gross violation in California

1990We are not persuaded. “ ‘Misappropriation of a client’s property is a gross violation of general morality likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession and therefore merits severe punishment.’” (Greenbaum v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 893, 905 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 544 P.2d 921 ], quoting Yokozeki v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 436, 450 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 521 P.2d 858 ].) Petitioner’s misconduct was especially harmful to his client because the misappropriated funds were significant in amount and were meant to reimburse the client for personal injuries.

1990We are not persuaded. “ ‘Misappropriation of a client’s property is a gross violation of general morality likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession and therefore merits severe punishment.’” (Greenbaum v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 893, 905 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 544 P.2d 921 ], quoting Yokozeki v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 436, 450 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 521 P.2d 858 ].) Petitioner’s misconduct was especially harmful to his client because the misappropriated funds were significant in amount and were meant to reimburse the client for personal injuries.

1975In Sturr v. State Bar, 52 Cal.2d 125 , 134 ... we ordered disbarment, saying: ‘Misappropriation of funds entrusted to an attorney at law is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics and, in addition, is likely to endanger the confidence of the public in the legal profession.

1974(Persion v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 456, 461 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 708 , 509 P.2d 524 ]; In re Plotner (1971) 5 Cal.3d 714, 716 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 193 , 488 P.2d 385 ]; Mack v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 440, 443 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 625 , 467 P.2d 225 ]; Sturr v. State Bar (1959) 52 Cal.2d 125, 127 [ 388 P.2d 897 ].) Misappropriation of a client’s property is a gross violation of general morality likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession and therefore merits severe punishment.

2026Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800 (Cassim); see also Sabato v. Brooks (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 715 , 724–725 (Sabato).) “A reasonable probability for these purposes does not mean an absolute probability” (Sabato, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 725 ), nor does it mean “more likely than not.” (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 800 .) Rather, it means “merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility” (ibid.), and “[t]he test is satisfied, and prejudice appears, if the case presents ‘an equal balance of reasonable probabilities.’ ” (Sabato, at p. 725.) D.

2026Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800 (Cassim); see also Sabato v. Brooks (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 715 , 724–725 (Sabato).) “A reasonable probability for these purposes does not mean an absolute probability” (Sabato, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 725 ), nor does it mean “more likely than not.” (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 800 .) Rather, it means “merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility” (ibid.), and “[t]he test is satisfied, and prejudice appears, if the case presents ‘an equal balance of reasonable probabilities.’ ” (Sabato, at p. 725.) D.

1977This fact, together with his improbable explanation for its loss, substantiates the conclusion of the board that Allen misappropriated the funds. *178 “Misappropriation of a client’s property is a gross violation of general morality likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession and therefore merits severe punishment.” (Yokozeki v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 436, 450 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 521 P.2d 858 ]; see Walter v. State Bar, supra, 2 Cal.3d 880, 891 .) 1 The findings of the board regarding the house transaction are also amply supported.

1975(Compare Crooks v. State Bar (1970) 3 Cal.3d 346, 358 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 600 , 475 P.2d 872 ].) On the other hand, however, petitioner’s conduct involved a misappropriation of his client’s trust funds, “ ‘ “a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics . . ., likely to endanger the confidence of the public in the legal profession.” ’ ” (Walter v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 880, 891 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 833 , 471 P.2d 481 ].) Furthermore, petitioner’s testimony before the committee and his contentions in this court indicate that he still does not understand the impropriety of his co

1969Morrill Co. v. State of California (1967) 65 Cal.2d 787, 794-795 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 479 , 423 P.2d 551 ]; A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State of California (1965) 238 Cal. App.2d 736, 742 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 225 ].) This court considered this precise provision of the state's highway contracts in A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State of California, supra . [1] We held that section 9(f) establishes a nonjudicial remedy for the settlement of disputed contract claims; that this remedy must be pursued to completion before recourse to the courts; that the provision has an impact on the scope of judicial inquiry. (

1969Morrill Co. v. State of California (1967) 65 Cal.2d 787, 794-795 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 479 , 423 P.2d 551 ]; A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State of California (1965) 238 Cal. App.2d 736, 742 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 225 ].) This court considered this precise provision of the state's highway contracts in A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State of California, supra . [1] We held that section 9(f) establishes a nonjudicial remedy for the settlement of disputed contract claims; that this remedy must be pursued to completion before recourse to the courts; that the provision has an impact on the scope of judicial inquiry. (

2026Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800 (Cassim); see also Sabato v. Brooks (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 715 , 724–725 (Sabato).) “A reasonable probability for these purposes does not mean an absolute probability” (Sabato, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 725 ), nor does it mean “more likely than not.” (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 800 .) Rather, it means “merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility” (ibid.), and “[t]he test is satisfied, and prejudice appears, if the case presents ‘an equal balance of reasonable probabilities.’ ” (Sabato, at p. 725.) D.

