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32 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1894–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Negley v. Farrowgreen2 sentences1997As pointed out by this Court over one hundred years ago in Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158, 176 (1883), “[t]he liberty of the press guaranteed by the Constitution [of Maryland] is a right belonging to every one, whether proprietor of a newspaper or not, to publish whatever he pleases, without the license, interference or control of the government, being responsible alone for the abuse of the privilege. 1997As pointed out by this Court over one hundred years ago in Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158, 176 (1883), "[t]he liberty of the press guaranteed by the Constitution [of Maryland] is a right belonging to every one, whether proprietor of a newspaper or not, to publish whatever he pleases, without the license, interference or control of the government, being responsible alone for the abuse of the privilege. | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Valentino Johnsongreen2 sentences2023That the Majority thinks the abuse of standard is unfair in this context does not justify setting it aside and applying what is, in practice if not in name, a de novo standard 2 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667 , 702-04 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming admission of expert testimony that cartridge cases found in different locations matched and acknowledging PCAST findings); United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1280-81 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming admission of expert testimony that matched a bullet recovered from crime scene to defendant’s pistol and acknowledging 2009 NAS report’s cr 2023That the Majority thinks the abuse of standard is unfair in this context does not justify setting it aside and applying what is, in practice if not in name, a de novo standard 2 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667 , 702-04 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming admission of expert testimony that cartridge cases found in different locations matched and acknowledging PCAST findings); United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1280-81 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming admission of expert testimony that matched a bullet recovered from crime scene to defendant’s pistol and acknowledging 2009 NAS report’s cr | 2 | 2 |
Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard Countygreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55 , 64 n.3 (2003). 2011State v. Brookins, 380 Md. 345 , 350 n. 2, 844 A.2d 1162 (2004); The Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55, 64 , 832 A.2d 170 (2003). | 1 | 3 |
Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorfgreen2 sentences2003It provides in relevant part: "that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege." Id. (emphasis added). 2003It provides in relevant part: “that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.” Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
Reed v. Town of Gilbertgreen1 sentence2025For content-based laws impacting speech to be upheld, however, strict scrutiny review requires a court to determine that the restriction on speech is justified because the restrictions “are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163-64 (2015). 3 The Maryland Constitution provides, in relevant part, “that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.” Md. | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance v. Millergreen1 sentence2021See AGC v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 182 (2014) (a hearing judge “has broad discretion to determine evidence’s relevance when considering its admission”); AGC v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 203 (2020) (overruling attorney’s exception to hearing judge’s factual finding that adoption proceedings at issue did not contain novel or contested issues and that any finding on this point required expert testimony from a family law practitioner). | 1 | 1 |
Newell v. Runnelsgreen1 sentence2021Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 608 (2009); State v. Brookins, 380 Md. 345 , 350 n.2 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hodesgreen1 sentence2021See AGC v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 182 (2014) (a hearing judge “has broad discretion to determine evidence’s relevance when considering its admission”); AGC v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 203 (2020) (overruling attorney’s exception to hearing judge’s factual finding that adoption proceedings at issue did not contain novel or contested issues and that any finding on this point required expert testimony from a family law practitioner). | 1 | 1 |
Bagwell v. Peninsula Regional Medical Centergreen1 sentence2017See Bagwell, supra, 106 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Freedman v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584, 595 , 689 A.2d 65, 70 (1997); see also Freedman v. State, 233 Md. 498, 505 , 197 A.2d 232, 235 (1964) (noting that "Art[icle] 40 has been treated by this Court as in pari materia with the First Amendment”), rev’d on other grounds, 380 U.S. 51 , 85 S.Ct. 734 , 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). 12 . 2009Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584, 595 , 689 A.2d 65, 70 (1997); see also Freedman v. State, 233 Md. 498, 505 , 197 A.2d 232, 235 (1964) (noting that "Art[icle] 40 has been treated by this Court as in pari materia with the First Amendment”), rev’d on other grounds, 380 U.S. 51 , 85 S.Ct. 734 , 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). 12 . | 1 | 1 |
