Husband motion in South Carolina

2019See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 385 , 709 S.E.2d at 651-52 (stating an appellate court reviews the family court's findings de novo, it is not required to ignore the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign 4 Although Husband filed a motion to reconsider pursuant to Rules 52 and 59, SCRCP, the family court dismissed the motion without considering the merits of his claims due to Husband's late filing and service of his memorandum in support.

2019See Lewis, 392 S.C. at 385 , 709 S.E.2d at 651-52 (stating an appellate court reviews the family court's findings de novo, it is not required to ignore the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign 4 Although Husband filed a motion to reconsider pursuant to Rules 52 and 59, SCRCP, the family court dismissed the motion without considering the merits of his claims due to Husband's late filing and service of his memorandum in support.

2024See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 4.

2024See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 4.

2024See Sellers v. Nicholls, 432 S.C. 101 , 113, 851 S.E.2d 54 , 60 (Ct. App. 2020) ("When 'reviewing a family court's evidentiary or procedural rulings,' appellate courts apply 'an abuse of discretion standard.'" (quoting Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593 , 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d 486 , 486 n.2 (2018))); Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 529 , 599 S.E.2d 114, 121 (2004) ("An abuse of discretion occurs either when a court is controlled by some error of law, or where the order is based upon findings of fact lacking evidentiary support."); Pollard v. Cnty. of Florence, 314 S.C. 397, 402 , 444 S.E.2d 534, 536 (

2019See Rule 408, SCRE ("Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount." (emphasis added)); Stoney, 422 S.C. at 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d at 486 n.2 (providing appellate courts review the "family court's evidentiary or procedural rulings . . . using an abuse of discretion standard"); Pittman, 407 S.C. at 149 , 754 S.E.2d at 50

2026See Lynn v. Lynn, 290 S.C. 359, 362 , 350 S.E.2d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding the family court did not err in holding that the husband could not challenge the enforcement of the alimony and child support provisions on appeal from the contempt order, having failed to raise that issue in an appeal from the divorce final order); Doran v. Doran, 288 S.C. 477, 478 , 343 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1986) (providing that when a family court issues a final order which neither party appeals, that order becomes the law of the case).

2026See Lynn v. Lynn, 290 S.C. 359, 362 , 350 S.E.2d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding the family court did not err in holding that the husband could not challenge the enforcement of the alimony and child support provisions on appeal from the contempt order, having failed to raise that issue in an appeal from the divorce final order); Doran v. Doran, 288 S.C. 477, 478 , 343 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1986) (providing that when a family court issues a final order which neither party appeals, that order becomes the law of the case).

2026See Lynn v. Lynn, 290 S.C. 359, 362 , 350 S.E.2d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding the family court did not err in holding that the husband could not challenge the enforcement of the alimony and child support provisions on appeal from the contempt order, having failed to raise that issue in an appeal from the divorce final order); Doran v. Doran, 288 S.C. 477, 478 , 343 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1986) (providing that when a family court issues a final order which neither party appeals, that order becomes the law of the case).

2026See Lynn v. Lynn, 290 S.C. 359, 362 , 350 S.E.2d 403, 405 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding the family court did not err in holding that the husband could not challenge the enforcement of the alimony and child support provisions on appeal from the contempt order, having failed to raise that issue in an appeal from the divorce final order); Doran v. Doran, 288 S.C. 477, 478 , 343 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1986) (providing that when a family court issues a final order which neither party appeals, that order becomes the law of the case).

2026See Simmons, 392 S.C. at 414 , 709 S.E.2d at 667 ("In appeals from the family court, [the appellate court] reviews factual and legal issues de novo."); Rule 60(b), SCRCP ("[T]he court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) [of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure]; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; [or] (5) . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgme

2026See Simmons, 392 S.C. at 414 , 709 S.E.2d at 667 ("In appeals from the family court, [the appellate court] reviews factual and legal issues de novo."); Rule 60(b), SCRCP ("[T]he court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) [of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure]; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; [or] (5) . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgme

2026See Nicholson, 378 S.C. at 537 , 663 S.E.2d at 82 ("The imposition of the preservation requirement upon an appellant is designed to enable the [family] court to rule properly after consideration of all relevant facts, law[,] and arguments."); id. ("An issue is not preserved where the [family] court does not explicitly rule on an argument and the appellant does not make a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment." (quoting Doe v. Roe, 369 S.C. 351, 376 , 631 S.E.2d 317, 330 (Ct. App. 2006))).