2026Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800 (Cassim); see also Sabato v. Brooks (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 715 , 724–725 (Sabato).) “A reasonable probability for these purposes does not mean an absolute probability” (Sabato, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 725 ), nor does it mean “more likely than not.” (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 800 .) Rather, it means “merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility” (ibid.), and “[t]he test is satisfied, and prejudice appears, if the case presents ‘an equal balance of reasonable probabilities.’ ” (Sabato, at p. 725.) D.

2009The statute does not require specific intent to injure but does require criminal negligence. (§ 7; People v. Superior Court (Holvey) (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 51, 60 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 335 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Heitzman, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 209, fn. 17.) *1103 Criminal negligence requires a gross violation of an existing duty of care.

2009The statute does not require specific intent to injure but does require criminal negligence. (§ 7; People v. Superior Court (Holvey) (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 51, 60 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 335 ], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Heitzman, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 209, fn. 17.) *1103 Criminal negligence requires a gross violation of an existing duty of care.

1990We are not persuaded. “ ‘Misappropriation of a client’s property is a gross violation of general morality likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession and therefore merits severe punishment.’” (Greenbaum v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 893, 905 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 544 P.2d 921 ], quoting Yokozeki v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 436, 450 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 521 P.2d 858 ].) Petitioner’s misconduct was especially harmful to his client because the misappropriated funds were significant in amount and were meant to reimburse the client for personal injuries.

1990We are not persuaded. “ ‘Misappropriation of a client’s property is a gross violation of general morality likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession and therefore merits severe punishment.’” (Greenbaum v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 893, 905 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 544 P.2d 921 ], quoting Yokozeki v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 436, 450 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 521 P.2d 858 ].) Petitioner’s misconduct was especially harmful to his client because the misappropriated funds were significant in amount and were meant to reimburse the client for personal injuries.

1989(Ar den v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 713, 728 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 68 , 739 P.2d 1236 ] [increased discipline is justified in cases in which an attorney has demonstrated a “ ‘continuing course of serious professional misconduct extending over a period of several years’ ”].) Misappropriation of client funds by itself is a gross violation of an attorney’s professional oath {Tenner v. State Bar (1980) 28 Cal.3d 202, 206 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 333 , 617 P.2d 486 ]; Rules Prof.

1989(Ar den v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 713, 728 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 68 , 739 P.2d 1236 ] [increased discipline is justified in cases in which an attorney has demonstrated a “ ‘continuing course of serious professional misconduct extending over a period of several years’ ”].) Misappropriation of client funds by itself is a gross violation of an attorney’s professional oath {Tenner v. State Bar (1980) 28 Cal.3d 202, 206 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 333 , 617 P.2d 486 ]; Rules Prof.

1982(Brody v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 347, 350 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 371 , 521 P.2d 107 ].) Where, as here, the attorney has been convicted of grand theft as a result of his misappropriation, disbarment is the usual sanction.

1976The extent of the discipline imposed does not derive from a fixed formula but rather is determined from a “balanced consideration of the relevant factors.” (Silver v. State Bar, supra, 13 Cal.3d 134, 146 (9) quoting from Bernstein v. State Bar, 6 Cal.3d 909, 919 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 369 , *905 495 P.2d 1289 ].) “Misappropriation of a client’s property is a gross violation of general morality likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession and therefore merits severe punishment.” (Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal.3d 436, 450 (16) [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 521 P.2d 858 ]; Brody v. State Bar, s

1969Morrill Co. v. State of California (1967) 65 Cal.2d 787, 794-795 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 479 , 423 P.2d 551 ]; A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State of California (1965) 238 Cal. App.2d 736, 742 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 225 ].) This court considered this precise provision of the state's highway contracts in A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State of California, supra . [1] We held that section 9(f) establishes a nonjudicial remedy for the settlement of disputed contract claims; that this remedy must be pursued to completion before recourse to the courts; that the provision has an impact on the scope of judicial inquiry. (

1969Morrill Co. v. State of California (1967) 65 Cal.2d 787, 794-795 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 479 , 423 P.2d 551 ]; A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State of California (1965) 238 Cal. App.2d 736, 742 [ 48 Cal. Rptr. 225 ].) This court considered this precise provision of the state's highway contracts in A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State of California, supra . [1] We held that section 9(f) establishes a nonjudicial remedy for the settlement of disputed contract claims; that this remedy must be pursued to completion before recourse to the courts; that the provision has an impact on the scope of judicial inquiry. (

2014Thus, reversible error is a relative concept, and whether a slight or gross error is ground for reversal depends on the circumstances in each case." [Citation.] [¶] The phrase "miscarriage of justice" has a settled meaning in our law, having been explained in the seminal case of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson).

2014Thus, reversible error is a relative concept, and whether a slight or gross error is ground for reversal depends on the circumstances in each case.’ [Citation.] The phrase ‘miscarriage of justice’ has a settled meaning in our law, having been explained in the seminal case of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal. 2d 818 (Watson).

