Calhoun factors in Ohio

2023Clark No. 04CA43, 2005-Ohio-3874, ¶ 25 (holding that Calhoun’s analysis of affidavits supporting petitions for postconviction relief “comfortably applies to affidavits submitted in support of a motion for a new trial”).

2021No. 04CA43, 2005-Ohio-3874, ¶ 25 (holding that Calhoun's analysis of affidavits supporting petitions for postconviction relief "comfortably applies to affidavits submitted in support No. 20AP-159 19 of a motion for a new trial").

2025State v. Guevarra, 2022-Ohio-1974, ¶ 20-21 (6th Dist.) (adopting the factors of State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 284-85 (1999) for purposes of considering the credibility of affidavits supporting Crim.R. 32.1 motions without a hearing); see also West at ¶ 38-39 (applying Calhoun factors when determining if trial court abused its discretion when wholly discounting the credibility of an affidavit). {¶ 39} Here, the record shows that the judge who reviewed James’s motion did not preside at the plea hearing.

2022Compare Appellee's Brief at 18-25 (prosecutor's Calhoun analysis); compare also, e.g., West, 2017-Ohio-5596, at ¶ 29-40 (First District rejects ineffective assistance of counsel argument for post-sentence plea withdrawal but then analyzes actual innocence affidavit evidence pursuant to Calhoun; Alford-plea case in which movant throughout had made "constant and consistent protestations of innocence," judge who took plea was not judge who denied withdrawal motion, etc.); State v. Mynatt, 1st Dist.

2025In assessing the credibility of an affidavit, the court should consider: “(1) whether the judge reviewing the postconviction petition also presided at the trial, (2) whether multiple affidavits contain nearly identical language, or appear to have been drafted by the same person, (3) whether the affidavits contain or rely on hearsay, (4) whether the affiants are relatives of the petitioner, or are otherwise interested in the outcome of the petition, and Case No. 24 MA 0097 – 18 – (5) whether the affidavits contradict evidence proffered by the defense at trial.” Id. at 285 , citing State v. Moor

2025In assessing the credibility of an affidavit, the court should consider: “(1) whether the judge reviewing the postconviction petition also presided at the trial, (2) whether multiple affidavits contain nearly identical language, or appear to have been drafted by the same person, (3) whether the affidavits contain or rely on hearsay, (4) whether the affiants are relatives of the petitioner, or are otherwise interested in the outcome of the petition, and Case No. 24 MA 0097 – 18 – (5) whether the affidavits contradict evidence proffered by the defense at trial.” Id. at 285 , citing State v. Moor

2025In assessing the credibility of an affidavit, the court should consider: “(1) whether the judge reviewing the postconviction petition also presided at the trial, (2) whether multiple affidavits contain nearly identical language, or appear to have been drafted by the same person, (3) whether the affidavits contain or rely on hearsay, (4) whether the affiants are relatives of the petitioner, or are otherwise interested in the outcome of the petition, and Case No. 24 MA 0097 – 18 – (5) whether the affidavits contradict evidence proffered by the defense at trial.” Id. at 285 , citing State v. Moor

2025In assessing the credibility of an affidavit, the court should consider: “(1) whether the judge reviewing the postconviction petition also presided at the trial, (2) whether multiple affidavits contain nearly identical language, or appear to have been drafted by the same person, (3) whether the affidavits contain or rely on hearsay, (4) whether the affiants are relatives of the petitioner, or are otherwise interested in the outcome of the petition, and Case No. 24 MA 0097 – 18 – (5) whether the affidavits contradict evidence proffered by the defense at trial.” Id. at 285 , citing State v. Moor

2023Butler No. CA2016- 08-159, 2017-Ohio-1403, ¶ 28 (noting that Calhoun stated a nonexclusive list of credibility factors). {¶45} Moreover, as the Calhoun factors are not intended to be exhaustive or exclusive, and because a credibility assessment is a matter of the trial court’s discretion, it was not error for the trial court to apply Calhoun as a tool to determine Williams’ credibility. {¶46} Based on the foregoing, Davis’ first assignment of error is overruled.

2023Butler No. CA2016- 08-159, 2017-Ohio-1403, ¶ 28 (noting that Calhoun stated a nonexclusive list of credibility factors). {¶45} Moreover, as the Calhoun factors are not intended to be exhaustive or exclusive, and because a credibility assessment is a matter of the trial court’s discretion, it was not error for the trial court to apply Calhoun as a tool to determine Williams’ credibility. {¶46} Based on the foregoing, Davis’ first assignment of error is overruled.

2015"The term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶ 19} Hughes argues this court's application of the four-part Calhoun test in Bethel requires a finding that Kreuzer's attorney fees obligation was not discharged in bankruptcy because it was a domestic support obligation.

