gross violation (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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gross violation in Pennsylvania

18 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1923–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
JOHNSTON, INC. v. Com., Dept. of Revenuegreen
pa · 1999 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2005–2024
2 sentences

2024Cos., 883 A.2d 562 , 570 n.7 (Pa. 2005) (observing that legislation “may be harsh, so long as [it] is constitutional[;]” “policy determinations . . . are within the exclusive purview of the legislature[;] and it would be a gross violation of the separation of powers doctrine for us to intrude into that arena” (quoting Glenn Johnston, Inc. v. Dep’t of Rev., 726 A.2d 384, 388 (Pa. 1998.))). 8 Villani v. Seibert, 159 A.3d 478, 492 (Pa. 2017) (“[J]udges plainly stand at a disadvantage in the substantive lawmaking process, which also, quite frankly, is often steeped in difficult political judgments

2012Auth., 593 Pa. 184, 192 , 928 A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (2007) ("[I]t is the Legislature's chief function to set public policy and the courts' role to enforce that policy, subject to constitutional limitations."); Glenn Johnston, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Revenue, 556 Pa. 22, 30 , 726 A.2d 384, 388 (1999) (noting, in the context of applying a different tax exemption, that "[s]uch policy determinations, however, are within the exclusive purview of the legislature, and it would be a gross violation of the separation of powers doctrine for us to intrude into that arena").

44
Slater v. Rimar, Inc.green
pa · 1975 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1980–2017
2 sentences

2017Based upon considerations of public -policy, therefore, the law wisely declares that all confidential communications and disclosures, made by a client to his legal adviser for the purpose of obtaining his professional aid or advice, shall be strictly privileged; — that the attorney shall not be permitted, without the consent of his client — and much less ■will.he be compelled — to reveal or disclose communications made to him under such circumstances.’ Slater v. Rimar, Inc., 462 Pa. 138 , 338 A.2d 584, 589 (1975) (citation omitted).

2002“To permit the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed, would be not only a gross violation of a sacred trust upon his part, but it would utterly destroy and prevent the usefulness and benefits to be derived from professional assistance.” Ibid.

14
Brennan v. Brennangreen
pasuperct · 1980 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024This rule states that a lawyer “shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client” without the client’s consent, except “to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary. . . to establish a defense” to a claim against them “based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s ____________________________________________ 7 See also Brennan v. Brennan, 422 A.2d 510, 514 (Pa.Super. 1980) (en banc) (“To permit the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed, would be not only a gross violation

11
Villani v. Seibert Appeal of: Seibertgreen
pa · 2017 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Cos., 883 A.2d 562 , 570 n.7 (Pa. 2005) (observing that legislation “may be harsh, so long as [it] is constitutional[;]” “policy determinations . . . are within the exclusive purview of the legislature[;] and it would be a gross violation of the separation of powers doctrine for us to intrude into that arena” (quoting Glenn Johnston, Inc. v. Dep’t of Rev., 726 A.2d 384, 388 (Pa. 1998.))). 8 Villani v. Seibert, 159 A.3d 478, 492 (Pa. 2017) (“[J]udges plainly stand at a disadvantage in the substantive lawmaking process, which also, quite frankly, is often steeped in difficult political judgments

11
Commonwealth v. Danielsgreen
pasuperct · 2010 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa.Super. 2010).

11
Crystal Lake Camps v. Alfordgreen
pasuperct · 2007 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020Specifically, the trial court reasoned that, under Pa.R.C.P. 126, Cross’s procedural misstep in prematurely filing its Rule 1042.6 notice was excusable, whereas Gross’s “failure to take any of the ____________________________________________ 6“A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which operates as a demurrer to the record.” Crystal Lake Camps v. Afford, 923 A.2d 482, 486 (Pa. Super. 2007). -6- J-A13026-20 actions required by Rule 1042.3” to file timely her COM was not.

11
Commonwealth v. Maguigangreen
pa · 1986 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Commonwealth v. Maguigan [ 511 Pa. 112 ], 511 A.2d 1327, 1333-1334 (Pa.1986) *1004 (emphasis added).

2016Commonwealth v. Maguigan [ 511 Pa. 112 ], 511 A.2d 1327, 1333-1334 (Pa.1986) *1004 (emphasis added).

11
Program Administration Services, Inc. v. Dauphin County General Authoritygreen
pa · 2007 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012Auth., 593 Pa. 184, 192 , 928 A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (2007) ("[I]t is the Legislature's chief function to set public policy and the courts' role to enforce that policy, subject to constitutional limitations."); Glenn Johnston, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Revenue, 556 Pa. 22, 30 , 726 A.2d 384, 388 (1999) (noting, in the context of applying a different tax exemption, that "[s]uch policy determinations, however, are within the exclusive purview of the legislature, and it would be a gross violation of the separation of powers doctrine for us to intrude into that arena").

2012Auth., 593 Pa. 184, 192 , 928 A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (2007) ("[I]t is the Legislature's chief function to set public policy and the courts' role to enforce that policy, subject to constitutional limitations."); Glenn Johnston, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Revenue, 556 Pa. 22, 30 , 726 A.2d 384, 388 (1999) (noting, in the context of applying a different tax exemption, that "[s]uch policy determinations, however, are within the exclusive purview of the legislature, and it would be a gross violation of the separation of powers doctrine for us to intrude into that arena").

11
Pap's A.M. v. City of Eriegreen
pa · 1998 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999See Pap’s A.M. v. Erie, 553 Pa. 348 , 719 A.2d 273, 281 (1998).

