abuse privilege in Texas

2015DAVENPORT FAILS TO CONSIDER COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES The sole issue the Texas Supreme Court addressed in Davenport was “whether the court’s gag orders violate the guarantee of free expression contained in article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege….” 1 Id. at 7 .

2015Decisional Basis of Davenport In analyzing the propriety of the gag order, the Texas Supreme Court considered only “whether the court’s gag orders violate the guarantee of free expression contained in article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege….” Id. at 7 .

2015I agree with the holding in Urbish, but consider it inapposite in the present case, where the issue is not which parent will represent the child, but whether the parents or a third party will represent the child. --------- Page 75 his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed 220 S.W. 75 (Tex. 1920) curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press.' 110 Tex. 335 The purpose of this provision is to preserve what we call 'liberty of speech' and 'the freedom of the press,' and Ex parte TUCKER. at the same time hold all persons acco

2015I agree with the holding in Urbish, but consider it inapposite in the present case, where the issue is not which parent will represent the child, but whether the parents or a third party will represent the child. --------- Page 75 his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed 220 S.W. 75 (Tex. 1920) curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press.' 110 Tex. 335 The purpose of this provision is to preserve what we call 'liberty of speech' and 'the freedom of the press,' and Ex parte TUCKER. at the same time hold all persons acco

2021Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Barber, 111 S.W.3d 86, 106 (Tex. 2003); Sanchez v. Striever, 614 S.W.3d 233 , 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.); Dehnert, 605 S.W.3d at 895–96.

2021Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Barber, 111 S.W.3d 86, 106 (Tex. 2003); Sanchez v. Striever, 614 S.W.3d 233 , 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.); Dehnert, 605 S.W.3d at 895–96.

2008Emphasis added. 13: When interpreting the Texas Constitution, we “rely heavily on its literal text and must give effect to its plain language.” Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Cor p., 23 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. 2000); Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz , 940 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. 1997).

2008Emphasis added. 13 When interpreting the Texas Constitution, we “rely heavily on its literal text and must give effect to its plain language.” Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 23 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. 2000); Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. 1997).

2008Emphasis added. 13: When interpreting the Texas Constitution, we “rely heavily on its literal text and must give effect to its plain language.” Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Cor p., 23 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. 2000); Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz , 940 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. 1997).

2008Emphasis added. 13 When interpreting the Texas Constitution, we “rely heavily on its literal text and must give effect to its plain language.” Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 23 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. 2000); Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. 1997).

2007Punishment for the abuse of the right, not prevention of its exercise, is what the provision contemplates.” Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton , 980 S.W.2d 425, 434-35 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Davenport , 834 S.W.2d at 9 ) (other citations omitted).

2007Punishment for the abuse of the right, not prevention of its exercise, is what the provision contemplates.” Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 434-35 (Tex.1998) (quoting Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 9 ) (other citations omitted).

1982First, our constitution has always insisted that the one who exercises the liberty to speak, write or publish on any subject is at once “responsible for the abuse of the privilege.” Ex parte McCormick, supra, at 106; Ex parte Tucker, supra, at 76; McMorries v. Hudson Sales Corp., 233 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso, 1950, no writ history).

1971The constitutional principle governing our action is that set out by the court in Ex parte Tucker, supra: “The existence of any power in a court of equity to supervise one person’s opinion of another, or to dictate what one person may say of another, is plainly and emphatically refuted by the 8th section of the Bill of Rights [of the Texas Constitution], “That section, in part, reads: “Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write, or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or th

2015Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791 , 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); see also law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or id. (" If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil of the press." ), with U.S. Const. Amend. 1 ( " Congress sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, 'freezes' it at least for the time." (quoting A. Bickel, the or of the press . . . ." ).

2015Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791 , 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); see also law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or id. (" If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil of the press." ), with U.S. Const. Amend. 1 ( " Congress sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, 'freezes' it at least for the time." (quoting A. Bickel, the or of the press . . . ." ).

2025I, § 8 (“Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press.”); see also City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. 2007) (concluding that, though “there is no implied private right of action for damages arising under the free speech . . . section[] of the Texas Constitution,” “suits for injunctive relief may be maintained against governmental entities to remedy violations” of that section (internal quotation omitted)).

2025Pipe & Supply, responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2013). law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of [80] City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828 , speech or of the press." Tex. Const. art. 1, § 8. 831 (Tex. 2014); see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, [92] Tex. Parks & Wildlife Code § 43.954(b)(2). 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (stating regulatory taking occurs "when government actions do not [93] Tex. Dep't of Ins. v. Stonewater Roofing, Ltd., encroach upon or occupy the property yet still 696 S.W.3d 646 , 658 (Tex. 2024). affect and limit its us

2025Pipe & Supply, responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2013). law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of [80] City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828 , speech or of the press." Tex. Const. art. 1, § 8. 831 (Tex. 2014); see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, [92] Tex. Parks & Wildlife Code § 43.954(b)(2). 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (stating regulatory taking occurs "when government actions do not [93] Tex. Dep't of Ins. v. Stonewater Roofing, Ltd., encroach upon or occupy the property yet still 696 S.W.3d 646 , 658 (Tex. 2024). affect and limit its us

2025Pipe & Supply, responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2013). law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of [80] City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828 , speech or of the press." Tex. Const. art. 1, § 8. 831 (Tex. 2014); see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, [92] Tex. Parks & Wildlife Code § 43.954(b)(2). 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (stating regulatory taking occurs "when government actions do not [93] Tex. Dep't of Ins. v. Stonewater Roofing, Ltd., encroach upon or occupy the property yet still 696 S.W.3d 646 , 658 (Tex. 2024). affect and limit its us

2024Although the freedom of speech is referred to as “the very foundation of constitutional government,” De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937), limitations have commonly been understood to apply to it.

2018I, § 8 (“Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege . . . .”); see also Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989).

2018I, § 8 ("Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege ...."); see also Casso v. Brand , 776 S.W.2d 551 , 556 (Tex. 1989).

2015Publ’g Co. v. Shaver, 630 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex. Crim.

2015A “judicial order that forbids certain communications before they occur constitutes a prior restraint.” Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 550 , 113 S.Ct. 2766 (1993); Marketshare Telecom, LLC v. Ericson, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 908, 917 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).

2015Co. v. Marshall, 124 publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for Tex. 45, 76 S.W.2d 1007, 1012-25 (1934); Mellinger v. the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S.W. 249, 252-54 (1887). passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. [6] This provision in our state Bill of Rights, like the In applying article I, section 8 to the gag orders here, First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Court attempts to follow this process as it ordinarily similar provisions in the constitutions of other states, would, except

2015Co. v. Marshall, 124 publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for Tex. 45, 76 S.W.2d 1007, 1012-25 (1934); Mellinger v. the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S.W. 249, 252-54 (1887). passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. [6] This provision in our state Bill of Rights, like the In applying article I, section 8 to the gag orders here, First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Court attempts to follow this process as it ordinarily similar provisions in the constitutions of other states, would, except

2015Co. v. Marshall, 124 publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for Tex. 45, 76 S.W.2d 1007, 1012-25 (1934); Mellinger v. the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37 , 3 S.W. 249, 252-54 (1887). passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. [6] This provision in our state Bill of Rights, like the In applying article I, section 8 to the gag orders here, First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Court attempts to follow this process as it ordinarily similar provisions in the constitutions of other states, would, except