Freedman v. Marylandgreen2 sentences2009Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584, 595 , 689 A.2d 65, 70 (1997); see also Freedman v. State, 233 Md. 498, 505 , 197 A.2d 232, 235 (1964) (noting that "Art[icle] 40 has been treated by this Court as in pari materia with the First Amendment”), rev’d on other grounds, 380 U.S. 51 , 85 S.Ct. 734 , 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). 12 . 2009Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584, 595 , 689 A.2d 65, 70 (1997); see also Freedman v. State, 233 Md. 498, 505 , 197 A.2d 232, 235 (1964) (noting that "Art[icle] 40 has been treated by this Court as in pari materia with the First Amendment”), rev’d on other grounds, 380 U.S. 51 , 85 S.Ct. 734 , 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). 12 . | 1 | 1 |
Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery Countygreen2 sentences2009Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584, 595 , 689 A.2d 65, 70 (1997); see also Freedman v. State, 233 Md. 498, 505 , 197 A.2d 232, 235 (1964) (noting that "Art[icle] 40 has been treated by this Court as in pari materia with the First Amendment”), rev’d on other grounds, 380 U.S. 51 , 85 S.Ct. 734 , 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). 12 . 2009Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584, 595 , 689 A.2d 65, 70 (1997); see also Freedman v. State, 233 Md. 498, 505 , 197 A.2d 232, 235 (1964) (noting that "Art[icle] 40 has been treated by this Court as in pari materia with the First Amendment”), rev’d on other grounds, 380 U.S. 51 , 85 S.Ct. 734 , 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). 12 . | 1 | 1 |
Lubin v. Agora, Inc.green2 sentences2009Lubin v. Agora, Inc., 389 Md. 1, 23 , 882 A.2d 833, 846-47 (2005). 2009Lubin v. Agora, Inc., 389 Md. 1, 23 , 882 A.2d 833, 846-47 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Zolingreen2 sentences2004Nevertheless, we agree with the Supreme Court’s assessment that it would be an abuse of the privilege to permit the attorney-client privilege to “extend to communications ‘made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud’ or a crime.” United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 , 109 S.Ct. 2619, 2626 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469, 485 (1989). 2004Nevertheless, we agree with the Supreme Court’s assessment that it would be an abuse of the privilege to permit the attorney-client privilege to “extend to communications ‘made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud’ or a crime.” United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 , 109 S.Ct. 2619, 2626 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469, 485 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Coffin v. Browngreen2 sentences2003Our Declaration of Rights declares `that any citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.' It is a gross abuse of that privilege to falsely prefer such charges as are made against the appellee in this letter...." Id. at 197-98 , 50 A. at 569-70 (emphasis in original). 2003Our Declaration of Rights declares `that any citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.' It is a gross abuse of that privilege to falsely prefer such charges as are made against the appellee in this letter...." Id. at 197-98 , 50 A. at 569-70 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawesgreen2 sentences2003A liquor license is privilege, and in granting the license, the Legislature “ ‘may annex ... such conditions as are deemed necessary to prevent an abuse of the privilege,’ ” Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 201 Md. 58, 65 , 92 A.2d 560, 563 (1953). 2003A liquor license is privilege, and in granting the license, the Legislature “ ‘may annex ... such conditions as are deemed necessary to prevent an abuse of the privilege,’ ” Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 201 Md. 58, 65 , 92 A.2d 560, 563 (1953). | 1 | 1 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences2001As pointed out above, however, ž 123 is not such a statute. [3] Furthermore, the overbreadth doctrine would not be applicable in the Rowan situation because "the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 497 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 370 (1982). [4] The entire transcript relating to the trial court's rendition of the verdict is as follows: "THE COURT: I think the underlying question here is whether a defendant who is incarcerated can commit the crime of harassment as it relates to someone who is not incarcera 2001As pointed out above, however, ž 123 is not such a statute. [3] Furthermore, the overbreadth doctrine would not be applicable in the Rowan situation because "the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 497 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 370 (1982). [4] The entire transcript relating to the trial court's rendition of the verdict is as follows: "THE COURT: I think the underlying question here is whether a defendant who is incarcerated can commit the crime of harassment as it relates to someone who is not incarcera | 1 | 1 |
| Leese v. Baltimore Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tynecki v. Tufts University School of Dental Medicinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Resources for Human Development, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hanrahan v. Kellygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brookins
green
2 sentences2021Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 608 (2009); State v. Brookins, 380 Md. 345 , 350 n.2 (2004). 2011State v. Brookins, 380 Md. 345 , 350 n. 2, 844 A.2d 1162 (2004); The Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55, 64 , 832 A.2d 170 (2003). | 2 | 2011–2021 |
Foley v. Hoffman
green
