defendant filed exception in Louisiana

2019The Fuseliers argued in opposition that their intervention was timely because it related back to the original petition filed by the Stensons under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1153 and the factors set forth in Giroir v. South Louisiana Medical Center, Division of Hospitals, 475 So.2d 1040 (La. 1985). 8 See Stenson v. City of Oberlin , 60 So.3d at 1207 .

2019The Fuseliers argued in opposition that their intervention was timely because it related back to the original petition filed by the Stensons under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1153 and the factors set forth in Giroir v. South Louisiana Medical Center, Division of Hospitals, 475 So.2d 1040 (La. 1985). 8 See Stenson v. City of Oberlin , 60 So.3d at 1207 .

2019The Fuseliers argued in opposition that their intervention was timely because it related back to the original petition filed by the Stensons under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1153 and the factors set forth in Giroir v. South Louisiana Medical Center, Division of Hospitals, 475 So.2d 1040 (La. 1985). 8 See Stenson v. City of Oberlin , 60 So.3d at 1207 .

2019The Fuseliers argued in opposition that their intervention was timely because it related back to the original petition filed by the Stensons under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1153 and the factors set forth in Giroir v. South Louisiana Medical Center, Division of Hospitals, 475 So.2d 1040 (La. 1985). 8 See Stenson v. City of Oberlin , 60 So.3d at 1207 .

2025Id., 14-2483, pp. 5-6, 172 So. 3d at 625-26 .

2022Id., 17-0841, p. 3, 253 So. 3d at 236 .

2022Id., 2015-0854, p. 6, 195 So.3d at 603-04 .

2021Id. at 575 .

2021Id. at 872-73 .

2021The trial court granted the defendant’s protective order, but the appellate court reversed. 3 Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 577 So.2d 1 (La. 1991).

2017Id.

2016In Louisiana Bureau of Credit Control, Inc. v. Landeche, 2008-1099 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/4/09) , 6 So.3d 935 , the homeowners association assigned to a collection agency the defendant’s delinquent assessments account. 10 The defendant filed an exception based on three years under the open account law in the civil code, which was sustained by the trial court.

1976Fulmer v. Fulmer, La.S.Ct., 301 So.2d 622 (1974).

1975As the majority points out in its opinion, this basis for the loss of the right to disavow presupposes proof of a "valid and existing marriage", Wheeler v. Turlich, 176 La. 301 , 145 So. 546 (1933), and certainly one which is voluntary in nature.

1975As the majority points out in its opinion, this basis for the loss of the right to disavow presupposes proof of a "valid and existing marriage", Wheeler v. Turlich, 176 La. 301 , 145 So. 546 (1933), and certainly one which is voluntary in nature.

1973Sudduth, 265 So.2d 622 (La.App., 3rd Cir. 1972).

1971R.S. 23:1209 provides for the prescriptive period of one year for Workmen’s Compensation claims as follows: “Also, where the injury does not result at the time of, or develop immediately after the accident, the limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of one year from the time the injury develops, but in all such cases the claim for payment shall be forever barred unless the proceedings have been begun within two years from the date of the accident.” In construing this statute, the Supreme Court, in Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company, 220 La. 653 , 57 So.2d 218 , said: The

1971R.S. 23:1209 provides for the prescriptive period of one year for Workmen’s Compensation claims as follows: “Also, where the injury does not result at the time of, or develop immediately after the accident, the limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of one year from the time the injury develops, but in all such cases the claim for payment shall be forever barred unless the proceedings have been begun within two years from the date of the accident.” In construing this statute, the Supreme Court, in Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company, 220 La. 653 , 57 So.2d 218 , said: The

1966After the case was appealed to this court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in No. 22794, entitled Doucet v. Travelers Insurance Company and Dunn, 362 F.2d 263 , rendered a per curiam decision on June 10, 1966, affirming the lower court judgment, including dismissal of the suit as against The Home Indemnity Company for lack of jurisdiction.

1962The matter went to the Supreme Court where the exception to jurisdiction was finally maintained in its opinion reported in Cameron v. Reserve Insurance Company, 237 La. 433 , 111 So.2d 336 .

