Husband motion in Georgia

2015See BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Wedereit, 297 Ga. 313 ( 773 SE2d 711 ) (2015).

2015See BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Wedereit, 297 Ga. 313 ( 773 SE2d 711 ) (2015).

2024Wife argues that the trial court erred when it granted Husband’s motion to compel her to produce a variety of documents and ordering her to pay Husband $9,000 in attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-37. “[A] trial court has broad discretion to control discovery, including the imposition of sanctions, and this Court will not reverse a trial court’s decision on discovery matters absent a clear abuse of discretion.”(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anglin v. Smith, 346 Ga. App. 456, 462 (2) ( 816 SE2d 426 ) (2018).

2024Wife argues that the trial court erred when it granted Husband’s motion to compel her to produce a variety of documents and ordering her to pay Husband $9,000 in attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-37. “[A] trial court has broad discretion to control discovery, including the imposition of sanctions, and this Court will not reverse a trial court’s decision on discovery matters absent a clear abuse of discretion.”(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anglin v. Smith, 346 Ga. App. 456, 462 (2) ( 816 SE2d 426 ) (2018).

2024See City of Griffin v. Jackson, 239 Ga. App. 374, 378 (1) ( 520 SE2d 510 ) (1999). 10 In light of this finding, we vacate the trial court’s award of attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-37 and remand the case to the trial court for further consideration of the amount to be awarded, if any.

2024See City of Griffin v. Jackson, 239 Ga. App. 374, 378 (1) ( 520 SE2d 510 ) (1999). 10 In light of this finding, we vacate the trial court’s award of attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-37 and remand the case to the trial court for further consideration of the amount to be awarded, if any.

2023See id. at 127 (1); Russ v. Russ, 272 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 530 SE2d 469 ) (2000).

2023See id. at 127 (1); Russ v. Russ, 272 Ga. 438, 440 (3) ( 530 SE2d 469 ) (2000).

2021Throughout his brief, Husband also argues that the trial court failed “to consider, rule and decide the case [itself] and to follow the applicable law in doing so[.]” As explained in the divisions above, the trial court’s determinations were supported by the evidence and in accordance with applicable law.29 “The trial judge is presumed to . . . faithfully and lawfully perform his or her duties[,]” and Husband Husband, because it resulted in a lower equity share for Wife and the court awarded Husband ownership of the house. 29 See Carson, 277 Ga. at 336 (1). 13 has not rebutted this presumption

2019See Jones v. Jones , 298 Ga. 762 , 765 (1), 787 S.E.2d 682 (2016) ("Except for those alleging lack of jurisdiction, [a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 ] must be made within three years of the entry of the challenged judgment.").

2019See Jones v. Jones , 298 Ga. 762 , 765 (1), 787 S.E.2d 682 (2016) ("Except for those alleging lack of jurisdiction, [a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 ] must be made within three years of the entry of the challenged judgment.").

2018See Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 ( 799 SE2d 160 ) (2017) (an appeal in a domestic relations case in which custody is not at issue must be brought by discretionary application).

2018See Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 ( 799 SE2d 160 ) (2017) (an appeal in a domestic relations case in which custody is not at issue must be brought by discretionary application).

2017The trial court erred in granting, in part, Husband’s motion to set aside because he was bound by his admission of jurisdiction and waiver of the defense of insufficiency of service. 2 See Maples v. Maples, 289 Ga. 560, 562 (2) ( 713 SE2d 865 ) (2011). 6 2.

2017The trial court erred in granting, in part, Husband’s motion to set aside because he was bound by his admission of jurisdiction and waiver of the defense of insufficiency of service. 2 See Maples v. Maples, 289 Ga. 560, 562 (2) ( 713 SE2d 865 ) (2011). 6 2.

