strange rule in Illinois

2000It would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon him the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.” Bender , 20 Ill. 2d at 53-54 .

2000It would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon him the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.” Bender, 20 Ill. 2d at 53-54 .

1978(People v. Thompson (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 332, 334-45 ; People v. Bedford (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 227, 228-29 ; People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 54-53 .) Tt would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon [the defendant] the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.’ (People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .)” (Emphasis added.) People v. McCullum (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 306, 312-13 , 362 N.E.2d 307, 310 .

1977(People v. Thompson (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 332, 334-35 ; People v. Bedford (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 227, 228-29 ; People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .) “It would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon [the defendant] the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.” (People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .) Similarly, in McKinstray, the court noted, “To accept defendant’s opinion that he is able to co-operate with counsel in his defense, when

1978(People v. Thompson (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 332, 334-45 ; People v. Bedford (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 227, 228-29 ; People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 54-53 .) Tt would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon [the defendant] the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.’ (People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .)” (Emphasis added.) People v. McCullum (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 306, 312-13 , 362 N.E.2d 307, 310 .

1977(People v. Thompson (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 332, 334-35 ; People v. Bedford (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 227, 228-29 ; People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .) “It would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon [the defendant] the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.” (People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .) Similarly, in McKinstray, the court noted, “To accept defendant’s opinion that he is able to co-operate with counsel in his defense, when

1978(People v. Thompson (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 332, 334-45 ; People v. Bedford (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 227, 228-29 ; People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 54-53 .) Tt would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon [the defendant] the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.’ (People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .)” (Emphasis added.) People v. McCullum (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 306, 312-13 , 362 N.E.2d 307, 310 .

1978(People v. Thompson (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 332, 334-45 ; People v. Bedford (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 227, 228-29 ; People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 54-53 .) Tt would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon [the defendant] the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.’ (People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .)” (Emphasis added.) People v. McCullum (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 306, 312-13 , 362 N.E.2d 307, 310 .

1977(People v. Thompson (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 332, 334-35 ; People v. Bedford (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 227, 228-29 ; People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .) “It would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon [the defendant] the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.” (People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .) Similarly, in McKinstray, the court noted, “To accept defendant’s opinion that he is able to co-operate with counsel in his defense, when

1975It would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon him the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.” ( 20 Ill.2d 45, 53-54 .) Accord, People v. McKinstray, 30 Ill.2d 611 , 198 N.E.2d 829 (1964).

1923In Frye v. Partridge, 82 Ill. 267 , the court said it would be a strange doctrine to hold that an owner of real estate could not convey a part and restrict its use in such manner as not to impair or lessen in value the portion retained, and that the court was aware of no restriction upon the rights of an owner to convey upon such terms and conditions as he might see proper or might be acceptable to the grantee, except that the right should be exercised with proper regard to public policy.

1913In Frye v. Partridge, 82 Ill. 267 , the court said: “It would be a strange doctrine, indeed, to hold that an owner of real estate could not convey a part and restrict its use in such a manner as not to impair or lessen in value the portion retained.

2009In fact, drawing a distinction between alternative-theory error and the instructional errors in Neder, Roy, Pope, and Rose would be ‘patently illogical,’ given that such a distinction ‘ “reduces to the strange claim that, because the jury ... received both a ‘good’ charge and a ‘bad’ charge on the issue, the error was somehow more pernicious than ... where the only charge on the critical issue was a mistaken one.” ’ [Citations.]” (Emphases in original.) Pulido, 555 U.S. at 61 , 172 L.

2009In fact, drawing a distinction between alternative-theory error and the instructional errors in Neder, Roy, Pope, and Rose would be ‘patently illogical,’ given that such a distinction ‘ “reduces to the strange claim that, because the jury ... received both a ‘good’ charge and a ‘bad’ charge on the issue, the error was somehow more pernicious than ... where the only charge on the critical issue was a mistaken one.” ’ [Citations.]” (Emphases in original.) Pulido, 555 U.S. at 61 , 172 L.

2004The court then stated as follows: “It would be a strange rule indeed that would require a plaintiff to present all conceivably relevant evidence in her case in chief— despite her preference not to do so — because she otherwise would be barred from presenting that evidence in rebuttal in the event defendants present evidence in their case in chief that plaintiff needs to (and can) rebut. *** Such a rule would also be antithetical to the concerns expressed by all involved in our civil justice system about its present costs, wastes, and delays.” (Emphasis in original.) Hoem, 239 Ill.

2004App. 3d at 619 , 606 N.E.2d at 830 .

1992The court therefore stated: “It would be a strange doctrine which would compel a court of chancery to hold that the parties kept out of title and possession by the vendors’ default must yet assume the vendor’s obligations during such period.” (Krabbenhoft, 337 Ill. at 412 , 169 N.E. at 264 .) The instant case is also distinguishable from Lidikevicz in that plaintiff did not receive benefits from the property to be acquired during the time defendant wrongfully withheld the property.

