 , 349 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1986) ("The burden is on the party claiming error not only to show error, but error which injured him and unless the error result

1999See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 500 (Colo.1986) ("Because the defendant does not allege a deprivation of constitutional rights ... the defendant has the burden of showing prejudice."); State v. McKnight, 47 Conn.App. 664 , 706 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1998) ("When a trial error ... does not involve a constitutional violation the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the harmfulness of the court's error."); Stewart v. State, 180 Ga.App. 266 , 349 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1986) ("The burden is on the party claiming error not only to show error, but error which injured him and unless the error result

1999See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 500 (Colo.1986) ("Because the defendant does not allege a deprivation of constitutional rights ... the defendant has the burden of showing prejudice."); State v. McKnight, 47 Conn.App. 664 , 706 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1998) ("When a trial error ... does not involve a constitutional violation the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the harmfulness of the court's error."); Stewart v. State, 180 Ga.App. 266 , 349 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1986) ("The burden is on the party claiming error not only to show error, but error which injured him and unless the error result

1999See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 500 (Colo.1986) ("Because the defendant does not allege a deprivation of constitutional rights ... the defendant has the burden of showing prejudice."); State v. McKnight, 47 Conn.App. 664 , 706 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1998) ("When a trial error ... does not involve a constitutional violation the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the harmfulness of the court's error."); Stewart v. State, 180 Ga.App. 266 , 349 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1986) ("The burden is on the party claiming error not only to show error, but error which injured him and unless the error result

1999See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 500 (Colo.1986) ("Because the defendant does not allege a deprivation of constitutional rights ... the defendant has the burden of showing prejudice."); State v. McKnight, 47 Conn.App. 664 , 706 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1998) ("When a trial error ... does not involve a constitutional violation the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the harmfulness of the court's error."); Stewart v. State, 180 Ga.App. 266 , 349 S.E.2d 18, 19 (1986) ("The burden is on the party claiming error not only to show error, but error which injured him and unless the error result