Indiana constitutional analysis in Indiana

2013Indiana Constitution Finally, Wiese contends that forcible entry was not justified under an Indiana Constitutional analysis, and he “asks this Court to reconsider its conclusion, under the Litchfield3 analysis, that the officer’s concerns and needs were high in the circumstances 3 Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005). 8 presented here.” (Pet. for Reh’g at 4.) He “asks this Court to find that under the totality of the circumstances, the police entry was unreasonable and violated [his] rights under Article One, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.” (Pet. for Reh’g at 4-5.) However,

2013Indiana Constitution Finally, Wiese contends that forcible entry was not justified under an Indiana Constitutional analysis, and he “asks this Court to reconsider its conclusion, under the Litchfield3 analysis, that the officer’s concerns and needs were high in the circumstances 3 Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005). 8 presented here.” (Pet. for Reh’g at 4.) He “asks this Court to find that under the totality of the circumstances, the police entry was unreasonable and violated [his] rights under Article One, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.” (Pet. for Reh’g at 4-5.) However,

2019See Myers v. State , 839 N.E.2d 1154 , 1158 (Ind. 2005) (choosing not to address Indiana constitutional claim; appellant failed to present an argument separate from his federal constitutional claim). [18] The Fourth Amendment provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, *1172 against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [19] The Fourth Amendment

2009See Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind.2005) (observing that in spite of defendant's reference to the Indiana Constitution, his failure to develop a separate argument specifically treating and analyzing bis claim under the Indiana Constitution rendered separate Indiana Constitutional analysis unnecessary).

2012Crawford v. State, 669 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind. 1996). 20 When a defendant’s speedy trial rights have been implicated, we undertake a balancing test mandated by Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 (1972), in which the conduct of both the State and the defendant are weighed.

2012Crawford v. State, 669 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind.1996). 12 .

1999Overman v. State, 194 Ind. 483, 491 , 143 N.E. 604, 607 (1924) (addressing the Indiana constitutional privilege against self-incrimination).

1999Overman v. State, 194 Ind. 483, 491 , 143 N.E. 604, 607 (1924) (addressing the Indiana constitutional privilege against self-incrimination).

1998We noted that because the “issue was not briefed, we decline to give it extensive treatment.” Id. at 360 (footnote omitted).

1997We noted that because the “issue was not briefed, we decline to give it extensive treatment.” Id. at 360 (footnote omitted).

2016To the extent Trisler and the ACLU develop an argument that requires us to assess the impact of the unlawful-entry statute on the basis of facts and parties not before us, the Indiana Supreme Court has stated that, in the context of an Indiana constitutional challenge, “a court should focus on the actual operation of the statute at issue and refrain from speculating about hypothetical applications,” and that “[u]nless the court concludes that the statute before it is incapable of constitutional application, it should limit itself to vindicating the rights of the party before it.” Price v. Stat

2009"Onee an Indiana constitutional challenge is properly raised, a court should focus on the actual operation of the statute at issue and refrain from speculating about hypothetical applications." Id.

2013Helton v. State, 624 N.E.2d 499, 507 (Ind. Ct.App.1993) (citations and footnote omitted), trans. denied.

1994"Once an Indiana constitutional challenge is properly raised, the court should first determine whether the statute is capable of constitutional application and then determine whether its application in the case was constitutional, refraining from speculation about hypothetical applications." Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 507 (citing Price, 622 N.E.2d. at 958).

2019See Butler v. State , 724 N.E.2d 600 , 604 (Ind. 2000) (Indiana Constitutional claim related to jury instructions was waived for failure to present claim at trial). [15] In response, Peacock argues that jurisdiction in Indiana cannot be waived, and the issue can virtually be raised at any time.

2017See Willis v. State, 780 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“Because the State failed to raise standing under the Indiana Constitution and because we cannot raise the issue sua sponte, we proceed to the merits of the state constitutional challenge.”).

2017See Willis v. State , 780 N.E.2d 423 , 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("Because the State failed to raise standing under the Indiana Constitution and because we cannot raise the issue sua sponte, we proceed to the merits of the state constitutional challenge.").

2016To the extent Trisler and the ACLU develop an argument that requires us to assess the impact of the unlawful-entry statute on the basis of facts and parties not before us, the Indiana Supreme Court has stated that, in the context of an Indiana constitutional challenge, “a court should focus on the actual operation of the statute at issue and refrain from speculating about hypothetical applications,” and that “[u]nless the court concludes that the statute before it is incapable of constitutional application, it should limit itself to vindicating the rights of the party before it.” Price v. Stat

2015“A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” McDermott v. State, 877 N.E.2d 467, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted) (applying this reasoning to the Indiana constitutional analysis), trans. denied. [22] Finally, there is a legitimate need for law enforcement to investigate citizens’ complaints of suspicious activity.

2013Thus, in Francis , we held as waived an Indiana constitutional challenge to an investigatory stop where the defendant argued that “the Indiana Constitution’s ‘protections relating to investigative stops [are] consistent with federal Fourth Amendment constitutional analysis.’ ” Id. at 646 (citations omitted).

2013Thus, in Francis, we held as waived an Indiana constitutional challenge to an investigatory stop where the defendant argued that “the Indiana Constitution’s ‘protections 10 relating to investigative stops [are] consistent with federal Fourth Amendment constitutional analysis.’” Id. at 646 (citations omitted).

2013See Scalissi v. State, 759 N.E.2d 618, 621 (Ind. 2001) (under Indiana Constitutional analysis, defendant’s sleep deprivation, ingestion of large quantities of alcohol and drugs, and blows to the head by the victim of the shooting a short time before the interrogation began did not render the confession involuntary under the Indiana Constitution, given substantial evidence there was no improper police influence or coercion in obtaining the confession), reh’g denied. 3 confession is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive

2013See Scalissi v. State, 759 N.E.2d 618, 621 (Ind. 2001) (under Indiana Constitutional analysis, defendant’s sleep deprivation, ingestion of large quantities of alcohol and drugs, and blows to the head by the victim of the shooting a short time before the interrogation began did not render the confession involuntary under the Indiana Constitution, given substantial evidence there was no improper police influence or coercion in obtaining the confession), reh’g denied. 3 confession is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive

2013See Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1150, n. 1 (Ind.2000) (declining to address an Indiana constitutional claim where appellant referred to the constitutional provision but made no separate argument on that basis).

2012Crawford v. State, 669 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind. 1996). 20 When a defendant’s speedy trial rights have been implicated, we undertake a balancing test mandated by Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 (1972), in which the conduct of both the State and the defendant are weighed.

2006See Taylor v. State, 812 N.E.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) ("Whether Taylor has preserved any claim under the Indiana Constitution is beside the point, because in the context of inventory searches, the ultimate standard dictated by the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 is the reasonableness of the police conduct.").

2000Ind. Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7); Barber v. State, 715 N.E.2d 848 , 851 n. 2 (Ind.1999); Valentin v. State, 688 N.E.2d 412, 413 (Ind.1997).

1993See, e.g., Hightower v. State (1976), 168 Ind.App. 194 , 343 N.E.2d 300 .

1993See, e.g., Hightower v. State (1976), 168 Ind.App. 194 , 343 N.E.2d 300 .