2026See Nicholson, 378 S.C. at 537 , 663 S.E.2d at 82 ("The imposition of the preservation requirement upon an appellant is designed to enable the [family] court to rule properly after consideration of all relevant facts, law[,] and arguments."); id. ("An issue is not preserved where the [family] court does not explicitly rule on an argument and the appellant does not make a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment." (quoting Doe v. Roe, 369 S.C. 351, 376 , 631 S.E.2d 317, 330 (Ct. App. 2006))).

2026See Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414 , 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011) ("In appeals from the family court, [the appellate court] reviews factual and legal issues de novo."); S.C.

2026See Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414 , 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011) ("In appeals from the family court, [the appellate court] reviews factual and legal issues de novo."); S.C.

2026See Nicholson, 378 S.C. at 537 , 663 S.E.2d at 82 ("The imposition of the preservation requirement upon an appellant is designed to enable the [family] court to rule properly after consideration of all relevant facts, law[,] and arguments."); id. ("An issue is not preserved where the [family] court does not explicitly rule on an argument and the appellant does not make a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment." (quoting Doe v. Roe, 369 S.C. 351, 376 , 631 S.E.2d 317, 330 (Ct. App. 2006))).

2026See Nicholson, 378 S.C. at 537 , 663 S.E.2d at 82 ("The imposition of the preservation requirement upon an appellant is designed to enable the [family] court to rule properly after consideration of all relevant facts, law[,] and arguments."); id. ("An issue is not preserved where the [family] court does not explicitly rule on an argument and the appellant does not make a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment." (quoting Doe v. Roe, 369 S.C. 351, 376 , 631 S.E.2d 317, 330 (Ct. App. 2006))).

2024See Sellers v. Nicholls, 432 S.C. 101 , 113, 851 S.E.2d 54 , 60 (Ct. App. 2020) ("When 'reviewing a family court's evidentiary or procedural rulings,' appellate courts apply 'an abuse of discretion standard.'" (quoting Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593 , 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d 486 , 486 n.2 (2018))); Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 529 , 599 S.E.2d 114, 121 (2004) ("An abuse of discretion occurs either when a court is controlled by some error of law, or where the order is based upon findings of fact lacking evidentiary support."); Pollard v. Cnty. of Florence, 314 S.C. 397, 402 , 444 S.E.2d 534, 536 (

2024See Sellers v. Nicholls, 432 S.C. 101 , 113, 851 S.E.2d 54 , 60 (Ct. App. 2020) ("When 'reviewing a family court's evidentiary or procedural rulings,' appellate courts apply 'an abuse of discretion standard.'" (quoting Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593 , 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d 486 , 486 n.2 (2018))); Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 529 , 599 S.E.2d 114, 121 (2004) ("An abuse of discretion occurs either when a court is controlled by some error of law, or where the order is based upon findings of fact lacking evidentiary support."); Pollard v. Cnty. of Florence, 314 S.C. 397, 402 , 444 S.E.2d 534, 536 (

2024See Sellers v. Nicholls, 432 S.C. 101 , 113, 851 S.E.2d 54 , 60 (Ct. App. 2020) ("When 'reviewing a family court's evidentiary or procedural rulings,' appellate courts apply 'an abuse of discretion standard.'" (quoting Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593 , 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d 486 , 486 n.2 (2018))); Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 529 , 599 S.E.2d 114, 121 (2004) ("An abuse of discretion occurs either when a court is controlled by some error of law, or where the order is based upon findings of fact lacking evidentiary support."); Pollard v. Cnty. of Florence, 314 S.C. 397, 402 , 444 S.E.2d 534, 536 (

2024See Sellers v. Nicholls, 432 S.C. 101 , 113, 851 S.E.2d 54 , 60 (Ct. App. 2020) ("When 'reviewing a family court's evidentiary or procedural rulings,' appellate courts apply 'an abuse of discretion standard.'" (quoting Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593 , 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d 486 , 486 n.2 (2018))); Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 529 , 599 S.E.2d 114, 121 (2004) ("An abuse of discretion occurs either when a court is controlled by some error of law, or where the order is based upon findings of fact lacking evidentiary support."); Pollard v. Cnty. of Florence, 314 S.C. 397, 402 , 444 S.E.2d 534, 536 (

2022The family court filed a subsequent order addressing attorney's fees, in which it found Wife prevailed on certain issues and ordered Husband to pay Wife $10,099.50 in 1 At the time of trial, Wife was forty-eight and Husband was sixty-six. 2 The family court ordered the record be sealed "[g]iven the vast amount of financial information that was introduced into evidence in this matter and the fact that much of this information deals with [Husband's] business partner[,] who is not a party to this action[,] and the fact that [Wife] is a sitting Magistrate Court Judge." McMillan v. McMillan, 417 S.