2016Husband then filed a timely notice of appeal. *138 In Kent v. Kent, 289 Ga. 821 ( 716 SE2d 212 ) (2011), this Court reiterated the longstanding, bright-line procedural rule that a party’s right to a transcript of a civil proceeding is not waived “unless the [trial] court makes a ruling ‘at the commencement of the hearing’ that the party ‘expressly refused,’by “ ‘direct and appropriate language,’ ” to share in the costs of the takedown.” Id. at 824 (quoting Giddings v. Starks, 240 Ga. 496, 496-497 ( 241 SE2d 208 ) (1978)).

2016Husband then filed a timely notice of appeal. *138 In Kent v. Kent, 289 Ga. 821 ( 716 SE2d 212 ) (2011), this Court reiterated the longstanding, bright-line procedural rule that a party’s right to a transcript of a civil proceeding is not waived “unless the [trial] court makes a ruling ‘at the commencement of the hearing’ that the party ‘expressly refused,’by “ ‘direct and appropriate language,’ ” to share in the costs of the takedown.” Id. at 824 (quoting Giddings v. Starks, 240 Ga. 496, 496-497 ( 241 SE2d 208 ) (1978)).

2016Husband then filed a timely notice of appeal. *138 In Kent v. Kent, 289 Ga. 821 ( 716 SE2d 212 ) (2011), this Court reiterated the longstanding, bright-line procedural rule that a party’s right to a transcript of a civil proceeding is not waived “unless the [trial] court makes a ruling ‘at the commencement of the hearing’ that the party ‘expressly refused,’by “ ‘direct and appropriate language,’ ” to share in the costs of the takedown.” Id. at 824 (quoting Giddings v. Starks, 240 Ga. 496, 496-497 ( 241 SE2d 208 ) (1978)).

2016Husband then filed a timely notice of appeal. *138 In Kent v. Kent, 289 Ga. 821 ( 716 SE2d 212 ) (2011), this Court reiterated the longstanding, bright-line procedural rule that a party’s right to a transcript of a civil proceeding is not waived “unless the [trial] court makes a ruling ‘at the commencement of the hearing’ that the party ‘expressly refused,’by “ ‘direct and appropriate language,’ ” to share in the costs of the takedown.” Id. at 824 (quoting Giddings v. Starks, 240 Ga. 496, 496-497 ( 241 SE2d 208 ) (1978)).

2014See Farris v. Farris, 285 Ga. 331, 333-334 ( 676 SE2d 212 ) (2009).

2014See Farris v. Farris, 285 Ga. 331, 333-334 ( 676 SE2d 212 ) (2009).

2013See Kuriatnyk, 286 Ga. at 592 .

2012See Moccia v. Moccia, 277 Ga. 571, 572 ( 592 SE2d 664 ) (2004) (affirming denial of motion to reduce child support where the evidence did not “demand” a finding in favor of the party requesting modification). 8.

2012See Moccia v. Moccia, 277 Ga. 571, 572 ( 592 SE2d 664 ) (2004) (affirming denial of motion to reduce child support where the evidence did not “demand” a finding in favor of the party requesting modification). 8.

2010See generally Brown v. Frachiseur, 247 Ga. 463, 464 , 277 S.E.2d 16 (1981). [3] 2.

2010See generally Brown v. Frachiseur, 247 Ga. 463, 464 , 277 S.E.2d 16 (1981). [3] 2.

2009See Ledford v. Meyer, 249 Ga. 407, 408 (2), 290 S.E.2d 908 (1982) (A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless the averments in the complaint disclose with certainty that a party "would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proven in support of the claim.") (citation and punctuation omitted).

2009See Ledford v. Meyer, 249 Ga. 407, 408 (2), 290 S.E.2d 908 (1982) (A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless the averments in the complaint disclose with certainty that a party "would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proven in support of the claim.") (citation and punctuation omitted).

2008See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8 (1) ( 655 SE2d 611 ) (2008). 2 (b) Similarly, we find no merit to Husband’s claim that the trial court’s division of marital assets is unfair. “[A]n equitable division of marital property does not necessarily mean an equal division.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fuller v. Fuller, 279 Ga. 805, 808 (3) ( 621 SE2d 419 ) (2005).

