17 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1897–2023 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hines v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.green2 sentences2020MYERS Opinion of the Court v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 191 N.C. 2020MYERS Opinion of the Court v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 191 N.C. | 2 | 2 |
Howse v. Bank of Am., N.A.green1 sentence2023Our Supreme Court has instructed that “[o]rdinarily it is error for a court to hear and rule on a motion for summary judgment when discovery procedures, which might lead to the production of evidence relevant to the motion, are still pending and the party seeking discovery has not been dilatory in doing so.” Conover v. Newton, 297 N.C. 506, 512 , 256 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1979); see also Howse v. Bank of America, 255 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Conover v. Newtongreen2 sentences2023Our Supreme Court has instructed that “[o]rdinarily it is error for a court to hear and rule on a motion for summary judgment when discovery procedures, which might lead to the production of evidence relevant to the motion, are still pending and the party seeking discovery has not been dilatory in doing so.” Conover v. Newton, 297 N.C. 506, 512 , 256 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1979); see also Howse v. Bank of America, 255 N.C. 2023Our Supreme Court has instructed that “[o]rdinarily it is error for a court to hear and rule on a motion for summary judgment when discovery procedures, which might lead to the production of evidence relevant to the motion, are still pending and the party seeking discovery has not been dilatory in doing so.” Conover v. Newton, 297 N.C. 506, 512 , 256 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1979); see also Howse v. Bank of America, 255 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Mooregreen2 sentences2019See id. at 658-59 , 424 S.E.2d at 675 . *364 Because Husband presented no evidence to rebut the regularity of the notarization of the Agreement, and Wife's evidence, particularly the Agreement itself, supported the presumption of regularity of the notarization, the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the Agreement was void because it was not properly acknowledged. 2019See id. at 658-59 , 424 S.E.2d at 675 . *364 Because Husband presented no evidence to rebut the regularity of the notarization of the Agreement, and Wife's evidence, particularly the Agreement itself, supported the presumption of regularity of the notarization, the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the Agreement was void because it was not properly acknowledged. | 1 | 1 |
WAR EAGLE, INC. v. Belairgreen1 sentence2019App. 722 , 723, 697 S.E.2d 406 , 407 (2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also War Eagle, Inc. v. Belair , 204 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2018Neither the order nor Husband's brief separates the issues of classification, valuation, and distribution, but to review the issues, we must separate them. "[E]quitable distribution is a three-step process; the trial court must (1) determine *98 what is marital and divisible property; (2) find the net value of the property; and (3) make an equitable distribution of that property." Robinson , 210 N.C. 2018App. at 323 , 707 S.E.2d at 789 (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Byrd v. Byrdgreen1 sentence2018See generally id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Collins v. Collins
green
2 sentences2021App. at 50 , 196 S.E.2d at 286 , and the trial court did not err in allowing Husband’s motion to dismiss Wife’s motion in the cause in File No. 18 CVD 201. 2021App. at 50 , 196 S.E.2d at 286 , and the trial court did not err in allowing Husband’s motion to dismiss Wife’s motion in the cause in File No. 18 CVD 201. | 4 | 2021–2021 |
Hodges v. Moore
green
2 sentences2019The trial court conducted a bench trial, not a summary judgment hearing, and we make this determination based upon several factors: (1) Neither party had filed a motion for summary judgment and neither had filed any affidavits or other evidence which could support a ruling on summary judgment; (2) neither party expected or requested a summary judgment hearing; the trial court determined sua sponte to treat Husband's motion to dismiss as a summary judgment motion; and *357 (3) the trial court made findings of fact, "and summary judgment presupposes that there are no triable issues of material f 2019App. 722 , 723, 697 S.E.2d 406 , 407 (2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also War Eagle, Inc. v. Belair , 204 N.C. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Shingledecker v. Shingledecker
