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6 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1970–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bobogreen1 sentence1999Bobo had applied Bigge broadly, stating that "If silence in the face of specific accusation may not be used, it would be a strange doctrine indeed that would permit silence absent such an accusation to be used as evidence of guilt." Bobo, at 361, 212 N.W.2d 190 . | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Constitutionality of Chapter 280, Or. Laws 1975green2 sentences1977See fn 28, supra. "The framers of the 1963 Constitution created a pay-as-you-go government for the State of Michigan. 1977It would be a strange rule of construction that language granting powers is to be liberally construed and that language of restriction is to be narrowly and technically construed." Fairbank v United States, 181 US 283, 289 ; 21 S Ct 648 ; 45 L Ed 862 (1901). [30] See fn 28, supra. [31] "The framers of the 1963 Constitution created a pay-as-you-go government for the State of Michigan. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cerar
neutral
2 sentences1971State v. Cerar (1922), 60 Utah 208 ( 207 P 597 ). 1970State v. Cerar (1922), 60 Utah 208 ( 207 P 597 , 602). | 2 | 1970–1971 |
United States v. James Clinton Adrian, United States of America v. James Clinton Adrian
green
1 sentence1998Id. at 493 . [28] The fact that the evidence is admissible for one purpose, but not another, does not make it inadmissible. [T]here is no rule of evidence which provides that testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case. [For example],[i]t would be a strange rule of law which held that relevant, competent evidence which tended to show bias on the part of a witness was nonetheless inadmissible because it also tended to show that the witness was a liar. [ United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 56 , 105 S.C | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Abel
green
2 sentences1998The fact that the evidence is admissible for one purpose, but not another, does not make it inadmissible. [TJhere is no rule of evidence which provides that testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case. [For example], [i]t would be a strange rule of law which held that relevant, competent evidence which tended to show bias on the part of a witness was nonetheless inadmissible because it also tended to show that the witness was a liar. [United States v Abel, 469 US 45, 56 ; 105 S Ct 465 ; 83 L Ed 2d 45 1998The fact that the evidence is admissible for one purpose, but not another, does not make it inadmissible. [TJhere is no rule of evidence which provides that testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case. [For example], [i]t would be a strange rule of law which held that relevant, competent evidence which tended to show bias on the part of a witness was nonetheless inadmissible because it also tended to show that the witness was a liar. [United States v Abel, 469 US 45, 56 ; 105 S Ct 465 ; 83 L Ed 2d 45 | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Sebring
green
2 sentences1988Other than a physical beating directly inflicted upon a victim, it is difficult to imagine anything that would more clearly be a "personal wrong or injury.” In People v Sebring, 66 Mich 705, 706-707 ; 33 NW 808 (1887), this Court stated: It would be a strange rule of law, indeed, either common or statute, which would not allow a wife, when assaulted and beaten until her life is endangered by a cruel and malicious husband, to resort to the courts and make her complaint, and secure his arrest. 1988Other than a physical beating directly inflicted upon a victim, it is difficult to imagine anything that would more clearly be a "personal wrong or injury.” In People v Sebring, 66 Mich 705, 706-707 ; 33 NW 808 (1887), this Court stated: It would be a strange rule of law, indeed, either common or statute, which would not allow a wife, when assaulted and beaten until her life is endangered by a cruel and malicious husband, to resort to the courts and make her complaint, and secure his arrest. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Fairbank v. United States
green
2 sentences1977It would be a strange rule of construction that language granting powers is to be liberally construed and that language of restriction is to be narrowly and technically construed.” Fairbank v United States, 181 US 283, 289 ; 21 S Ct 648 ; 45 L Ed 862 (1901). 1977It would be a strange rule of construction that language granting powers is to be liberally construed and that language of restriction is to be narrowly and technically construed.” Fairbank v United States, 181 US 283, 289 ; 21 S Ct 648 ; 45 L Ed 862 (1901). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.