2008See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8 (1) ( 655 SE2d 611 ) (2008). 2 (b) Similarly, we find no merit to Husband’s claim that the trial court’s division of marital assets is unfair. “[A]n equitable division of marital property does not necessarily mean an equal division.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fuller v. Fuller, 279 Ga. 805, 808 (3) ( 621 SE2d 419 ) (2005).

2008See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8 (1) ( 655 SE2d 611 ) (2008). 2 (b) Similarly, we find no merit to Husband’s claim that the trial court’s division of marital assets is unfair. “[A]n equitable division of marital property does not necessarily mean an equal division.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fuller v. Fuller, 279 Ga. 805, 808 (3) ( 621 SE2d 419 ) (2005).

2008See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8 (1) ( 655 SE2d 611 ) (2008). 2 (b) Similarly, we find no merit to Husband’s claim that the trial court’s division of marital assets is unfair. “[A]n equitable division of marital property does not necessarily mean an equal division.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fuller v. Fuller, 279 Ga. 805, 808 (3) ( 621 SE2d 419 ) (2005).

2007Wife further contends that, even if it was timely filed, Husband’s motion for new trial nevertheless was not a proper post-judgment procedural vehicle by which he could obtain review of the final judgment. “ ‘A motion for a new trial is a proper means of seeking a retrial or reexamination, in the same court, of an issue of fact, or of some part or portion thereof, after decision by a jury or a decision by the court thereon.’ [Cit.]” Eldridge v. Ireland, 259 Ga. App. 44, 47 (2) ( 576 SE2d 44 ) (2002).

2007Wife further contends that, even if it was timely filed, Husband’s motion for new trial nevertheless was not a proper post-judgment procedural vehicle by which he could obtain review of the final judgment. “ ‘A motion for a new trial is a proper means of seeking a retrial or reexamination, in the same court, of an issue of fact, or of some part or portion thereof, after decision by a jury or a decision by the court thereon.’ [Cit.]” Eldridge v. Ireland, 259 Ga. App. 44, 47 (2) ( 576 SE2d 44 ) (2002).

2007See Mitchell v. Oliver, 254 Ga. 112 (1) ( 327 SE2d 216 ) (1985).

2007See Mitchell v. Oliver, 254 Ga. 112 (1) ( 327 SE2d 216 ) (1985).

2007In urging that Husband’s motion for new trial was untimely, Wife relies on the following language from Moore v. Farmers Bank of Union Point, 182 Ga. App. 94, 95 (1) ( 354 SE2d 692 ) (1987): “An order granting a motion to enforce a disputed settlement agreement is tantamount to a final judgment and constitutes an order finally terminating the case. [Cit.]” She contends that, if the grant of her motion to enforce the settlement is the equivalent of a final judgment which ended the case, then he should have filed his motion for new trial within 30 days of the entry of that order.

2007In urging that Husband’s motion for new trial was untimely, Wife relies on the following language from Moore v. Farmers Bank of Union Point, 182 Ga. App. 94, 95 (1) ( 354 SE2d 692 ) (1987): “An order granting a motion to enforce a disputed settlement agreement is tantamount to a final judgment and constitutes an order finally terminating the case. [Cit.]” She contends that, if the grant of her motion to enforce the settlement is the equivalent of a final judgment which ended the case, then he should have filed his motion for new trial within 30 days of the entry of that order.

2007Compare Brown v. Brown, 269 Ga. 724 ( 506 SE2d 108 ) (1998).

2007Compare Brown v. Brown, 269 Ga. 724 ( 506 SE2d 108 ) (1998).

2006Compare Period Homes v. Wallick, supra at 489 (2).

2006Compare Period Homes v. Wallick, supra at 489(2), 569 S.E.2d 502 .