party claiming error in Washington

2020The party claiming error has “the burden of showing that a finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence.” Fisher Props., Inc. v. Arden- Mayfair, Inc., 115 Wn.2d 364, 369 , 798 P.2d 799 , 804 P.2d 1262 (1990).

2020The party claiming error has “the burden of showing that a finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence.” Fisher Props., Inc. v. Arden- Mayfair, Inc., 115 Wn.2d 364, 369 , 798 P.2d 799 , 804 P.2d 1262 (1990).

2025“Application of RAP 2.5(a)(3) depends on the answers to two questions: ‘(1) Has the party claiming error shown the error is truly of a constitutional magnitude, and if so, (2) has the party demonstrated that the error is manifest?’” State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256, 267 , 458 P.3d 750 (2020) (quoting State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 583 , 355 P.3d 253 (2015)).

2025“Application of RAP 2.5(a)(3) depends on the answers to two questions: ‘(1) Has the party claiming error shown the error is truly of a constitutional magnitude, and if so, (2) has the party demonstrated that the error is manifest?’” State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256, 267 , 458 P.3d 750 (2020) (quoting State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 583 , 355 P.3d 253 (2015)).

2026State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304 , 253 P.3d 84 (2011).

2026State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292 , 304, 253 P.3d 84 (2011).

2026State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304 , 253 P.3d 84 (2011).

2026State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292 , 304, 253 P.3d 84 (2011).

2025“Application of RAP 2.5(a)(3) depends on the answers to two questions: ‘(1) Has the party claiming error shown the error is truly of a constitutional magnitude, and if so, (2) has the party demonstrated that the error is manifest?’” State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256, 267 , 458 P.3d 750 (2020) (quoting State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 583 , 355 P.3d 253 (2015)).

2025“Application of RAP 2.5(a)(3) depends on the answers to two questions: ‘(1) Has the party claiming error shown the error is truly of a constitutional magnitude, and if so, (2) has the party demonstrated that the error is manifest?’” State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256, 267 , 458 P.3d 750 (2020) (quoting State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 583 , 355 P.3d 253 (2015)).

2020The focus of the manifest error inquiry “must be on whether the error is so obvious on the record that the error warrants appellate review.” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99-100 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009).

2020The focus of the manifest error inquiry “must be on whether the error is so obvious on the record that the error warrants appellate review.” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99-100 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009).

2015Jones v. Best, 134 Wn.2d 232,241-42 , 950 P.2d 1 (1998).

2013Jones, 134 Wn.2d at 241-42 . ¶25 The record shows McLain knew he had a right to an administrative hearing under RCW 28A.405.210.

2020The focus of the manifest error inquiry “must be on whether the error is so obvious on the record that the error warrants appellate review.” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99-100 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009).

2020The focus of the manifest error inquiry “must be on whether the error is so obvious on the record that the error warrants appellate review.” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99-100 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009).

2015Jones v. Best, 134 Wn.2d 232,241-42 , 950 P.2d 1 (1998).

2012Jones v. Best, 134 Wn.2d 232, 241-42 , 950 P.2d 1 (1998) (citations omitted).

1998Rhodes v. Gould, 19 Wash.App. 437, 441 , 576 P.2d 914 , review denied, 90 Wash.2d 1026 (1978).

1998Rhodes v. Gould, 19 Wn.

2026Saili v. Parkland Auto Ctr., Inc., 181 Wn.

2017The burden of proving intent to waive is on the party claiming waiver and, because waiver is disfavored, the claimant has a “heavy burden of proof.” Saili, 181 Wn.

2024App. 880, 883 , 830 P.2d 676 (1992) (citing Thor v. McDearmid, 63 Wn.

1992Thor v. McDearmid, 63 Wn.

2024“A presumption exists in favor of the trial court’s findings of fact, 5 No. 39944-3-III Lamb v. Crider and the party claiming error has the burden of showing the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” Carson v. Willstadter, 65 Wn.

2016We reject this argument because the referees’ finding was supported by facts, not mere speculation. ¶44 “A presumption exists in favor of trial court’s findings of fact [in a partition action], and the party claiming error has the burden of showing the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” Carson, 65 Wn.

2023Co. v. King County, 136 Wn.

2019Co. v. King County, 136 Wn.

2021State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 619 , 290 P.3d 942 (2012).

2021State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 619 , 290 P.3d 942 (2012).

2020Dombrosky, 84 Wn.

2013Dombroskv. 84 Wn.

2020“There is a presumption in favor of the trial court’s findings, and the party claiming error has the burden of showing that a finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Merrill, 183 Wn.

2020App. 749, 755 , 335 P.3d 444 (2014).