2015"The term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶ 19} Hughes argues this court's application of the four-part Calhoun test in Bethel requires a finding that Kreuzer's attorney fees obligation was not discharged in bankruptcy because it was a domestic support obligation.

2026In doing so, we explained that “the Calhoun factors are not intended to be exhaustive or exclusive[,]” and that “a credibility assessment is a matter of the trial court’s discretion . . . .” Id.; see State v. Lacy, 2018-Ohio-3249, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.) (“In assessing the credibility of affidavits [attached to a motion for a new trial], the trial court may consider all relevant factors.”). {¶25} Here, the trial court’s decision indicates that it considered the Calhoun factors when assessing the credibility of J.E.’s affidavit.

2026In doing so, we explained that “the Calhoun factors are not intended to be exhaustive or exclusive[,]” and that “a credibility assessment is a matter of the trial court’s discretion . . . .” Id.; see State v. Lacy, 2018-Ohio-3249, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.) (“In assessing the credibility of affidavits [attached to a motion for a new trial], the trial court may consider all relevant factors.”). {¶25} Here, the trial court’s decision indicates that it considered the Calhoun factors when assessing the credibility of J.E.’s affidavit.

2025State v. Guevarra, 2022-Ohio-1974, ¶ 20-21 (6th Dist.) (adopting the factors of State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 284-85 (1999) for purposes of considering the credibility of affidavits supporting Crim.R. 32.1 motions without a hearing); see also West at ¶ 38-39 (applying Calhoun factors when determining if trial court abused its discretion when wholly discounting the credibility of an affidavit). {¶ 39} Here, the record shows that the judge who reviewed James’s motion did not preside at the plea hearing.

2022No. 2016-G-0094, 2017-Ohio-5640, ¶ 14 (applying Calhoun factors in affirming denial of post-sentence motion); State v. Hoffman, 2d Dist.

2022No. 19 CA 29, 2020-Ohio-4118, ¶ 26, 28 (trial court need not hold evidentiary hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea "if the affidavit testimony is deemed to lack credibility"; performing Calhoun analysis in determining that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion with the denial of Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea without holding a hearing"); State v. Pennington, 1st Dist.

2022No. 2006 CA 19, 2006-Ohio-6119, ¶ 36 (using Calhoun factors to evaluate affidavits "in the context of the entire record of the case"). {¶ 22} Here, unlike in Yahya, the trial court did summarize its basis for discounting the affidavit and denying Mr. Little's post-sentence plea withdrawal motion without a hearing.

2022No. 2006 CA 19, 2006-Ohio-6119, ¶ 36 (using Calhoun factors to evaluate affidavits "in the context of the entire record of the case"). {¶ 22} Here, unlike in Yahya, the trial court did summarize its basis for discounting the affidavit and denying Mr. Little's post-sentence plea withdrawal motion without a hearing.

2022No. C-180081, 2019-Ohio-3642, ¶ 35 (same effect); State v. Watters, 11th Dist.

2022No. C-180081, 2019-Ohio-3642, ¶ 35 (same effect); State v. Watters, 11th Dist.

2022No. C-200358, 2021-Ohio-3365, ¶ 14 (trial court "has the discretion to judge the credibility of an affidavit without first conducting an evidentiary hearing on the [post-sentence withdrawal] motion.

2018State v. Henry, 2017-Ohio-7426 , 96 N.E.3d 1123, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.) (“[a]lthough the Calhoun case involved a review of a petition for postconviction relief rather than a motion for new trial, we have held that the Calhoun factors ‘also comfortably appl[y] to affidavits submitted in support of a motion for new trial’”) (citation omitted); State v. Gaines, 1st Dist.

2018State v. Henry, 2017-Ohio-7426 , 96 N.E.3d 1123, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.) (“[a]lthough the Calhoun case involved a review of a petition for postconviction relief rather than a motion for new trial, we have held that the Calhoun factors ‘also comfortably appl[y] to affidavits submitted in support of a motion for new trial’”) (citation omitted); State v. Gaines, 1st Dist.

2017See Robinson, supra, at ¶27-28 , citing State v. Christley, 11th Dist.

2017See Robinson, supra, at ¶27-28 , citing State v. Christley, 11th Dist.

2012See Bays, 87 Ohio St.3d at 25 , quoting 3 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, Section 23.3, at 19 (1984) (“‘[W]here the informant merely provided information concerning the offense,’ the courts ‘have quite consistently held that disclosure is not required.’”).

1998In Calhoun, the Sixth Circuit set forth the following analytical framework courts should employ when determining whether a certain debt, not specifically designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, is “actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.” See Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (C.A.6, 1993), 9 F.3d 517, 520 (explaining Calhoun analysis).

1998“First, the obligation constitutes support only if the state court or parties intended to create a support obligation.” Id. at 520 (citing Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109-1110 ).