green
2 sentences2018In accord with *112 Shingledecker , Husband's motion to dismiss "is not properly presented by this appeal." Id. at 787 , 407 S.E.2d at 591 . 2018In accord with *112 Shingledecker , Husband's motion to dismiss "is not properly presented by this appeal." Id. at 787 , 407 S.E.2d at 591 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Parslow v. Parslow
green
1 sentence1983App. 84 , 266 S.E. 2d 746 (1980), in which this Court held that where the husband possessed a good faith belief that he owned or would own an interest in the value of the improvements he made on his wife’s property and those improvements inured to the wife’s benefit, the husband had a claim sufficient to support an equitable lien under the unjust enrichment doctrine. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
McRae v. McRae
green
2 sentences1981Peercy v. Peercy, 154 Colo. 575 , 392 P. 2d 609 , (1964); McRae v. McRae, 115 N.H. 353 , 341 A. 2d 762 (1975), where the Court said: In this case the husband did not challenge paternity until more than three and one-half years after the final divorce decree was granted and almost five years after he had returned to Keene where he allegedly discovered the new “reliable information” that he might not be the natural father of Denise Ann. 1981Peercy v. Peercy, 154 Colo. 575 , 392 P. 2d 609 , (1964); McRae v. McRae, 115 N.H. 353 , 341 A. 2d 762 (1975), where the Court said: In this case the husband did not challenge paternity until more than three and one-half years after the final divorce decree was granted and almost five years after he had returned to Keene where he allegedly discovered the new “reliable information” that he might not be the natural father of Denise Ann. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Peercy v. Peercy
green
2 sentences1981Peercy v. Peercy, 154 Colo. 575 , 392 P. 2d 609 , (1964); McRae v. McRae, 115 N.H. 353 , 341 A. 2d 762 (1975), where the Court said: In this case the husband did not challenge paternity until more than three and one-half years after the final divorce decree was granted and almost five years after he had returned to Keene where he allegedly discovered the new “reliable information” that he might not be the natural father of Denise Ann. 1981Peercy v. Peercy, 154 Colo. 575 , 392 P. 2d 609 , (1964); McRae v. McRae, 115 N.H. 353 , 341 A. 2d 762 (1975), where the Court said: In this case the husband did not challenge paternity until more than three and one-half years after the final divorce decree was granted and almost five years after he had returned to Keene where he allegedly discovered the new “reliable information” that he might not be the natural father of Denise Ann. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
GENERAL AIR CONDITIONING COMPANY v. Douglass
green
2 sentences1981In Air Conditioning Co. v. Douglass, 241 N.C. 170 , 84 S.E.2d 828 (1954), this Court held that a husband’s dealings with a creditor did not automatically bind the wife, and thus did not allow the creditor to attach a lien to the entirety property. 1981In Air Conditioning Co. v. Douglass, 241 N.C. 170 , 84 S.E.2d 828 (1954), this Court held that a husband’s dealings with a creditor did not automatically bind the wife, and thus did not allow the creditor to attach a lien to the entirety property. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Southard v. . Southard
neutral
2 sentences1951It has been repeatedly held by this Court that on a motion of this kind, in an action brought under the provisions of G.S. 50-16, the judge is not required to find the facts as a basis for his order for temporary subsistence of the wife, except when her adultery is alleged by the husband as a bar to her recovery, Phillips v. Phillips, 223 N.C. 276 , 25 S.E. 2d 848 ; Holloway v. Holloway, 214 N.C. 662 , 200 S.E. 436 ; Southard v. Southard, 208 N.C. 392 , 180 S.E. 665 ; Byerly v. Byerly, 194 N.C. 532 , 140 S.E. 158 ; McManus v. McManus, supra, although it is better for him to do so when the fact 1951It has been repeatedly held by this Court that on a motion of this kind, in an action brought under the provisions of G.S. 50-16, the judge is not required to find the facts as a basis for his order for temporary subsistence of the wife, except when her adultery is alleged by the husband as a bar to her recovery, Phillips v. Phillips, 223 N.C. 276 , 25 S.E. 2d 848 ; Holloway v. Holloway, 214 N.C. 662 , 200 S.E. 436 ; Southard v. Southard, 208 N.C. 392 , 180 S.E. 665 ; Byerly v. Byerly, 194 N.C. 532 , 140 S.E. 158 ; McManus v. McManus, supra, although it is better for him to do so when the fact | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Byerly v. . Byerly