2022The family court filed a subsequent order addressing attorney's fees, in which it found Wife prevailed on certain issues and ordered Husband to pay Wife $10,099.50 in 1 At the time of trial, Wife was forty-eight and Husband was sixty-six. 2 The family court ordered the record be sealed "[g]iven the vast amount of financial information that was introduced into evidence in this matter and the fact that much of this information deals with [Husband's] business partner[,] who is not a party to this action[,] and the fact that [Wife] is a sitting Magistrate Court Judge." McMillan v. McMillan, 417 S.

2022See Pirri v. Pirri, 369 S.C. 258 , 268–69, 631 S.E.2d 279, 285 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that barring alimony solely based on an eight-year marriage's length was an error when the parties' standard of living, relative incomes, and the husband's fault in breaking up the marriage favored awarding wife alimony); McDowell v. McDowell, 300 S.C. 96, 100 , 386 S.E.2d 468, 470 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming a family court's alimony award to a husband when the factors supported the court's decision despite the marriage lasting only two and a half years).

2022See Pirri v. Pirri, 369 S.C. 258 , 268–69, 631 S.E.2d 279, 285 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that barring alimony solely based on an eight-year marriage's length was an error when the parties' standard of living, relative incomes, and the husband's fault in breaking up the marriage favored awarding wife alimony); McDowell v. McDowell, 300 S.C. 96, 100 , 386 S.E.2d 468, 470 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming a family court's alimony award to a husband when the factors supported the court's decision despite the marriage lasting only two and a half years).

2022DFAS is "the agency charged with administering and distributing military retired pay." Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 297 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

2022See Pirri v. Pirri, 369 S.C. 258 , 268–69, 631 S.E.2d 279, 285 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that barring alimony solely based on an eight-year marriage's length was an error when the parties' standard of living, relative incomes, and the husband's fault in breaking up the marriage favored awarding wife alimony); McDowell v. McDowell, 300 S.C. 96, 100 , 386 S.E.2d 468, 470 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming a family court's alimony award to a husband when the factors supported the court's decision despite the marriage lasting only two and a half years).

2022See Pirri v. Pirri, 369 S.C. 258 , 268–69, 631 S.E.2d 279, 285 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that barring alimony solely based on an eight-year marriage's length was an error when the parties' standard of living, relative incomes, and the husband's fault in breaking up the marriage favored awarding wife alimony); McDowell v. McDowell, 300 S.C. 96, 100 , 386 S.E.2d 468, 470 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming a family court's alimony award to a husband when the factors supported the court's decision despite the marriage lasting only two and a half years).

2019See M&M Grp., Inc. v. Holmes, 379 S.C. 468, 474-75 , 666 S.E.2d 262, 265 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The grant or denial of a continuance lies with the sound discretion of the trial court and such ruling will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.").

2019See M&M Grp., Inc. v. Holmes, 379 S.C. 468, 474-75 , 666 S.E.2d 262, 265 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The grant or denial of a continuance lies with the sound discretion of the trial court and such ruling will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.").

2019See Rule 408, SCRE ("Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount." (emphasis added)); Stoney, 422 S.C. at 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d at 486 n.2 (providing appellate courts review the "family court's evidentiary or procedural rulings . . . using an abuse of discretion standard"); Pittman, 407 S.C. at 149 , 754 S.E.2d at 50

2019See Rule 408, SCRE ("Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount." (emphasis added)); Stoney, 422 S.C. at 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d at 486 n.2 (providing appellate courts review the "family court's evidentiary or procedural rulings . . . using an abuse of discretion standard"); Pittman, 407 S.C. at 149 , 754 S.E.2d at 50

2019See Rouvet, 388 S.C. at 309 , 696 S.E.2d at 208 ("In determining whether to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1), the court must consider the following factors: '(1) the promptness with which relief is sought; (2) the reasons for the failure to act promptly; (3) the existence of a meritorious defense; and (4) the prejudice to the other party.'" (quoting Mictronics, 345 S.C. at 510–11, 548 S.E.2d at 226 )).

2019See Rouvet, 388 S.C. at 309 , 696 S.E.2d at 208 ("In determining whether to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1), the court must consider the following factors: '(1) the promptness with which relief is sought; (2) the reasons for the failure to act promptly; (3) the existence of a meritorious defense; and (4) the prejudice to the other party.'" (quoting Mictronics, 345 S.C. at 510–11, 548 S.E.2d at 226 )).