2017In Evans v. Thompson, 124 Wn.2d 435, 437 , 879 P.2d 938 (1994), we recognized that the statutory scheme under RCW 51.24.030 favors third party actions and that contrary to the principle or interpretation benefiting the injured worker, immunity from liability requires a narrow interpretation, with the burden on the party claiming immunity to establish its existence. ¶9 In interpreting RCW 51.24.030(1), Washington courts have previously confronted the question of whether co-employees are in the “same employ.” In Olson v. Stern, this court decided that coemployees are not in the same employ and a

2017In Evans v. Thompson, 124 Wn.2d 435, 437 , 879 P.2d 938 (1994), we recognized that the statutory scheme under RCW 51.24.030 favors third party actions and that contrary to the principle or interpretation benefiting the injured worker, immunity from liability requires a narrow interpretation, with the burden on the party claiming immunity to establish its existence. ¶9 In interpreting RCW 51.24.030(1), Washington courts have previously confronted the question of whether co-employees are in the “same employ.” In Olson v. Stern, this court decided that coemployees are not in the same employ and a

2017In Evans v. Thompson, 124 Wn.2d 435, 437 , 879 P.2d 938 (1994), we recognized that the statutory scheme under RCW 51.24.030 favors third party actions and that contrary to the principle or interpretation benefiting the injured worker, immunity from liability requires a narrow interpretation, with the burden on the party claiming immunity to establish its existence. ¶9 In interpreting RCW 51.24.030(1), Washington courts have previously confronted the question of whether co-employees are in the “same employ.” In Olson v. Stern, this court decided that coemployees are not in the same employ and a

2017In Evans v. Thompson, 124 Wn.2d 435, 437 , 879 P.2d 938 (1994), we recognized that the statutory scheme under RCW 51.24.030 favors third party actions and that contrary to the principle or interpretation benefiting the injured worker, immunity from liability requires a narrow interpretation, with the burden on the party claiming immunity to establish its existence. ¶9 In interpreting RCW 51.24.030(1), Washington courts have previously confronted the question of whether co-employees are in the “same employ.” In Olson v. Stern, this court decided that coemployees are not in the same employ and a

2007Relying on Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002), they assert that a party claiming an exception to a rule, here, the City, bears the burden of demonstrating that the claimed exception applies.

2007Relying on Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas , 146 Wn.2d 740 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002), they assert that a party claiming an exception to a rule, here, the City, bears the burden of demonstrating that the claimed exception applies.

2007Relying on Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002), they assert that a party claiming an exception to a rule, here, the City, bears the burden of demonstrating that the claimed exception applies.

2007Relying on Isla Verde International Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas , 146 Wn.2d 740 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002), they assert that a party claiming an exception to a rule, here, the City, bears the burden of demonstrating that the claimed exception applies.

2001Steele, 85 Wash.App. at 852 , 935 P.2d 671 .

2001Steele, 85 Wn.

2000Romjue v. Fairchild, 60 Wn.

2000Romjue v. Fairchild, 60 Wash.App. 278, 282 , 803 P.2d 57 (1991).

1998(Citations omitted.) Wagner, 95 Wn.2d at 102 , noting: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.

1998(Citations omitted.) Wagner, 95 Wash.2d at 102 , 621 P.2d 1279 , noting: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.

2026App. 376, 390 , 228 P.3d 780 (2010). 12 No. 60044-7-II The burden of proving intent to waive is on the party claiming waiver.

2025“The party claiming error has the burden of showing that a finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence.” Id.

2025In gauging substantial evidence, “[w]e will not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s, weigh the evidence, or”—most relevant here—“adjudge witness credibility.” In re Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn.

2025“There is a presumption in favor of the trial court’s findings, and the party claiming error has the burden of showing that a finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence.” Id.

2025Lastly, we “defer to the trier of fact for purposes of resolving conflicting testimony and evaluating the persuasiveness of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.” Id.

2025As to the second factor, our Supreme Court has held a litigant does not establish a due process violation by simply showing that additional procedures would have decreased the likelihood that an interest would have been affected; rather, a party claiming such a violation must show that the extant procedures contain “inadequacies that ma[d]e erroneous deprivations readily foreseeable.” Hardee v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 172 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 256 P.3d 339 (2011) (emphasis added).

2025As to the second factor, our Supreme Court has held a litigant does not establish a due process violation by simply showing that additional procedures would have decreased the likelihood that an interest would have been affected; rather, a party claiming such a violation must show that the extant procedures contain “inadequacies that ma[d]e erroneous deprivations readily foreseeable.” Hardee v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 172 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 256 P.3d 339 (2011) (emphasis added).