1992The court therefore stated: “It would be a strange doctrine which would compel a court of chancery to hold that the parties kept out of title and possession by the vendors’ default must yet assume the vendor’s obligations during such period.” (Krabbenhoft, 337 Ill. at 412 , 169 N.E. at 264 .) The instant case is also distinguishable from Lidikevicz in that plaintiff did not receive benefits from the property to be acquired during the time defendant wrongfully withheld the property.

1991Every principle of insurance law and sound reasoning would seem to be against such contention.” (Felsenthal, 284 Ill. at 348-49 .) Given the fact that an insured corporation cannot recover if the sole shareholder is found to have destroyed the corporate property, it would be a strange rule which would preclude the admission of evidence which tends to show that the sole shareholder was responsible for the fire.

1984(People v. Lucas (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 245, 250 , 430 N.E.2d 1091 .) Moody assigned error in his post-trial motion only to “prejudicial inflammatory and erroneous statements in closing argument designed to arouse the prejudices and passions of the jury,” which is insufficient to preserve specific remarks for review, absent plain error.

1984(People v. Lucas (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 245, 250 , 430 N.E.2d 1091 .) Moody assigned error in his post-trial motion only to “prejudicial inflammatory and erroneous statements in closing argument designed to arouse the prejudices and passions of the jury,” which is insufficient to preserve specific remarks for review, absent plain error.

1977Following an analysis similar to that in Garlick, the supreme court concluded: “Fundamental fairness dictates that, where a defendant has raised a bona fide doubt as to his fitness to stand trial, the State, as a matter of due process, should bear the ultimate burden of proving defendant’s fitness to stand trial.” ( 66 Ill. 2d 306, 314 .) Discussing the concept of “retroactive” application of McCullum, the First District in People v. Hubert, 51 Ill.

1977(People v. Thompson (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 332, 334-35 ; People v. Bedford (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 227, 228-29 ; People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .) “It would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon [the defendant] the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.” (People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .) Similarly, in McKinstray, the court noted, “To accept defendant’s opinion that he is able to co-operate with counsel in his defense, when

1977(People v. Thompson (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 332, 334-35 ; People v. Bedford (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 227, 228-29 ; People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .) “It would be a strange rule, indeed, to impose upon [the defendant] the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legally, of sustaining the burden of proof.” (People v. Bender (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 45, 53-54 .) Similarly, in McKinstray, the court noted, “To accept defendant’s opinion that he is able to co-operate with counsel in his defense, when

1977United States v. Albright (4th Cir. 1968), 388 F.2d 719, 724 , following the Whitlow lead, held that a court-ordered pretrial psychiatric examination was not a per se violation of the privilege against self-incrimination on the basis of the maintenance of a fair State-individual balance.

1977It would be a strange doctrine, indeed, to permit a person charged with crime to put in issue his want of mental capacity to commit it, and in order to make his plea invulnerable, prevent all inquiry into his mental state or condition. [Citation.] To allow the accused to obtain his own expert, and after a private and unlimited conference with him and examination by him, to plead insanity, and then put forward the privilege against self-incrimination to frustrate like activities by the prosecution is to balance the competing interests unfairly and disproportionately against the public.” 45 N.J.

1977It would be a strange doctrine, indeed, to permit a person charged with crime to put in issue his want of mental capacity to commit it, and in order to make his plea invulnerable, prevent all inquiry into his mental state or condition. [Citation.] To allow the accused to obtain his own expert, and after a private and unlimited conference with him and examination by him, to plead insanity, and then put forward the privilege against self-incrimination to frustrate like activities by the prosecution is to balance the competing interests unfairly and disproportionately against the public.” 45 N.J.

1967Another case establishing that an independent suit may be maintained in such cases for child support is Hoover v. Hoover, 307 Ill App 590, 603, 30 NE2d 940 (1940) (1st Dist), holding that “. . . the duty of a father to support his minor child exists and can be enforced, even by the people, despite the existence of an adverse decree awarding the custody of the child to the mother, where the decree makes no provision for the payment of any sum for the support of the child.” (Emphasis added.) It would be a strange doctrine that would permit a new and separate action by plaintiff and deny her the

1957Corp., 332 Ill. 136 , the court said (p. 145): “The owner of real estate has the right to convey it subject to any restriction he may see fit to impose and the only restriction upon such right is that it must be exercised with proper regard to public policy and that the conveyance must not be in restraint of trade.

1929Counsel cite Lidikevicz v. Kopala , 315 Ill. 404 , and call attention to the holding that the decree in that case was in error for charging the vendors with taxes and assessments after the time provided by the contract.

1916If persons in being are before the court who have the same interest and are equally certain to bring forward the entire merits of the question, and thus give such interests effective protection, the dictates both of convenience and justice require that there should be a complete decree.” (See, also, to the same effect, Hopkins v. Patton, 257 Ill. 346 ; Thompson v. Adams, 205 id. 552; Denegre v. Walker, 214 id. 113; Temple v. Scott, 143 id. 290.) It would, indeed, be a strange doctrine to hold that a court of equity could not preserve the interests of the minors in this property and give legal