2018See E.D.M. , 307 S.C. at 476 -77 , 415 S.E.2d at 816 (stating that when determining whether to award attorney's fees and costs the family court must consider: "(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; [and] (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of living"); see also Buist v. Buist , 410 S.C. 569 , 579, 766 S.E.2d 381 , 386 (2014) (Pleicones, C.J., concurring) (recognizing "the threshold question of entitlement [to fees] always turns, at least in part, on the

2018See E.D.M. , 307 S.C. at 476 -77 , 415 S.E.2d at 816 (stating that when determining whether to award attorney's fees and costs the family court must consider: "(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; [and] (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of living"); see also Buist v. Buist , 410 S.C. 569 , 579, 766 S.E.2d 381 , 386 (2014) (Pleicones, C.J., concurring) (recognizing "the threshold question of entitlement [to fees] always turns, at least in part, on the

2018See Woods v. Woods , 418 S.C. 100 , 124, 790 S.E.2d 906 , 918 (Ct. App. 2016) ("Whe[n] beneficial results are reversed on appeal, the attorney's fee award, or lack thereof, must also be reconsidered.").

2018See Woods v. Woods , 418 S.C. 100 , 124, 790 S.E.2d 906 , 918 (Ct. App. 2016) ("Whe[n] beneficial results are reversed on appeal, the attorney's fee award, or lack thereof, must also be reconsidered.").

2018See Smith , 386 S.C. at 268 n.3, 687 S.E.2d at 729 n.3 (providing the failure to file a gift tax return "is not dispositive on the issue of whether a gift was actually given").

2018See Smith , 386 S.C. at 268 n.3, 687 S.E.2d at 729 n.3 (providing the failure to file a gift tax return "is not dispositive on the issue of whether a gift was actually given").

2018See E.D.M. , 307 S.C. at 476 -77 , 415 S.E.2d at 816 (stating that when determining whether to award attorney's fees and costs the family court must consider: "(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; [and] (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of living"); see also Buist v. Buist , 410 S.C. 569 , 579, 766 S.E.2d 381 , 386 (2014) (Pleicones, C.J., concurring) (recognizing "the threshold question of entitlement [to fees] always turns, at least in part, on the

2018See E.D.M. , 307 S.C. at 476 -77 , 415 S.E.2d at 816 (stating that when determining whether to award attorney's fees and costs the family court must consider: "(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; [and] (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of living"); see also Buist v. Buist , 410 S.C. 569 , 579, 766 S.E.2d 381 , 386 (2014) (Pleicones, C.J., concurring) (recognizing "the threshold question of entitlement [to fees] always turns, at least in part, on the

2017See DiMarco v. DiMarco, 399 S.C. 295, 301 , 731 S.E.2d 617, 620 (Ct. App. 2012) (stating an issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the appellant raises the argument in his or her brief but does not support it with any authority); id. (declining to address the appellant's argument on the merits because he "failed to cite any case law or authority to support his argument, and therefore . . . abandoned [it] on appeal"). 4.

2017See DiMarco v. DiMarco, 399 S.C. 295, 301 , 731 S.E.2d 617, 620 (Ct. App. 2012) (stating an issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the appellant raises the argument in his or her brief but does not support it with any authority); id. (declining to address the appellant's argument on the merits because he "failed to cite any case law or authority to support his argument, and therefore . . . abandoned [it] on appeal"). 4.

2017Auth., 343 S.C. 424 , 437, 540 S.E.2d 113 , 120 (Ct. App. 2000) ("An issue is deemed abandoned if the argument in the brief is only conclusory."); Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S.C. 401, 418-19 , 505 S.E.2d 344, 353 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding the family court did not abuse its discretion in declining to interview an eleven-year-old child in a custody proceeding). 2.

2017Auth., 343 S.C. 424 , 437, 540 S.E.2d 113 , 120 (Ct. App. 2000) ("An issue is deemed abandoned if the argument in the brief is only conclusory."); Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S.C. 401, 418-19 , 505 S.E.2d 344, 353 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding the family court did not abuse its discretion in declining to interview an eleven-year-old child in a custody proceeding). 2.

2017Auth., 343 S.C. 424 , 437, 540 S.E.2d 113 , 120 (Ct. App. 2000) ("An issue is deemed abandoned if the argument in the brief is only conclusory."); Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S.C. 401, 418-19 , 505 S.E.2d 344, 353 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding the family court did not abuse its discretion in declining to interview an eleven-year-old child in a custody proceeding). 2.

2017Auth., 343 S.C. 424 , 437, 540 S.E.2d 113 , 120 (Ct. App. 2000) ("An issue is deemed abandoned if the argument in the brief is only conclusory."); Dodge v. Dodge, 332 S.C. 401, 418-19 , 505 S.E.2d 344, 353 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding the family court did not abuse its discretion in declining to interview an eleven-year-old child in a custody proceeding). 2.