2 sentences1975In determining *70 an abuse of privilege all relevant circumstances are admissible, Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273 (1947), including the defendant’s reasonable belief in. the truth of his statements, Simon [v. Robinson], supra, the excessive nature of the language used, Stevenson, supra, Fresh, supra, whether the disclosures were unsolicited, id., and whether the communication was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties, Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92 (1962).” 7 “Malice may be a jury question.” Hanrahan v. Kelly, supra, at 29. 1971In determining an abuse of privilege all relevant circumstances are admissible, Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273 (1947), including the defendant’s reasonable belief in the truth of his statements, Simon, supra, the excessive nature of the language used, Stevenson, supra, Fresh, supra, whether the disclosures were unsolicited, id., and whether the communication was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties, Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92 (1962). | 2 | 1971–1975 |
Fresh v. Cutter
green
2 sentences1975In determining *70 an abuse of privilege all relevant circumstances are admissible, Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273 (1947), including the defendant’s reasonable belief in. the truth of his statements, Simon [v. Robinson], supra, the excessive nature of the language used, Stevenson, supra, Fresh, supra, whether the disclosures were unsolicited, id., and whether the communication was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties, Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92 (1962).” 7 “Malice may be a jury question.” Hanrahan v. Kelly, supra, at 29. 1975In determining *70 an abuse of privilege all relevant circumstances are admissible, Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273 (1947), including the defendant’s reasonable belief in. the truth of his statements, Simon [v. Robinson], supra, the excessive nature of the language used, Stevenson, supra, Fresh, supra, whether the disclosures were unsolicited, id., and whether the communication was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties, Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92 (1962).” 7 “Malice may be a jury question.” Hanrahan v. Kelly, supra, at 29. | 2 | 1971–1975 |
Stevenson v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc.
green
2 sentences1975In determining *70 an abuse of privilege all relevant circumstances are admissible, Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273 (1947), including the defendant’s reasonable belief in. the truth of his statements, Simon [v. Robinson], supra, the excessive nature of the language used, Stevenson, supra, Fresh, supra, whether the disclosures were unsolicited, id., and whether the communication was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties, Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92 (1962).” 7 “Malice may be a jury question.” Hanrahan v. Kelly, supra, at 29. 1971In determining an abuse of privilege all relevant circumstances are admissible, Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273 (1947), including the defendant’s reasonable belief in the truth of his statements, Simon, supra, the excessive nature of the language used, Stevenson, supra, Fresh, supra, whether the disclosures were unsolicited, id., and whether the communication was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties, Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92 (1962). | 2 | 1971–1975 |
Kennedy v. Cannon
green
2 sentences1975In determining *70 an abuse of privilege all relevant circumstances are admissible, Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273 (1947), including the defendant’s reasonable belief in. the truth of his statements, Simon [v. Robinson], supra, the excessive nature of the language used, Stevenson, supra, Fresh, supra, whether the disclosures were unsolicited, id., and whether the communication was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties, Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92 (1962).” 7 “Malice may be a jury question.” Hanrahan v. Kelly, supra, at 29. 1971In determining an abuse of privilege all relevant circumstances are admissible, Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273 (1947), including the defendant’s reasonable belief in the truth of his statements, Simon, supra, the excessive nature of the language used, Stevenson, supra, Fresh, supra, whether the disclosures were unsolicited, id., and whether the communication was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties, Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92 (1962). | 2 | 1971–1975 |
Piscatelli v. Smith
green
2 sentences2013The court relied on Piscatelli v. Smith, 424 Md. 294 , 35 A.3d 1140 (2012), and specifically its holding that an abuse of privilege required a showing of malice and defining malice as “a person’s actual knowledge that his or her statement is false, coupled with his or her intent to deceive another by means of that statement.” And in granting the motion, the court concluded that it had “not heard any argument or any evidence anticipated to be presented at trial or that has been discovered to this point to indicate at all that there was any intent to deceive another by means of the statement,” a 2013The court relied on Piscatelli v. Smith, 424 Md. 294 , 35 A.3d 1140 (2012), and specifically its holding that an abuse of privilege required a showing of malice and defining malice as “a person’s actual knowledge that his or her statement is false, coupled with his or her intent to deceive another by means of that statement.” And in granting the motion, the court concluded that it had “not heard any argument or any evidence anticipated to be presented at trial or that has been discovered to this point to indicate at all that there was any intent to deceive another by means of the statement,” a | 1 | 2013–2013 |
WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State
green