1962The matter went to the Supreme Court where the exception to jurisdiction was finally maintained in its opinion reported in Cameron v. Reserve Insurance Company, 237 La. 433 , 111 So.2d 336 .

1960In Lewy v. Wilkinson, 135 La. 105 , 64 So. 1003, 1004 , the defendant filed an exception of no cause of action which was referred to the merits.

1960In Lewy v. Wilkinson, 135 La. 105 , 64 So. 1003, 1004 , the defendant filed an exception of no cause of action which was referred to the merits.

1960In our original decision, which is reported in La.App., 103 So.2d 99 , we overruled the judgment of the Lower Court and remanded the matter for trial on the merits.

1954The defendant filed exception of no right or cause of action which was sustained by the district court under the authority of Dezendorf v. National Casualty Co., La.App., 171 So. 160 , and Harper v. Ragus, La.App., 62 So.2d 167 , in which our brethren of the Second Circuit held that a member of a partnership could not sue for compensation for he could not be both employer and employee at the same time.

1954The defendant filed exception of no right or cause of action which was sustained by the district court under the authority of Dezendorf v. National Casualty Co., La.App., 171 So. 160 , and Harper v. Ragus, La.App., 62 So.2d 167 , in which our brethren of the Second Circuit held that a member of a partnership could not sue for compensation for he could not be both employer and employee at the same time.

1951Therefore he can make no one else liable if he negligently runs a person down in the street. * * * ” In Charles v. Barrett, 233 N.Y. 127 , 135 N.E. 199, 200 , decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, with Justice Cardozo as its organ, the rule here under consideration was stated as follows: “ ■* * * The rule now is that, as long as the employee ' is furthering the business of his general employer by the service rendered to another, there will be no inference of a new relation ■ unless command has been *397 surrendered, and no inference of its surrender from the mere fact of its division. *

1951Therefore he can make no one else liable if he negligently runs a person down in the street. * * * ” In Charles v. Barrett, 233 N.Y. 127 , 135 N.E. 199, 200 , decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, with Justice Cardozo as its organ, the rule here under consideration was stated as follows: “ ■* * * The rule now is that, as long as the employee ' is furthering the business of his general employer by the service rendered to another, there will be no inference of a new relation ■ unless command has been *397 surrendered, and no inference of its surrender from the mere fact of its division. *

1951Therefore he can make no one else liable if he negligently runs a person down in the street. * * * ” In Charles v. Barrett, 233 N.Y. 127 , 135 N.E. 199, 200 , decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, with Justice Cardozo as its organ, the rule here under consideration was stated as follows: “ ■* * * The rule now is that, as long as the employee ' is furthering the business of his general employer by the service rendered to another, there will be no inference of a new relation ■ unless command has been *397 surrendered, and no inference of its surrender from the mere fact of its division. *

1951Therefore he can make no one else liable if he negligently runs a person down in the street. * * * ” In Charles v. Barrett, 233 N.Y. 127 , 135 N.E. 199, 200 , decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, with Justice Cardozo as its organ, the rule here under consideration was stated as follows: “ ■* * * The rule now is that, as long as the employee ' is furthering the business of his general employer by the service rendered to another, there will be no inference of a new relation ■ unless command has been *397 surrendered, and no inference of its surrender from the mere fact of its division. *

1950The defendant filed an exception to the jurisdiction of the court rationae persona, which exception was overruled by the district court under the authority of Article 165 of the Code of Practice and the case of Vicknair v. Daily States Publishing Co., 144 La. 809 , 81 So. 324 .

1950The defendant filed an exception to the jurisdiction of the court rationae persona, which exception was overruled by the district court under the authority of Article 165 of the Code of Practice and the case of Vicknair v. Daily States Publishing Co., 144 La. 809 , 81 So. 324 .

1949App., 21 So.2d 893 , 894, arising out of an automobile accident, the defendant filed an exception of no cause of action which *Page 535 was referred to the merits.

1947App., 197 So. 436 . [2] As before stated, the defendant filed an exception of vagueness in which they sought to obtain certain information regarding plaintiff's title, from whom he acquired the right of servitude, the nature of the titles, and whether or not he had fulfilled the terms of the contract between Helaire Guillory and the Well Company under which he is now claiming a right of servitude on the land of defendant Fontenot.