Calhoun brief in Alabama

2016"Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial." Newsome v. State , 570 So.2d 703 , 717 (Ala.Crim.App.1989).

2016"Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial." Newsome v. State , 570 So.2d 703 , 717 (Ala.Crim.App.1989).

2016Calhoun also argues that trial counsel's closing argument constituted ineffective assistance because, he says, "[a]t no point did counsel advance an argument by which Mr. Calhoun was not guilty of capital murder or present a viable defense theory on Mr. Calhoun's behalf." (Calhoun's brief, at 87.) Calhoun then cites to Herring v. New York , 422 U.S. 853 , 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550 , 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975), for the general proposition that "no aspect of such advocacy could be more important than the opportunity finally to marshal the evidence for each side before submission of the case to judgment." Ho

2016Calhoun also argues that trial counsel's closing argument constituted ineffective assistance because, he says, "[a]t no point did counsel advance an argument by which Mr. Calhoun was not guilty of capital murder or present a viable defense theory on Mr. Calhoun's behalf." (Calhoun's brief, at 87.) Calhoun then cites to Herring v. New York , 422 U.S. 853 , 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550 , 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975), for the general proposition that "no aspect of such advocacy could be more important than the opportunity finally to marshal the evidence for each side before submission of the case to judgment." Ho

2016Specifically, counsel failed to object to ... the Court's failure to instruct the jury that its findings on mitigating circumstances need not be unanimous for individual jurors to consider such factors in violation of Mills [v. Maryland] , 486 U.S. 367 [ (1988) ]...." (C. 356.) Calhoun's bare allegation was insufficient to satisfy the pleading burden of Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim.

2016Specifically, counsel failed to object to ... the Court's failure to instruct the jury that its findings on mitigating circumstances need not be unanimous for individual jurors to consider such factors in violation of Mills [v. Maryland] , 486 U.S. 367 [ (1988) ]...." (C. 356.) Calhoun's bare allegation was insufficient to satisfy the pleading burden of Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim.

2016In Egbuonu v. State , 993 So.2d 35 , 38-39 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), this Court held: " Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App.

2016In Egbuonu v. State , 993 So.2d 35 , 38-39 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), this Court held: " Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App.

2005He argues, "a new sentencing hearing is required when a trial court fails to find the existence of mitigation before it." (Calhoun's brief at page 21.) As the Alabama Supreme Court stated in Ex parte Giles, 632 So.2d 577 (Ala.1993): "We are aware of no authority for Giles's legal proposition that these [mitigating] *975 factors, assuming they were conclusively established, mandate a sentence of life imprisonment.

2005Second, Calhoun asserts that such an instruction "improperly subsumed the jury's role as an independent evaluator of the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances." (Calhoun's brief at page 106.) However, we have upheld similar instructions, see Snyder v. State, 893 So.2d 488 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), as correct statements of the law.

2005Although evidence of nonstatutory factors, such as that presented by Giles, cannot be excluded from the sentencing tribunal, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), such evidence is only ` potentially mitigating.' Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1672 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (emphasis added).

2005Although evidence of nonstatutory factors, such as that presented by Giles, cannot be excluded from the sentencing tribunal, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), such evidence is only ` potentially mitigating.' Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1672 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (emphasis added).

2005Although evidence of nonstatutory factors, such as that presented by Giles, cannot be excluded from the sentencing tribunal, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), such evidence is only ` potentially mitigating.' Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1672 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (emphasis added).

2005Although evidence of nonstatutory factors, such as that presented by Giles, cannot be excluded from the sentencing tribunal, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), such evidence is only ` potentially mitigating.' Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 , 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1672 , 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (emphasis added).