gross hearing in New Jersey

2025Al explained that he stopped following the car when it "jumped on the highway." Al also stated that he was confident 2 "[A] Gross hearing is the name given to the Rule 104 hearing that the trial court conducts to determine the admissibility of a witness's inconsistent out -of- court statement -- offered by the party calling that witness -- by assessing whether the statement is reliable." State v. Greene, 242 N.J. 530 , 540 n.2 (2020) (first citing State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1, 15-17 (1990); and then citing State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311 , 322 n.5 (2011)).

2025Defendant appeals from his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) admitting the witness, Kevin Harvey's prior statements to the police without first conducting a Gross1 hearing; (2) failing to follow the procedure under State v. Burr 2 and its progeny in replaying the prerecorded 1 "[A] Gross hearing is the name given to the Rule 104 hearing that the trial court conducts to determine the admissibility of a witness's inconsistent out-of- court statement – offered by the party calling that witness – by assessing whether the statement is admissible." State v. Greene, 242

2025Here, while one might debate the legal correctness of Trugman's use of a lack of marketability discount, there is no basis on which that decision could fairly be termed a gross error, an unmistakable error, or an undebatable error, nor could it be described as a decision made in "manifest disregard of the applicable law and leading to an unjust result." Ibid.

2000Here, while one might debate the legal correctness of Trugman's use of a lack of marketability discount, there is no basis on which that decision could fairly be termed a gross error, an unmistakable error, or an undebatable error, nor could it be described as a decision made in "manifest disregard of the applicable law and leading to an unjust result." Ibid.

2025Defendant appeals from his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) admitting the witness, Kevin Harvey's prior statements to the police without first conducting a Gross1 hearing; (2) failing to follow the procedure under State v. Burr 2 and its progeny in replaying the prerecorded 1 "[A] Gross hearing is the name given to the Rule 104 hearing that the trial court conducts to determine the admissibility of a witness's inconsistent out-of- court statement – offered by the party calling that witness – by assessing whether the statement is admissible." State v. Greene, 242

2025Hodge"; (3) raise an objection to the State's discovery violation by failing to disclose Hodge's testimony about the overheard Super Bowl bet between defendant and Crowley; (4) "investigate a third-party defense" regarding the sender of prior allegedly threatening texts to the victim; (5) request the redaction from Monroe's recorded statement of his opinion that defendant "ain't no type you want to f[***] with"; (6) obtain defendant's cell phone records showing he was on the telephone at 7:31:40 p.m., less than eighty seconds after Shot Spotter reported gunshots, or investigate the identity of

2025Hodge"; (3) raise an objection to the State's discovery violation by failing to disclose Hodge's testimony about the overheard Super Bowl bet between defendant and Crowley; (4) "investigate a third-party defense" regarding the sender of prior allegedly threatening texts to the victim; (5) request the redaction from Monroe's recorded statement of his opinion that defendant "ain't no type you want to f[***] with"; (6) obtain defendant's cell phone records showing he was on the telephone at 7:31:40 p.m., less than eighty seconds after Shot Spotter reported gunshots, or investigate the identity of

2025Defendant appeals from his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) admitting the witness, Kevin Harvey's prior statements to the police without first conducting a Gross1 hearing; (2) failing to follow the procedure under State v. Burr 2 and its progeny in replaying the prerecorded 1 "[A] Gross hearing is the name given to the Rule 104 hearing that the trial court conducts to determine the admissibility of a witness's inconsistent out-of- court statement – offered by the party calling that witness – by assessing whether the statement is admissible." State v. Greene, 242

2021The judge also confirmed defense counsel's initial uncertainty during the Gross hearing did not constitute an error "so serious that [he] was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578 (2015), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013) (citation omitted).

2021The judge also confirmed defense counsel's initial uncertainty during the Gross hearing did not constitute an error "so serious that [he] was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578 (2015), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013) (citation omitted).

2012Id. at 8-9 , 417 A.2d 474 .

2012Id. at 8-9 , 417 A.2d 474 .

2011Because a recanting witness is deemed “unavailable," see State v. Byrd, 198 N.J. 319, 352-53 , 967 A.2d 285 (2009) (explaining that recanting witnesses are "unavailable” for hearsay rule purposes); see also N.J.R.E. 804(a)(4) (defining, in part, "unavailability"), those prior statements were admitted against defendant at his trial.