2014Union v. Long (1898) 123 Cal. 107, 113 [ 55 P. 708 ].) Thus, ELG’s caption announced Major’s membership in that law firm and his concomitant ability to act on behalf of ELG.

2014Union v. Long (1898) 123 Cal. 107, 113 [ 55 P. 708 ].) Thus, ELG’s caption announced Major’s membership in that law firm and his concomitant ability to act on behalf of ELG.

1977(Greenbaum v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 893, 904 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 785 , 544 P.2d 921 ]; Silver v. State Bar, supra, 13 Cal.3d 134, 147 .) The extent of the discipline imposed is determined from a “ ‘balanced consideration of the relevant factors.’ ” (Greenbaum v. State Bar, supra, 15 Cal.3d 893, 904 .) Misappropriation of a client’s property is a gross violation of general morality likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession and therefore merits severe punishment.

1976The extent of the discipline imposed does not derive from a fixed formula but rather is determined from a “balanced consideration of the relevant factors.” (Silver v. State Bar, supra, 13 Cal.3d 134, 146 (9) quoting from Bernstein v. State Bar, 6 Cal.3d 909, 919 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 369 , *905 495 P.2d 1289 ].) “Misappropriation of a client’s property is a gross violation of general morality likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession and therefore merits severe punishment.” (Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal.3d 436, 450 (16) [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 602 , 521 P.2d 858 ]; Brody v. State Bar, s

1974(Walter v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 880, 891 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 833 , 471 P.2d 481 ]; In re Urias (1966) 65 Cal.2d 258, 262 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 881 , 418 P.2d 849 ].) However, there are a number of mitigating factors in petitioner’s case.

1967In re Urias (1966) supra, 65 Cal.2d 258, 262 , stated, “Misappropriation of funds entrusted to an attorney at law is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional ethics and, in addition, is likely to endanger the confidence of the public in the legal profession.

2022(Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263 , 281−282; People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1043 (Salazar).) We review Gross’s claim of Brady error de novo, giving great weight to any underlying factual findings of the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence.

2021Jabbar’s argument rests on the principle that “ ‘criminal negligence only arises from a gross violation of an already existing duty of care.’ ” (People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 207 (Heitzman).) Jabbar argues that “because [he] had no special relationship with [V.L.’s] children, he did not owe a particular duty to the teenagers and could not be convicted of indirect child abuse based on his conduct towards [V.L.].” He argues that he would have a duty of care to refrain from indirectly inflicting harm on the children only if he had a “familial-like relationship with either child or [V.L

2021Specifically, the defendant has a duty of care if the plaintiff “(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress—a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances.” (Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 667-668 (Thing).) The duty of care does not depend on the defendant’s relationship to the person who experiences emot

2021Jabbar’s argument rests on the principle that “ ‘criminal negligence only arises from a gross violation of an already existing duty of care.’ ” (People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 207 (Heitzman).) Jabbar argues that “because [he] had no special relationship with [V.L.’s] children, he did not owe a particular duty to the teenagers and could not be convicted of indirect child abuse based on his conduct towards [V.L.].” He argues that he would have a duty of care to refrain from indirectly inflicting harm on the children only if he had a “familial-like relationship with either child or [V.L

2021Jabbar’s argument rests on the principle that “ ‘criminal negligence only arises from a gross violation of an already existing duty of care.’ ” (People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 207 (Heitzman).) Jabbar argues that “because [he] had no special relationship with [V.L.’s] children, he did not owe a particular duty to the teenagers and could not be convicted of indirect child abuse based on his conduct towards [V.L.].” He argues that he would have a duty of care to refrain from indirectly inflicting harm on the children only if he had a “familial-like relationship with either child or [V.L

2021Jabbar’s argument rests on the principle that “ ‘criminal negligence only arises from a gross violation of an already existing duty of care.’ ” (People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 207 (Heitzman).) Jabbar argues that “because [he] had no special relationship with [V.L.’s] children, he did not owe a particular duty to the teenagers and could not be convicted of indirect child abuse based on his conduct towards [V.L.].” He argues that he would have a duty of care to refrain from indirectly inflicting harm on the children only if he had a “familial-like relationship with either child or [V.L

2021Jabbar’s argument rests on the principle that “ ‘criminal negligence only arises from a gross violation of an already existing duty of care.’ ” (People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 207 (Heitzman).) Jabbar argues that “because [he] had no special relationship with [V.L.’s] children, he did not owe a particular duty to the teenagers and could not be convicted of indirect child abuse based on his conduct towards [V.L.].” He argues that he would have a duty of care to refrain from indirectly inflicting harm on the children only if he had a “familial-like relationship with either child or [V.L

2016This is a gross violation of the California Rules of Court, which require specific citations to the record rather than a single, useless cite that effectively says, “See Record.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) What is more, this is not counsel’s first such transgression.1 Although we are empowered to strike appellants’ entire brief on this basis (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(4); City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1237, 1240 ), we will not penalize appellants for the intransigence of their attorney and will proceed to hear the merits of the appeal.