2 sentences2010WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State, 300 Md. 233 , 243 n. 4, 477 A.2d 776 (1984); Peroutka v. Streng, 116 Md.App. 301, 308 , 695 A.2d 1287 (1997); Pendergast, 99 Md.App. at 148 , 636 A.2d 18 ; Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55 , 64-65 n. 3, 832 A.2d 170 (2003). 11 . 2010WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State, 300 Md. 233 , 243 n. 4, 477 A.2d 776 (1984); Peroutka v. Streng, 116 Md.App. 301, 308 , 695 A.2d 1287 (1997); Pendergast, 99 Md.App. at 148 , 636 A.2d 18 ; Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55 , 64-65 n. 3, 832 A.2d 170 (2003). 11 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Peroutka v. Streng
green
2 sentences2010WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State, 300 Md. 233 , 243 n. 4, 477 A.2d 776 (1984); Peroutka v. Streng, 116 Md.App. 301, 308 , 695 A.2d 1287 (1997); Pendergast, 99 Md.App. at 148 , 636 A.2d 18 ; Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55 , 64-65 n. 3, 832 A.2d 170 (2003). 11 . 2010WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State, 300 Md. 233 , 243 n. 4, 477 A.2d 776 (1984); Peroutka v. Streng, 116 Md.App. 301, 308 , 695 A.2d 1287 (1997); Pendergast, 99 Md.App. at 148 , 636 A.2d 18 ; Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55 , 64-65 n. 3, 832 A.2d 170 (2003). 11 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Pendergast v. State
green
2 sentences2010WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State, 300 Md. 233 , 243 n. 4, 477 A.2d 776 (1984); Peroutka v. Streng, 116 Md.App. 301, 308 , 695 A.2d 1287 (1997); Pendergast, 99 Md.App. at 148 , 636 A.2d 18 ; Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55 , 64-65 n. 3, 832 A.2d 170 (2003). 11 . 2010WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State, 300 Md. 233 , 243 n. 4, 477 A.2d 776 (1984); Peroutka v. Streng, 116 Md.App. 301, 308 , 695 A.2d 1287 (1997); Pendergast, 99 Md.App. at 148 , 636 A.2d 18 ; Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55 , 64-65 n. 3, 832 A.2d 170 (2003). 11 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
General Motors Corp. v. Piskor
green
2 sentences2007We hold, therefore, that there was sufficient evidence to warrant submitting to the jury the question whether the conditional privilege had been abused. 277 Md. at 173-74 , 352 A.2d 810 (emphasis supplied). 2007We hold, therefore, that there was sufficient evidence to warrant submitting to the jury the question whether the conditional privilege had been abused. 277 Md. at 173-74 , 352 A.2d 810 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Happy 40, Inc. v. Miller
green
2 sentences2007The issue in the case was whether the behavior of the employer, in the course of responding to the three inquiries, amounted to an abuse of the privilege. [W]e shall focus on the issue of whether there was legally sufficient evidence of an y abuse of the qualified privileges under which these statements were uttered by Booher. 63 Md.App. at 32 , 491 A.2d 1210 (emphasis supplied). 2007The issue in the case was whether the behavior of the employer, in the course of responding to the three inquiries, amounted to an abuse of the privilege. [W]e shall focus on the issue of whether there was legally sufficient evidence of an y abuse of the qualified privileges under which these statements were uttered by Booher. 63 Md.App. at 32 , 491 A.2d 1210 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Lightman v. State
green
2 sentences2003The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states: "That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.” We have made "no distinction between the free speech and press guarantees in Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the First Amendment....” Lightman v. State, 15 Md.App. 713, 727 2003The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states: "That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.” We have made "no distinction between the free speech and press guarantees in Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the First Amendment....” Lightman v. State, 15 Md.App. 713, 727 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Landover Books, Inc. v. Prince George's County
green
2 sentences2001Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: "That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.” As this Court stated in Landover Books, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 81 Md.App. 54, 76 , 566 A.2d 792 (1989), "[t]he guaranty of freedom of speech under Art. 40 is substantially similar to that enunciated in the First Amendment and should not be interpreted differently.” 3 . 2001Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: "That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.” As this Court stated in Landover Books, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 81 Md.App. 54, 76 , 566 A.2d 792 (1989), "[t]he guaranty of freedom of speech under Art. 40 is substantially similar to that enunciated in the First Amendment and should not be interpreted differently.” 3 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Mareck v. Johns Hopkins University green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Orrison v. Vance green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co. green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Matter of Easton, Incompetent green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Wright v. Wright's Lessee green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Simon v. Robinson green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Grosjean v. American Press Co. green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Miller v. State green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Berry v. State green | 1 | 1894–1894 |
| Bradshaw v. State green | 1 | 1894–1894 |
| McLain v. State green | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.