2011Because a recanting witness is deemed “unavailable," see State v. Byrd, 198 N.J. 319, 352-53 , 967 A.2d 285 (2009) (explaining that recanting witnesses are "unavailable” for hearsay rule purposes); see also N.J.R.E. 804(a)(4) (defining, in part, "unavailability"), those prior statements were admitted against defendant at his trial.

2011Because a recanting witness is deemed “unavailable," see State v. Byrd, 198 N.J. 319, 352-53 , 967 A.2d 285 (2009) (explaining that recanting witnesses are "unavailable” for hearsay rule purposes); see also N.J.R.E. 804(a)(4) (defining, in part, "unavailability"), those prior statements were admitted against defendant at his trial.

2011Because a recanting witness is deemed “unavailable," see State v. Byrd, 198 N.J. 319, 352-53 , 967 A.2d 285 (2009) (explaining that recanting witnesses are "unavailable” for hearsay rule purposes); see also N.J.R.E. 804(a)(4) (defining, in part, "unavailability"), those prior statements were admitted against defendant at his trial.

2000After the recess, the State informed the court that it would withdraw its motion for a mistrial provided defendant supplied an express waiver and Cucco represented that he did not have any “confidential information regarding [Posey] ... that he could possibly use as fruitful ground for cross-examination.” In response, Cucco admitted that the presentence report established that he had previously represented Posey, however he repeated that he did not “recall anything about her---- I don’t have any background information on her.” Despite the fact that the prosecutor, defense attorney, and defenda

2000After the recess, the State informed the court that it would withdraw its motion for a mistrial provided defendant supplied an express waiver and Cucco represented that he did not have any “confidential information regarding [Posey] ... that he could possibly use as fruitful ground for cross-examination.” In response, Cucco admitted that the presentence report established that he had previously represented Posey, however he repeated that he did not “recall anything about her---- I don’t have any background information on her.” Despite the fact that the prosecutor, defense attorney, and defenda

1999In Allstate Insurance Company v. Orthopedic Evaluations, Inc., 300 N.J.Super. 510 , 693 A. 2d 500 (" OEI "), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 67 , 697 A. 2d 541 , affirmed on remand, 304 N.J.Super. 278 , 700 A. 2d 372 (App.Div.1997), the Appellate Division squarely rejected this argument.

1999In Allstate Insurance Company v. Orthopedic Evaluations, Inc., 300 N.J.Super. 510 , 693 A. 2d 500 (" OEI "), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 67 , 697 A. 2d 541 , affirmed on remand, 304 N.J.Super. 278 , 700 A. 2d 372 (App.Div.1997), the Appellate Division squarely rejected this argument.

1999In Allstate Insurance Company v. Orthopedic Evaluations, Inc., 300 N.J.Super. 510 , 693 A. 2d 500 (" OEI "), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 67 , 697 A. 2d 541 , affirmed on remand, 304 N.J.Super. 278 , 700 A. 2d 372 (App.Div.1997), the Appellate Division squarely rejected this argument.

1999In Allstate Insurance Company v. Orthopedic Evaluations, Inc., 300 N.J.Super. 510 , 693 A. 2d 500 (" OEI "), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 67 , 697 A. 2d 541 , affirmed on remand, 304 N.J.Super. 278 , 700 A. 2d 372 (App.Div.1997), the Appellate Division squarely rejected this argument.

1999In Allstate Insurance Company v. Orthopedic Evaluations, Inc., 300 N.J.Super. 510 , 693 A. 2d 500 (" OEI "), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 67 , 697 A. 2d 541 , affirmed on remand, 304 N.J.Super. 278 , 700 A. 2d 372 (App.Div.1997), the Appellate Division squarely rejected this argument.

1999In Allstate Insurance Company v. Orthopedic Evaluations, Inc., 300 N.J.Super. 510 , 693 A. 2d 500 (" OEI "), certif. granted, 151 N.J. 67 , 697 A. 2d 541 , affirmed on remand, 304 N.J.Super. 278 , 700 A. 2d 372 (App.Div.1997), the Appellate Division squarely rejected this argument.

1979In Ruckman v. Ransom, 35 N.J.L. 565 (E. & A. 1871), Chief Justice Beasley reconsidered the rule stated in Hoagland v. Veghte that review in the action at law was limited to the face of the award, except when the arbitrators neglected or refused to consider a matter submitted to them.

1979In Ruckman v. Ransom, 35 N.J.L. 565 (E. & A. 1871), Chief Justice Beasley reconsidered the rule stated in Hoagland v. Veghte that review in the action at law was limited to the face of the award, except when the arbitrators neglected or refused to consider a matter submitted to them.