1999See Pap’s A.M. v. Erie, 553 Pa. 348 , 719 A.2d 273, 281 (1998).

11
Ischo v. Baileygreen
pa · 1961 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1961–1961
1 sentence

1961See Ischo v. Bailey, 403 Pa. 281 ; Simpkins v. Richey, 192 Pa. Superior Ct. 46 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Swords v. Harleysville Insurance Companies green
pa · 2005
2 sentences

2024Cos., 883 A.2d 562 , 570 n.7 (Pa. 2005) (observing that legislation “may be harsh, so long as [it] is constitutional[;]” “policy determinations . . . are within the exclusive purview of the legislature[;] and it would be a gross violation of the separation of powers doctrine for us to intrude into that arena” (quoting Glenn Johnston, Inc. v. Dep’t of Rev., 726 A.2d 384, 388 (Pa. 1998.))). 8 Villani v. Seibert, 159 A.3d 478, 492 (Pa. 2017) (“[J]udges plainly stand at a disadvantage in the substantive lawmaking process, which also, quite frankly, is often steeped in difficult political judgments

2006Swords II, supra at 395 n. 7, 883 A.2d at 570 n. 7. ¶ 19 Having found that son was ineligible for first-party benefits pursuant to the plain language of § 1714, we need not decide whether the provision in insurer’s policy, excluding first-party benefit coverage for owners of registered motor vehicles who do not have financial responsibility, operates to deny son first-party benefit coverage in this case. ¶ 20 Order granting summary judgment to son reversed; order denying summary judgment to insurer reversed.

22006–2024
Commonwealth v. Hughes green
pa · 2003
1 sentence

2005Suppression Hearing, 2/10/04, at 30. [5] See Hughes, 836 A.2d at 900 , for a discussion of the ability of a co-resident to give consent to search the residence in which he resides. [6] Even if, under these circumstances, the evidence might be subject to suppression by the actual resident of the house, § 331.27b(d)(2) cannot be read to authorize a gross violation of a citizen's privacy and security in his abode.

12005–2005
Gardner v. Repasky green
pa · 1969
2 sentences

1980We note further that no prejudice has been demonstrated to petitioner from this situation, unlike the gross violation of due process present in Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126 , 252 A. 2d 704 (1969), cited by petitioner, and hence, we distinguish the said case from the instant one on that basis.

1980We note further that no prejudice has been demonstrated to petitioner from this situation, unlike the gross violation of due process present in Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126 , 252 A. 2d 704 (1969), cited by petitioner, and hence, we distinguish the said case from the instant one on that basis.

11980–1980
SIMPKINS v. Richey green
pasuperct · 1960
1 sentence

1961See Ischo v. Bailey, 403 Pa. 281 ; Simpkins v. Richey, 192 Pa. Superior Ct. 46 .

11961–1961
West Mahanoy Township's Contested Election green
pa · 1917
1 sentence

1941In Focht’s Appeal, 275 Pa. 449 , this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Simpson, said: “To disfranchise all of the one hundred and sixty-four electors . . . would have been a gross error; such action would not have been justified even if it had appeared that the’ twenty-nine suspicious votes had all been cast for one or another of the candidates.” See also West Mahanoy Township’s Contested Election, 258 Pa. 176 , where this Court held that “the mere casting of fraudulent votes” was not sufficient to throw out the return from the election district.

11941–1941
Focht's Appeal green
pa · 1923
1 sentence

1941In Focht’s Appeal, 275 Pa. 449 , this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Simpson, said: “To disfranchise all of the one hundred and sixty-four electors . . . would have been a gross error; such action would not have been justified even if it had appeared that the’ twenty-nine suspicious votes had all been cast for one or another of the candidates.” See also West Mahanoy Township’s Contested Election, 258 Pa. 176 , where this Court held that “the mere casting of fraudulent votes” was not sufficient to throw out the return from the election district.

11941–1941
Fish's Election green
pa · 1922
1 sentence

1923The conclusion there reached is alone sufficient to determine the present controversy; but, in addition thereto, the appeal to the court below was properly dismissed for the further reason that to disfranchise all of the one hundred and sixty-five electors, who voted in that election district for the proposed nominees for this office, although none of them was shown to have been disqualified, would have been a gross error (Fish’s Election, 273 Pa. 410 ); such action would not have been justified even if it had appeared that the twenty-nine suspicious votes had all been cast for one or another

11923–1923

Where else courts name it

CA 53 (1913–2026) IL 46 (1942–2025) NJ 32 (1937–2025) TX 22 (1867–2019) PA 18 (1923–2024) NY 17 (1874–2016) IN 14 (1874–2025) MI 14 (1863–2023) OH 14 (1908–2023) AK 11 (1978–2026) AL 10 (1923–2023) NC 10 (2006–2025) MD 8 (1908–2011) MN 5 (1897–1998) CO 5 (1896–2019) NE 4 (1995–2016) SD 4 (1980–2016) OR 4 (1974–2024) MT 4 (1896–2011) WI 4 (1938–2020) MO 3 (1879–2025) WY 3 (1988–2021) MA 3 (1960–2009) FL 3 (1939–2002) AZ 3 (1916–2013) VA 2 (1979–2019) WV 2 (1931–2009) TN 2 (1992–2020) DE 2 (1978–2005) CT 2 (1956–1997) AR 2 (1995–1997) LA 2 (1918–2023) ME 2 (1892–1970) ND 2 (1901–1983)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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