legislature considered factors in Illinois

2026“This double-enhancement rule is premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in determining the appropriate range of penalties for that offense.” People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995). ¶ 34 Defendant concedes he did not raise this issue in a postsentencing motion and has forfeited this claim.

2026The reasoning for the rule against double enhancement is “premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in determining the appropriate range of penalties for that offense.” People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995).

2023This dual use of a single factor is often referred to as a “double enhancement.” People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 84 (1992); see also People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (2004) (“a factor implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense”). ¶ 35 The rule against double enhancements is “premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in determining the appropriate range of penalties for that offense.” People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995).

2020“The prohibition against double enhancements is based on the assumption that, in designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2004). ¶ 52 The rule that a court may not consider a factor inherent in the offense in sentencing should not be applied rigidly because public policy demands that a sentence be varied according to the circumstances of the offense.

2023Moreover, the relevant authority we have located does not support defendant’s position: “[T]he general rule against double enhancement is merely a rule of construction established by this court, which arises from the presumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in setting the initial penalty for that offense. [Citation.] But where the legislature has made clear an intention to enhance the penalty for a crime, even in a way which might constitute double-enhancement, this court will not overrule the legislature. [Citation.]” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 5

2013In Sharpe, the supreme court held: “[T]he general rule against double enhancement is merely a rule of construction established by this court, which arises from the presumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in setting the initial penalty for that offense. [Citation.] But where the legislature has made clear an intention to enhance the penalty for a crime, even in a way which might constitute double-enhancement, this court will not overrule the legislature.” Id. at 530 .

2026See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988).

2023This dual use of a single factor is often referred to as a “double enhancement.” People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 84 (1992); see also People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (2004) (“a factor implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense”). ¶ 35 The rule against double enhancements is “premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in determining the appropriate range of penalties for that offense.” People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995).

2023However, “where the legislature has made clear an intention to enhance the penalty for a crime, even in a way which might constitute double-enhancement, this court will not overrule the legislature.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 530 (2005); see also People v. Owens, 377 Ill. App. 3d 302, 304 (2007) (“A - 13 - double enhancement is not improper *** if the legislature clearly expresses an intent to allow double enhancement.”). ¶ 36 Whether a statute contains an impermissible double enhancement is an issue we review de novo.

2020“In determining whether the trial court based the sentence on proper aggravating and mitigating factors, a court of review should consider the record as a whole, rather than focusing on a few words or statements by the trial court.” People v. Dowding, 388 Ill. App. 3d 936, 943 (2009).

1995See Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d at 97 , citing People v. White (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 61, 66 .

1995(People v. Ferguson (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 86, 97 .) This double-enhancement rule is premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in determining the appropriate range of penalties for that offense.

1995(See Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d at 97 , citing White, 114 Ill. 2d at 66 .) For this reason, this court has found that the legislature did not intend that a defendant convicted of aggravated battery of a child should have his sentence further enhanced under a separate sentencing scheme because of the victim’s age.

1995See Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d at 97 , citing People v. White (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 61, 66 .