green
2 sentences1951It has been repeatedly held by this Court that on a motion of this kind, in an action brought under the provisions of G.S. 50-16, the judge is not required to find the facts as a basis for his order for temporary subsistence of the wife, except when her adultery is alleged by the husband as a bar to her recovery, Phillips v. Phillips, 223 N.C. 276 , 25 S.E. 2d 848 ; Holloway v. Holloway, 214 N.C. 662 , 200 S.E. 436 ; Southard v. Southard, 208 N.C. 392 , 180 S.E. 665 ; Byerly v. Byerly, 194 N.C. 532 , 140 S.E. 158 ; McManus v. McManus, supra, although it is better for him to do so when the fact 1951It has been repeatedly held by this Court that on a motion of this kind, in an action brought under the provisions of G.S. 50-16, the judge is not required to find the facts as a basis for his order for temporary subsistence of the wife, except when her adultery is alleged by the husband as a bar to her recovery, Phillips v. Phillips, 223 N.C. 276 , 25 S.E. 2d 848 ; Holloway v. Holloway, 214 N.C. 662 , 200 S.E. 436 ; Southard v. Southard, 208 N.C. 392 , 180 S.E. 665 ; Byerly v. Byerly, 194 N.C. 532 , 140 S.E. 158 ; McManus v. McManus, supra, although it is better for him to do so when the fact | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Holloway v. . Holloway
neutral
2 sentences1951It has been repeatedly held by this Court that on a motion of this kind, in an action brought under the provisions of G.S. 50-16, the judge is not required to find the facts as a basis for his order for temporary subsistence of the wife, except when her adultery is alleged by the husband as a bar to her recovery, Phillips v. Phillips, 223 N.C. 276 , 25 S.E. 2d 848 ; Holloway v. Holloway, 214 N.C. 662 , 200 S.E. 436 ; Southard v. Southard, 208 N.C. 392 , 180 S.E. 665 ; Byerly v. Byerly, 194 N.C. 532 , 140 S.E. 158 ; McManus v. McManus, supra, although it is better for him to do so when the fact 1951It has been repeatedly held by this Court that on a motion of this kind, in an action brought under the provisions of G.S. 50-16, the judge is not required to find the facts as a basis for his order for temporary subsistence of the wife, except when her adultery is alleged by the husband as a bar to her recovery, Phillips v. Phillips, 223 N.C. 276 , 25 S.E. 2d 848 ; Holloway v. Holloway, 214 N.C. 662 , 200 S.E. 436 ; Southard v. Southard, 208 N.C. 392 , 180 S.E. 665 ; Byerly v. Byerly, 194 N.C. 532 , 140 S.E. 158 ; McManus v. McManus, supra, although it is better for him to do so when the fact | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Phillips v. . Phillips
neutral
2 sentences1951It has been repeatedly held by this Court that on a motion of this kind, in an action brought under the provisions of G.S. 50-16, the judge is not required to find the facts as a basis for his order for temporary subsistence of the wife, except when her adultery is alleged by the husband as a bar to her recovery, Phillips v. Phillips, 223 N.C. 276 , 25 S.E. 2d 848 ; Holloway v. Holloway, 214 N.C. 662 , 200 S.E. 436 ; Southard v. Southard, 208 N.C. 392 , 180 S.E. 665 ; Byerly v. Byerly, 194 N.C. 532 , 140 S.E. 158 ; McManus v. McManus, supra, although it is better for him to do so when the fact 1951It has been repeatedly held by this Court that on a motion of this kind, in an action brought under the provisions of G.S. 50-16, the judge is not required to find the facts as a basis for his order for temporary subsistence of the wife, except when her adultery is alleged by the husband as a bar to her recovery, Phillips v. Phillips, 223 N.C. 276 , 25 S.E. 2d 848 ; Holloway v. Holloway, 214 N.C. 662 , 200 S.E. 436 ; Southard v. Southard, 208 N.C. 392 , 180 S.E. 665 ; Byerly v. Byerly, 194 N.C. 532 , 140 S.E. 158 ; McManus v. McManus, supra, although it is better for him to do so when the fact | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Allen v. . Allen
green
1 sentence1926Allen v. Allen, 180 N. C., 465 . | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Heath, Morrow & Co. v. Morgan
neutral
1 sentence1897Heath v. Morgan , 117 N.C. 504 , was an action for personal property unlawfully withheld by the wife whose husband had abandoned her and could not be served with process, and it was held that the nonjoinder of the husband was no defense. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.